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Abstract

This dissertation is a study in literature and politics and proceeds by tracing out the major
political themes of McCarthy’s body of fiction and analyzing them toward their logical
conclusions. The critical approach in this narrative-based anthropology looks at man first in
profound isolation and then progresses through his novels in sequence, in an increasingly social
context. McCarthy’s later fiction displays an increasingly affirmative view of the sacredness of
human life and of the basic impulse toward community in even the most unreflective of
characters; an essential characteristic of humans.
To call any of McCarthy’s works a “political novel” would be absurd. Apocalyptic
fiction has rarely, if ever, been overtly or consistently political in terms of its subject matter or
intended audience. Rather, I find in McCarthy’s novels an artistic or poetic utterance that speaks
to discomforting realities of experience while simultaneously sublimating the particularities of
experience, however immediate, into a mythic plane. In this textual world, with its apocalyptic
backdrop and mythical sublime, I construct an analytical framework for exploring the political
ideas that appear and reappear throughout all of McCarthy’s work. Though interrelated,
narrative, nature, history, witnessing, agency, and order are broad conceptual categories within
which I discuss essential political questions.
McCarthy’s political vision demonstrates the general failure of politics to do what politics
is supposed to do. The political or sovereign power in McCarthy’s world may be said to attempt
to provide for an ordered environment for human existence, even with nominal liberty. But it
fails in any meaningful way to protect men from each other and from themselves or to advance
any notion of the good life. Indeed, his reader is frequently left to ponder exactly what might
even be said to constitute the good life in McCarthy’s fiction. Is this failure of the political the
ix

result of some deficiency in our laws or political institutions? No. The failure results from our
gross misunderstanding of our place in the order of the world. It results from our inability to
accept our fundamental loneliness in the world.

x

Introduction

Cormac McCarthy is not commonly regarded as a political writer. His works express a
strong preference for rural or frontier settings, a world beyond the city gates and the effective
reach of positive law. They display a general ambivalence regarding the political as commonly
depicted. Even in domestic scenes the familiar sense of stability and security accompanying a
settled or civilized way of life is never a given. By omitting familiar power structures and
symbolic representations of the state, he calls into question the bases of common philosophical
assumptions regarding man’s fundamental nature. His frequent presentation of the natural
human condition as one of hostility and violence challenges traditional approaches to moral or
ethical life. This would explain, at least in part, why the political dimensions of McCarthy’s
vision remain an impoverished topic of scholarly inquiry by political theorists. This oversight is
unfortunate for both the fields of political theory and literary criticism, as McCarthy’s fiction is
deeply resonant with established themes in both literatures. Indeed, many of his signature tropes
connect with a long tradition in American intellectual life wherein novelists have taken up the
role of political philosophers, using their fiction as a means of examining the fundamental
assumptions of liberal democracy.1
McCarthy’s fourteen novels, plays, short stories, and screenplays comprising his body of
fiction range in terms of character, setting, and narrative style, but are thematically linked by a
set of three persistent concerns: freedom, violence, and the relation of the self to the other.
McCarthy’s fiction is typified by his ongoing and developing interest in the place and power of

1

See Paul A. Cantor, “Literature and Politics: Understanding the Regime,” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol.
28, No. 2 (June 1995), 192-195; Zuckert, Catherine “On Reading Classic American Novelists as Political Thinkers,”
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Aug., 1981), 683-706.
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myth in the realm of human affairs. Over the course his lengthy career, McCarthy’s fiction
presents an ongoing interrogation into the mythic convergence of the particular and the universal.
Broadly considered, each of his works reveals some partial aspect of this mythic project in which
the story of one man, bound by particularities of place and time, sublimates into an ongoing story
that is common to all men in all places and at all times. The imagery McCarthy employs as a
means to suggest this mythic or narrative substance to reality is that of a man on a journey. This
story, as one of his oracular characters expresses it, is the story: “Ultimately every man’s path is
every other’s. There are no separate journeys for there are no separate men to make them. All
men are one and there is no other tale to tell.”2 My political interpretation of McCarthy’s fiction
begins with the central idea of story in McCarthy’s corpus, using it as a way to frame the later
chapters. The notion of a literary project dedicated to the articulation of the one tale that is the
tale of all, something that is true for all men at all places and at all times, would align
McCarthy’s fiction with the most basic aims of philosophy. Basic questions of ontology and
epistemology—whether one defines philosophy broadly as a systematic description of reality or
of experience—are at the heart of this enterprise. To wit: what it is to be, to know, and to act, in
a world that provides few answers to life’s most difficult questions. McCarthy’s fiction abounds
with formulations (and re-formulations) of these questions, though rarely positing any definitive
conclusions.
The existing scholarly research on McCarthy tends to coalesce around three overarching
themes that dominate McCarthy’s entire body of work. Literary theorists have productively
engaged McCarthy’s preoccupations with violence, freedom, and identity with an array of
compelling interpretive frameworks. And yet, insofar as these major themes in McCarthy’s
work have captured the attention of theorists, the insights available to date have offered little to
2

McCarthy, The Crossing, 156-7.
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foster a robust discussion of McCarthy’s literary vision explicitly from the standpoint of the
political. This lack of attention is not altogether surprising, as McCarthy’s representations of the
city and its established institutions of governance are more often provided in the negative, that is,
by their absence. McCarthy’s vision is rugged and primitive, favoring the upheavals of
movement and change to the settled and static scene. Any notions of the good life, to say
nothing of right order, can only be approached from a position of threat and of fear in
McCarthy’s fictional worlds.
The extraordinarily violent character of his novels reveals a device McCarthy employs as
a means of expressing certain uncomfortable truths about man’s fundamental condition in the
world and his endless journey in search of some absent or unknown good. Considered broadly,
this general view of man and human nature raises political questions concerning action and
identity, and questions the possibility of agency, of the ways in which the constant human will to
impose a rational order upon the world confronts a mysterious and resistant natural realm
actively opposing this effort. This frequently antagonistic view of nature is central to
McCarthy’s vision; a mysterious terrain of timeless forms and forces acting with a sentience and
lethal beauty all their own. Human activity within such a world is constrained not only by the
forbidding landscape, but also by a natural ordering that, if not hostile, is at least indifferent to
human affairs. Violence is also a prominent component of McCarthy’s vision of history. An
accomplished regionalist, his novels are highly historical in setting, but in this mode he employs
a sleight of misdirection. By engaging the reader’s assumptions about the veracity of local,
regional, and even national history, McCarthy subtly calls into question the very concept of
history itself, as the substructure of individual and collective human identity. The very act of
historicizing—the telling of a story as a representation of truth endowed with meaning—
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resonates with the symbolic representation of violence in McCarthy’s vision. A theorist in his
own right, McCarthy displays a nuanced understanding of narrative. Storytelling, as a creative
and destructive force in the world, is a major preoccupation for McCarthy and operates in his
fiction as the fundamental human enterprise. The interplay of narration and description,
storytelling and witnessing, establishes a philosophic textual and intertextual matrix of
intersecting lives and stories binding the worlds of his fiction, the characters of his stories, and
the artist to his audience. In my reading, this preoccupation with narrative reveals a deep
concern for questions regarding human freedom and the origins and reach of law, the ways in
which human agency is enabled or constrained by real or perceived forces of power. Many of
these forces are illusory, some outright illusions, but in their mysterious universality they bind
McCarthy’s imagined worlds, creating perpetual sources of dramatic tension.
Further, the epidemic violence of McCarthy’s novels is seldom if ever the result of
familiar rational motives like theft, retribution, intimidation, or impassioned jealousy. For
McCarthy’s characters, violence is not the means to an end but rather the end in itself. This
approach is liable to catch uninitiated readers off guard (as it has many scholars of his fiction),
being ill prepared by a framework of experience or philosophic tradition to accept a world in
which violence is not aberrant, but ordinary.

The search for McCarthy’s political vision to date
McCarthy’s fiction is unified by his attempt to explore the problem of human freedom in
the absence of the coercive power of the state or of civil society and the rule of law. Freedom in
McCarthy’s vision is compatible with license—the way humans are seen to act in the absence of
any recognized or sovereign authority invested with sufficient power to restrain them. For

4

McCarthy, the question of man in his natural state is always a primary concern, whether this
condition is one of profound isolation or a web of social and political relationships. McCarthy’s
vision abounds with provocative insights into the nature and purpose of civilization, the
legitimate basis of sovereign power, the true origins of law, and the real possibilities for order
and meaning in the world. To date, this effort constitutes a new and needed political
interpretation of McCarthy’s literary vision across disciplines. Although a fairly broad crosssection of critical literary studies of McCarthy’s work engage canonical works of philosophy,
and even a few political theorists, to explore questions of ontology, human nature, and the
individual will, none has sufficiently clarified these insights and their implications from the
standpoint of the political. Previous scholarship on McCarthy abounds with points of
comparison to Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power, as well as the writings of
Schopenhauer, Schelling, Wittgenstein, Hegel, and even Marx. A number of these have explored
the idea of history as mythopoeic representation of truth and the narrative basis of identity as the
impetus for political action in McCarthy’s fictional universe.3 Similarly, McCarthy’s concern for
man’s natural, which is to say, pre-political origins, has drawn critics toward the literature of
social contract theorists, particularly Hobbes’s famous formulations on man in the state of
nature.4
While this general trend of McCarthy scholarship has been to place the tone or tenor of
McCarthy’s work into conversation with Western (and, to a lesser extent, Eastern) philosophy,
both ancient and modern, none has yet attempted a unified accounting of his fiction in terms of
3

See Benjamin Mangrum, “Democracy, Justice, and Tragedy in Cormac McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men,”
Religion and Literature, 43.3 (Autumn 2011); Dwight Eddins, ‘“Everything a Hunter and Everything Hunted’:
Schopenhauer and Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian,” Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 45, no. 1: 2533; Chris Dacus, “The West as Symbol of the Eschaton in Cormac McCarthy, Cormac McCarthy Journal 2009; for
a partial but indicative survey of these studies.
4
See political philosopher John Gray’s piece “A Time When Violence is Normal,” published by BBC News
Magazine online, 16 July 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18829385
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its political vision. At least two fairly obvious explanations can account for this. The first is an
epistemological concern. Critical theory should avoid imposing ideologies on authors. Though
a scholar may choose to adopt a theoretical “lens” for interpretation, he must always be careful
about making absolute conclusions about what the author himself is saying to the reader or risk
betraying a narrow and insular prejudice on the part of the critic. The second difficulty is related
and is a direct result of McCarthy’s lack of public comments about his work as well as his
apparent ambivalence toward contemporary issues or even of direct portrayals of the state.5
Throughout his career, McCarthy has remained famously private, consistently refusing to grant
interviews or to comment on his work. Though one commentator has inferred a deeply, even
“radically conservative” outlook implied by McCarthy’s sympathy for the Southern Gothic
tradition, these are neither McCarthy’s words, nor should they be taken to indicate his
inclinations in contemporary politics.6 Thus, a basic premise structuring my study of
McCarthy’s political imagination is to limit the field of inquiry to the philosophic vision revealed
in the substance of his texts. However appropriate, this remains a difficult endeavor nonetheless
because McCarthy’s artistic and aesthetic approach resists concrete interpretation.
The “perverse and tantalizing density” of all McCarthy’s novels is noted by the earliest
book-length critical publication on McCarty’s fiction, Vereen M. Bell’s The Achievement of
Cormac McCarthy.7 In the introduction to his book Bell is quick to note the frustrating opacity
of McCarthy’s prose. “The pressure of meaning in them is strong, but they belligerently resist

5

A few critics have read in McCarthy’s novels allegorical depictions of contemporary issues. Kenneth Lincoln, to
give one example, finds in Blood Meridian a take on Vietnam. Lincoln, Cormac McCarthy: American Canticles
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). Others have used McCarthy’s preference for highly specific
historical/geographical setting to explore possibilities of commentary or parody beneath the text. While compelling,
I do not find these sufficiently convincing in an effort to pursue McCarthy’s use of political and philosophical
concepts.
6
Richard B. Woodward, “Cormac McCarthy’s Venomous Fiction,” The New York Times Magazine, 19 April 1992
(emphasis added).
7
Vereen M. Bell, The Achievement of Cormac McCarthy (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1988), 2.
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abstraction and classification.”8 The reader is typically left in a state of bafflement at their
conclusion, as though something intense and emotionally significant passed fleetingly overhead,
and then disappeared. Regarding McCarthy’s use of characters, Bell aptly notes their almost
total lack of interiority, their “tantalizingly obscure motivations” challenging familiar
assumptions about empathy. “All of the characters threaten to become almost eerily
unselfconscious. This is a poignant and haunting effect in itself, calling forth an impoverishment
in them far deeper than their simple lack of material means,” Bell concludes.9
While McCarthy is frequently celebrated for the tooth-and-claw realism of his writing,
his fictional reality remains mysterious and ephemeral, somehow simultaneously beautiful and
lethal. Yet perhaps the most enduring legacy of Bell’s critical enterprise remains his assertion of
an “ambiguous nihilism” at the heart of McCarthy’s fiction. This interpretive position remains a
touchstone for the majority of McCarthy scholarship, framing the terms of ongoing
conversations and galvanizing scholars in either agreement or rejection of Bell’s premise.10
Most compellingly, Bell’s ascription of an aesthetics of violence in McCarthy’s fiction, typified
as existential nihilism, continually invokes other prominent leitmotifs of landscape, history, and
storytelling. Taken together, these conceptual themes dominate the field in a broad survey of the
existing scholarly literature. Later critical reactions can generally be divided into either of what
one might call the McCarthy-as-nihilist, or the McCarthy-as-moralist camps, respectively.
One critical voice sharing an affinity for Bell’s nihilistic thesis belongs to the eminent
Harold Bloom. Celebrating McCarthy’s fifth novel, Blood Meridian, as an unsurpassed
achievement in twentieth-century American fiction, Bloom asserts: “When novels become this

8

Ibid.
Ibid., 4.
10
Vereen M. Bell, “The Ambiguous Nihilism of Cormac McCarthy,” Southern Literary Journal 15.2 (Spring 1983),
31-41.
9
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difficult, and this negative in their visions, do they still persuade us that there is a substance in us
that prevails? . . . Negativity cleanses, though at the high price of nihilism.”11 Similar to the
work of Bell and Bloom, Steven Shaviro’s essay on Blood Meridian also embraces this dark
vision reading of McCarthy. In the character of the novel’s antagonist, the Mephistopheles-like
Judge Holden, the novel’s immortal villain, Shaviro finds a bleak affirmation of unremitting
warfare between all men, in all ages. War in McCarthy’s vision, Shaviro argues, “is finally our
inmost, most secret and most horrific desire.”12 But Shaviro does not sufficiently parse
McCarthy’s thought on this point, failing to stand the vision of man on its feet, one might say.
Also similar to Bell, Steven Frye observes how McCarthy’s western novels “display an overt
concern with the material pattern of violence in the physical world.”13 Yet Frye militates against
Bell’s extreme stance on McCarthy’s “ambiguous nihilism,” a compelling distinction. He
suggests that while Blood Meridian (typically regarded as McCarthy’s most violent and, thus,
nihilistic novel) seems like an extended nightmare in human language,” it is not the
programmatic expression of nihilism that to some it appears to be.14 Frye cautions McCarthy’s
readers: “Though it is inappropriate to conflate McCarthy with one of his characters, it seems
reasonable to assume that, for all his fatalism, the author by no means accepts the bloodshed he
often portrays.”15 Frye stands in a middle position between the two camps.
At the opposite end of the moral/ethical spectrum from Bell, and what we may call the
“Nihilist camp” in McCarthy criticism, are scholars who find in McCarthy’s vision a carefully
integrated moral vision. This reading finds in McCarthy’s fiction an affirmation of ordered

11

Harold Bloom, How to Read and Why (New York: Scribner, 2000), 273.
Steven Shaviro, “The Very Life of the Darkness: A Reading of Blood Meridian,” Arnold and Luce (eds.)
Perspectives on Cormac McCarthy (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1993; revised edition, 1999), 157.
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Ibid., 93-94.
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existence and the human need for redemption, of which violence is but the vehicle of expression.
Thus, contra Bell and his allies stands the “Moralist camp” in McCarthy scholarship, of which
Edwin T. Arnold is the indisputable banner carrier. Arnold presents the bold thesis that
McCarthy is a deep and profoundly moral thinker, finding clear evidence in McCarthy’s work of
“a profound belief in the need for moral order, a conviction that is essentially religious.”16
Similar to Arnold’s position, Matthew Potts’ recently published dissertation in the field of
religious studies finds strong affinities between McCarthy and sacramental theology.17 Potts
argues, “If McCarthy does in fact offer some moral system through his fiction, a sophisticated
understanding of sacraments might inform how we understand McCarthy.”18 The moralist camp
can be said to rally around a basic position best arcticulated by Arnold: “There is, in addition
always the possibility of grace and redemption even in the darkest of his tales, although that
redemption may require more of his characters than they are ultimately willing to give.”19 Most
of McCarthy’s critics tend to fall somewhere in between these two positions with regard to the
presence or absence of God in McCarthy’s fiction, and nowhere is this better glimpsed than in
the diversity of conclusions regarding McCarthy’s use of landscape as an interrogation of nature.
McCarthy’s novels are stylistically linked through a pervasive use of passages presenting
natural imagery, a profound appreciation for landscape. The significance of this stylistic trope
transcends a mere preference for detailing scenery. Indeed, in this dissertation I argue that in
many instances McCarthy’s use of landscape is allegorical, externalizing some point of
psychological characterization or moral ambiguity in a way that his presentation of human

16

Edwin T. Arnold, “Naming, Knowing and Nothingness: McCarthy’s Moral Parables,” in Arnold and Luce (eds.)
Perspectives on Cormac McCarthy (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1993; rev. ed. 1999), 46.
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characters avoids. So crucial, in fact, is McCarthy’s depiction of the natural landscape, it
arguably comes to serve as a foil to the protagonist (or antagonist) in the plots of all his works, if
not acting as a character itself. The country often appears endowed with a certain will and
agency all of its own, acting as a causal force in how men act at certain times and in certain
places. Commenting on Blood Meridian, Dianne Luce affirms, “McCarthy’s landscape is his
real protagonist, looming over the kid’s story like some perverse deity or idiot narrator.”20 Once
again, the eloquent analysis of Vereen Bell clarifies the depth and complexity of this dense
symbol within McCarthy’s vision.
The thought that is difficult to hold in focus is that nature…is both a void and an
emanation. In either role it is not analogous to the categories of thought. . . . The human
beings constitute one protagonist and the natural world another. Narrative and
description collaborate with each other in conventional ways, but what is ultimately
important is that, even ontologically, they compete.21
Bell’s statement here presents a compelling gloss on many of the interrelated political and
philosophical concerns congregating around the conceptual theme of nature and its intimate
relationship to narrative throughout all of McCarthy’s novels. Beginning from similar premises,
Dana Phillips advances the argument:
This competition has been decided in favor of description and the natural world even
before Blood Meridian begins. For McCarthy, description and the natural world as
categories contain both narrative and human beings. Human beings and the natural world
do not figure as antagonists—Blood Meridian does not have that kind of dramatic
structure. They are instead parts of the same continuum and are consistently described by
McCarthy as such.22
An inescapable problem with attempting to account for the purely eco- or bio-centric
elements of McCarthy’s vision, then, is that the horizon of the human sphere is never fully
20

Dianne C. Luce, “Cormac McCarthy.” Dictionary of Literary Biography: American Novelists Since World War II.
Third Series. Ed. James R. Giles and Wanda H. Giles. Detroit: Gale Research, 1994. 143: 118-136. [Revised and
expanded version of Cox (1980), q.v.]
21
Bell, Achievement, 133.
22
Dana Phillips, “History and the Ugly Facts of Blood Meridian, in Lilley, ed. Cormac McCarthy: New Directions
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 32.
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eclipsed. Indeed, if anything, McCarthy’s use of landscape serves only to throw attention back
on the words and deeds of men. However intimate this relationship between the human and the
nonhuman may ever prove to be, any attempts to derive coherence or meaning from events in the
natural world are typically thwarted for McCarthy’s characters. Extending a related line of
thought regarding Blood Meridian, Phillips notes that “in the raw orchestration of the book’s
events, the world of nature and the world of men are parts of the same world, and both are
equally violent and indifferent to the other.”23 Consider a brief passage from one of the novels
imagist scenes of narrative description:
In the neuter austerity of that terrain all phenomena were bequeathed a strange equality
and no one thing nor spider nor stone nor blade of grass could put forth claim to
precedence. The very clarity of these articles belied their familiarity, for the eye
predicates the whole on some feature or part and here was nothing more luminous than
another and nothing more enshadowed and in the optical democracy of such landscapes
all preference is made whimsical and a man and a rock become endowed with unguessed
kinships.24
The phrase “optical democracy” used to describe the landscape in an important scene would
seem to imply more than simple notions of equality but rather a sense of mutual agency of all
things in that world, “as if the very sediment of things contained yet some residue of
sentience.”25 The immediacy that such style achieves for the eye on the page stands in powerful
and often paradoxical relation to the panoramic focal distance of the narrative voice. The reader
sees all, except for the inner world mediated through the eyes and mind of McCarthy’s “eerily
unselfconscious” characters.26 Thus, the motivations for McCarthy’s characters’ actions,
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whether horrific or humane, remain mostly obscure for the reader. On this point, McCarthy
scholar Robert Jarrett offers the following observation:
While McCarthy’s landscapes often do supply a symbolist commentary on his characters
or their drama, those landscapes fulfill another function—that of rehistoricizing an old
myth of American national self-consciousness. In this myth the “American”
contradictorily defined as “natural man” yet receives identity in the consciousness of his
or her exile from nature.27
Jarrett’s observation on this point is instructive for my analysis as it invokes the mythic nature of
national identity. While my primary interest in McCarthy’s political vision is directed toward its
philosophical interrogation of man as man, I find it difficult to ignore the particularly American
implications it brings to bear. This development becomes particularly compelling in the context
of McCarthy’s later novels (Blood Meridian, the Border Trilogy, and No Country for Old Men),
as they all incorporate elements of the Western genre, a provocative and distinctly American
form of political fiction.
The American frontier setting of McCarthy’s later novels foregrounds the question of
human freedom in the absence of law or civil society, perennial themes within political
philosophy. In such a setting: expansive, uncivilized, and limitless in potential for the growth or
decline of human sociality, the deep and often troubling paradoxes of philosophy and human
existence can be explored, though often without resolution. Indeed, such a setting “magnifies
and clarifies what is at issue” in these stories.28 American novelists, particularly those concerned
with depicting life on the wild frontier, frequently invoke important considerations on nature,
human nature, and society. Discussing the political significance of the Western as a specific and
important genre of American literature and a highly philosophical mode of storytelling, political
27
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theorist John Moeller argues that the American Western genre is a bountiful field for political
research as it “reveals about human nature, the innate human condition, and the society in which
humans reside.”29 In his study of this deeply political form of American literature, Moeller
identifies sharp points of contact with established and ongoing conversations in political theory.
Because the natural environment remains relatively untainted and human civilization is
either absent or still nascent, the early Western frontier invites comparison with the state
of nature posited by social-contract theorists. Of course, each of the protagonists has
tasted civilization, so that none is wholly natural. When they appear in the novels,
however, they have left the civilized world behind…and thus offer a glimpse of what a
natural person might look like and how that person might act.30
Free from the constraints of conventional or legal society, the Western hero, like a number of
McCarthy’s protagonists seeks a new way to shed the accumulated detritus of tradition-bound
institutions and social relationships, and to live unfettered by the mores or expectations that
typically govern the lives of most ordinary men.
The archetypal western hero, the ruggedly individualistic frontiersman of many famous
American novels, is a favorite trope of McCarthy’s for presentation and parody. This character
type stands at the center of an important type of political theory conducted through storytelling.
Political scholar Catherine Zuckert develops this paradigm at length in her thematic study of
American literature, Natural Right and the American Literary Imagination. Zuckert concludes
that by setting their narratives on the real and metaphorical frontier of civilization canonical
American novels pose enduring questions about the modern democratic regime. She writes:
These novels encouraged their readers to ask not only what was natural, but also whether
nature provided an adequate foundation for human community or freedom . . . To inquire
into the relation between nature and convention is to ask whether there is a standard of
29
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right or good inherent in human life by which all the different laws and customs that the
various peoples have established for themselves by agreement (convention) can be
judged good or bad—just or unjust. The issue of nature and convention is thus the
question of political philosophy as such, but different philosophers have raised that
question in different ways.31
Though remarkably similar to this tradition, the political thrust of McCarthy’s Western
fiction diverges somewhat from the Zuckert typology, attempting no such act of refoundation,
and pointing instead to rather opposite political conclusions. McCarthy never systematically
engages the philosophic basis of American political institutions beyond illustrating the inherent
violence attending their implementation throughout history. McCarthy scholar Steven Shaviro
argues:
Blood Meridian performs the violent, sacrificial, self-consuming ritual upon which our
civilization is founded. Or better, it traumatically re-enacts this ritual, for foundations are
never set in place once and for all. More blood is always needed to seal and renew the
pact.32
My own interpretation of violence is heavily informed by the text of Blood Meridian, analyzing
its portrayal as a powerful leitmotif illustrating deeper truths related to his view of human nature,
the problematic representation of truth in history and, ultimately, the way in which he considers
the artistic project in general to be an inherently violent enterprise. Other critical interpretations
have illuminated provocative and diverse elements of McCarthy’s literary and philosophical
project. The full depth and breadth of this discourse would be impractical (if not impossible) to
exhaust in this survey, even in a gloss. I have distilled the most compelling of the ongoing
debates around the signature hallmarks of McCarthy’s style: the extraordinarily violent character
of his subject matter, the preoccupation with landscape as a device for demonstrating human
isolation, and the antinomian frontier setting he favors for staging human action.
31
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A final major theme found throughout McCarthy’s fiction remains to be discussed.
Scholars of McCarthy’s fiction have begun to pay increasing attention to the idea of narrative
itself in McCarthy’s overall project. Indeed, no other conceptual theme (even among the most
prominent ones I have just presented) comes as close to capturing a unifying thread running the
entirety of McCarthy’s corpus. Vereen Bell, interpreting McCarthy’s third published novel,
Child of God, finds in it “a novel that is partly about stories and storytelling.”33 Bell observes
how “McCarthy is acutely conscious at each new turn of phrase or shift in idiom of how
language intensifies and heightens, defines and sharpens, or spreads out and projects our reality
through layers of time.”34 Beginning around the time of McCarthy’s major shift to a new locale
and subject matter, his novels display an increasing fixation with the idea of narrative and the
manner in which it structures the basis of human reality, in both form and substance. In the
novels of this later period, storytelling comes to dominate McCarthy’s humane vision. James D.
Lilley observes:
The central question of McCarthy’s fiction has always centered on the possibility of
agency—“whether the stuff of creation may be shaped to man’s will or whether his own
heart is not another kind of clay”—and in McCarthy’s world this possibility is actualized
only through a further perpetuation of the dance, a witnessing and retelling of the story, a
reweaving of the world.35
Lilley briefly traces the progression of this idea from McCarthy’s earliest work. McCarthy’s
fictional representations of historic and familiar places and times are not simply static or preordained, fractured “sketches and bones” of a distant and fading past. “Rather, they are a work
in progress, a living and fluid dialogue, that exists only at those storied moments of intersection
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between speaker and witness, traveler and desert absolute.”36 This connection between agency
and the interaction of narrative between storyteller and witness is a dominant and dynamic theme
in all of McCarthy’s work. Dianne C. Luce tackles this same theme in an essay on the Border
Trilogy, part of McCarthy’s later period. In her interpretation, the ideas of narrative and
witnessing emerge in the context of road narratives, a prominent motif in many of McCarthy’s
novels.
Like All the Pretty Horses (1992), Blood Meridian (1985), and Outer Dark (1968), The
Crossing [the second part of the trilogy] is a road narrative, but more than in the earlier
novels, The Crossing employs the road as metaphor for the life journey or the narrative of
a life. . . . And McCarthy is concerned with the role or function of story in human
experience of life, not only our own stories, our autobiographies, but our biographies of
others, our witnessing.37
The relationship between the self and the other, a social and moral vision found throughout
McCarthy’s work, is charged with compelling ideas for the study of politics and literature. As I
will show in this dissertation, the idea of narrative unlocks and provides lines of connection amid
a constellation of political ideas within and between his texts. Indeed, engaging McCarthy’s
theory of narrative, such as it is, offers the best possible framework for a systematic political
critique of McCarthy’s overall project. Developing this concept and using it as a contextual
reference point, I address McCarthy’s treatment of ideas related to essential questions of moral
obligation and ethics, the questions of nature, human nature, and man’s questionable sovereignty
in the world, the critique of our traditional pathways of knowing through which McCarthy
engages questions of ontology, and, finally, the notion of individual agency amid a universe
circumscribed by potent forces of fate and chance. It is, then, appropriate that I turn now to offer
some statement on the methodology I employ in this dissertation.
36
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Statement on methodology
I intend this dissertation as a study in literature and politics. I proceed analytically,
tracing out the major political themes of McCarthy’s body of fiction and analyzing them toward
their logical conclusions; such as may be found. Central to my interpretive and analytical
strategy is a commitment to approaching the political ideas found in any work of fiction as they
appear, rather than as asserting a specific message, teaching, or agenda on behalf of their author.
My interest in these texts concerns their possible contribution to an understanding of the human,
and a vision of man in the world. To accommodate this, I have adopted a longitudinal method of
approaching the broad political themes appearing in McCarthy’s novels as a way of both reading
and also in structuring a coherent argument. To this end, I approach the idea of a narrative as a
guiding leitmotif, but in a dualistic way: employing a similar distinction between narrating the
autobiography of the self in isolation and the witnessing of others’ stories as they intersect. My
critical approach in this narrative-based anthropology looks at man first in profound isolation
(not difficult to do in McCarthy’s work), and then, progressing through his novels in sequence, in
an increasingly social context. McCarthy’s later fiction displays an increasingly affirmative
view of the sacredness of human life and of the basic impulse toward community in even the
most unreflective of characters; an essential characteristic of the human.
Conceiving this study over a prolonged period of reading and research, I feel it bears
mention that had I anticipated finding programmatic, definitive, and conclusive answers to the
political questions raised by McCarthy’s fiction, I would have passed on the study or abandoned
it early on out of disinterest. Indeed, to call any of McCarthy’s works a “political novel” would
be absurd. Apocalyptic fiction has rarely, if ever, been overtly or consistently political in terms
of its subject matter or intended audience. Rather, I find in McCarthy’s novels an artistic or
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poetic utterance that speaks to discomforting realities of experience while simultaneously
sublimating the particularities of experience, however immediate, into a mythic plane. In this
textual world, with its apocalyptic backdrop and mythical sublime, I construct an analytical
framework for exploring the political ideas that appear and reappear throughout all of
McCarthy’s work. Though interrelated, narrative, nature, history, witnessing, agency, and order
are broad conceptual categories within which I discuss essential political questions arising from
the texts.

Organization of chapters
Using the pervasive themes of narrative, nature, history, witnessing, agency, and order, I
hope to demonstrate the manner in which his apparent ambivalence toward the political serves to
conceal a more robust philosophical inquiry into human nature and, correspondingly, the way in
which McCarthy raises problems of integrating the individual into the inhumane landscapes of
the natural world. Assuming that a political audience may be unfamiliar with McCarthy’s
fiction, I have structured the dissertation in such a way as to provide my reader with a general
context for McCarthy’s works by moving through them in the chronology of their publication.
This strategy is partially out of necessity due to the diversity of the material covered; a particular
challenge for studies in literature and politics. I should also mention that this dissertation is not
intended as a comprehensive or exhaustive study of all of McCarthy’s fiction (published or
unpublished, novels, plays, and screenplays). Indeed, I omit all of McCarthy’s early works
(prior to the publication of The Orchard Keeper in 1965, McCarthy had published two short
stories—“A Wake for Susan” (1959) and “A Drowning Incident” (1960) in the Phoenix, a
literary magazine at the University of Tennessee), and, most glaringly, I have opted not to treat
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McCarthy’s other Masterpiece, Suttree (1968) in my longitudinal analysis of his catalog. This
difficult editorial decision was made after it became apparent that, while a very impressive piece
of literary artistry (made the more so due its being his first started, but fourth published novel)
and while offering some resonance with established themes I trace out in other works, I find
Suttree to be largely out of dialogue with McCarthy’s other works, particularly with regard to
political themes. These considerations addressed I now set forward a basic organizational
overview of the dissertation and its chapters.
In my first chapter, titled “Narrative,” I begin by sketching McCarthy’s use of narrative
in his earliest three published novels. Although The Orchard Keeper, Outer Dark, and Child of
God are three very distinct works of fiction, they are unified by a sense of setting and an
approach to narrative. These are McCarthy’s “Southern’’ or “Appalachian” novels, all set in the
mountains of East Tennessee. They are further unified by certain stylistic devices McCarthy
uses in his early fiction before moving on to the later stylistic hallmarks of his Southwestern
fiction. Thus, my first chapter sets forward the framework for the theory of narrative that
grounds many of McCarthy’s most compelling political insights. Though many of the more
provocative aspects of this theory appear in McCarthy’s later works, his first three novels are
helpful to illustrate some of the signature aspects of McCarthy’s style. Storytelling, for
McCarthy as well as for several of his characters, is a world-making enterprise. And yet, the
reader may wonder, what is this world? I argue that McCarthy’s storytelling project creates an
atmosphere of disequilibrium by challenging his reader’s assumptions about time, space, and
empathy. As my analysis of his first novel The Orchard Keeper illustrates, McCarthy uses the
text as well as the plot of the novel to create a space for the exchange between the author, the
text, and the reader. Structurally, The Orchard Keeper creates a rupture in time through which
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the story enters and, by the novel’s conclusion, exits. Seen in this way, McCarthy’s theory of
narrative displays a particular understanding of time.
A related convention is visible in Outer Dark, McCarthy’s second novel and the first of
his road narratives. Here the idea of wandering builds upon the idea of time as seen in the
parallel wanderings of the siblings Culla and Rinthy Holme. Whereas The Orchard Keeper
demonstrates the manner in which McCarthy uses narrative to disrupt chronological sequence,
Outer Dark uses the imagery of the journey to demonstrate a similar effect in both time and
space. Finally, this chapter’s exploration of McCarthy’s storytelling techniques considers the
idea of meta-narratives in his third novel, Child of God. Here, McCarthy’s theory of storytelling
engages assumptions regarding identity through the use of disembodied community voices,
creating a moral conversation around one of the most unsympathetic protagonists in all of
American literature. The key interpretive detail here is the manner in which the community
creates the role of pariah that Lester Ballard comes to occupy simultaneously with his horrific
deeds. Child of God advances McCarthy’s basic theory of storytelling by establishing the
narrative component of empathy, in which the reader’s discomforting experience mimics that of
the community in the novel. In sum, the discussion in chapter one establishes the importance of
stories and of storytelling to McCarthy’s political imagination. While the narrative components
of time, place, and identity are presented across three very distinct novels, the political questions
of freedom and agency will be readily apparent in this discussion of the first chapter.
McCarthy’s view of nature, presented in chapter two is intimately connected to the
concepts of history, presented subsequently in chapter three. The correspondence and tension
between these two concepts serves to dramatize the mystery of existence, revealing a kind of
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spiritual blindness at the heart of human existence.38 The text of Blood Meridian, widely
regarded as McCarthy’s masterpiece, will serve as the focal point for this area of analysis. The
novel’s central theme actively engages one of the ultimate questions of political philosophy:
whether the political regime, and its laws, has its origins in nature or in convention. As a
nameless “kid,” the novel’s putative human protagonist, crosses into the unsettled frontier of
country of Texas in the year 1849, the voice of the impersonal narrator states that “not again in
all the world’s turning will there be terrains so wild and barbarous to try whether the stuff of
creation can be shaped to man’s will, or whether his own heart is not another kind of clay.”39 In
this formulation I find one aspect of McCarthy’s political vision most clearly expressed. For
McCarthy, the question of human nature and sociality can only be addressed in the open and
boundless expanse of the frontier—wherein the extent of man’s beastliness or godliness can
become fully visible. Only here can the deep and often troubling paradoxes of philosophy and
human existence be explored, though potentially without resolution. The political implication at
issue is whether any society, however rightly ordered or justly governed it aspires to be, can fully
protect human being from the feral rapacity within the self, or within others.
In chapter three I argue that McCarthy posits history as an analog to this problem
regarding the substance and of men’s hearts, and how to know them. Scholar Tim Parrish also
notes this paradoxical tendency. Regarding the paradoxes of history that contribute to many of
the deepest philosophical questions permeating Blood Meridian (and no less relevant to
McCarthy’s corpus in its entirety), he notes: “One cannot say precisely whether the novel is
about the true nineteenth-century historical events it describes or about the nature of history
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itself.”40 Parrish’s interpretation reveals a philosophical paradox at the heart of McCarthy’s
fiction, questioning the capacity of language to adequately represent the truth and, further,
whether the possibility of arriving at purely objective truths is entirely available to humans at all.
The nature and history chapters focus primarily on Blood Meridian. Distinct though
related, nature and history invoke discussions of McCarthy’s metaphysics, questions of ontology,
of epistemology, of the possibility and meaning of action, of the idea of truth and the resultant
questions complicating traditional assumptions about the order of the world. Out of these ideas
flows Lilley’s central question: the possibility of agency which, as the quotation cited above
illustrates, is deeply connected to the ideas of narrative and witnessing as a world-creating force
in McCarthy’s vision.
Chapter four, titled “Witnessing,” presents the other half of McCarthy’s narrative theory.
The idea of witnessing comes to the fore in McCarthy’s fifth novel, Blood Meridian, reappearing
with renewed vitality in The Crossing, the second novel of the Border Trilogy. In this early
period, McCarthy’s concern with story and with storytelling is a primary means of expressing the
function of story in the individual or subjective experience in human life. In this way, the
concept of witnessing is other-directed. Witnessing corresponds to the essential human
encounter with the other in McCarthy’s fiction, ultimately demonstrating the manner in which
the multiplicity of particular stories—corresponding to the multiplicity of particular or individual
people—converges to become the one tale told for all time by the one man, who is all men.
McCarthy’s theory of witnessing represents the social aspect of his vision (contra the charge of a
solipsistic nihilism ascribed by his harsher critics). It is through witnessing, ultimately, that
McCarthy’s great challenges to knowing, and pathways to the truth become most apparent.
40
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My fifth chapter, titled “Agency,” begins with a return to the idea of existential heroes in
McCarthy’s work. Here, I begin discussions of will, action, agency, and making promises that
will direct the argument throughout the second half of the dissertation. A classic expression of
this theme in McCarthy’s writing and thought is seen in scenes of dialog between the young
existential cowboy prodigy, John Grady Cole, and his interlocutor, the dueña Alphonsa in All the
Pretty Horses. As a mouthpiece for existential determinism, and endowed with a certain total
knowledge of the world expressed as total authority for action, Alphonsa represents a new take
on the established model of McCarthy’s favored antagonist. Yet she is unique in her
accessibility for a McCarthy “villain.” Accordingly, she serves as a useful point of departure for
continuing my ongoing analysis of McCarthy’s predatory characters found throughout his
corpus. In this chapter I proceed from an introduction and synopsis of The Border Trilogy to
scenes of dialog between John Grady and Alphonsa found in its first volume, All the Pretty
Horses (1992). Next, I turn to address the ongoing thematic analysis of naming responsibility in
McCarthy’s work, expressed here through the idea of making and keeping promises in the
context of the trilogy and later works. As ever, the issue of freedom looms and yet retains its
characteristic nebulousness. McCarthy never engages the idea directly in any text, at least in any
definitive way. The image of the road or path, invoking the established concepts of narrative and
witnessing remains vibrant, now seen in complicating paradoxes of causality, of the interplay of
chance, choice, and fate in the realm of human action.
I address the concept of order in my sixth chapter. Here, the relationship between
immanent and transcendent horizons are central. The tragic dimensions of McCarthy’s thought
are also visible here. To get at this I turn to McCarthy’s most recently published novels, No
Country for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006). In this work McCarthy deals with the
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question of the order of reality in a post-apocalyptic setting to frame the essential humane
questions confronting a dying man’s final mission: to get his young son to safety. Here
McCarthy reengages familiar imagery: the last man on earth, walking down a road with a boy.
The existential questions confronting the duo are obvious, as are the moral ones: What are the
choices a father must make to protect his son in such a world? What are the lessons he can
impart in good conscience? In this novel the act of naming responsibility is a fait accompli, but
what are the consequences? What are the promises that can be made and, perhaps more
importantly, kept? In the horrifying moral terrain such a landscape, the making and keeping of
promises comes to define both the man and the boy. McCarthy now questions directly the
uncertain substantiality of human value of man, and his position in the matrix of the world.
The discussion of order is the final substantive chapter. In my conclusion, I reframe
points of analysis reached in previous chapters, attempting to draw together the various thematic
strands of analysis in an attempt to offer some final thoughts regarding the breadth, depth, and
impact of McCarthy’s literary project in terms of political theory.
As illustrated, the literature of McCarthy scholarship initiates a number of analytical
discussions regarding themes of political and philosophical relevance. However, what it does
not currently provide is an analytical framework illuminating McCarthy’s vision from the
perspective of political theory. The questions of violence point out McCarthy’s concern for the
question of human nature and its moral core, and are glimpsed through his frequent painting of
the natural world as a mysterious realm of beauty and danger points toward a deep duplicity
inherent in human self-understanding. His foray into a kind of parodic historical revisionism
underscores the dramatic or story-telling nature of all human activity. While literary scholars
have glimpsed this, they do not sufficiently consider its implicit political significance. My
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dissertation seeks to correct this. In this work, McCarthy’s implications are treated more
emphatically. Where his formulations bear upon politics, these connections will be made more
explicit and traced to their theoretical conclusion and logical extensions. McCarthy’s vision,
with its deep concern for questions of nature, human nature, and society deserves a political
accounting. From it, political theory may gain access to a unique and insightful perspective on
human interaction and the nature of the American soul. The themes of narrative, nature, history,
and witnessing history manifest continually in the secondary literature as conceptual hallmarks
of McCarthy’s fiction. Discreet categories of this kind are always risky when treating works as
deeply nuanced as McCarthy’s. And the need for caution is particularly high in this case, as the
themes are neither succinct nor conclusive. The moral and ethical implications that flow from
the theme of metaphysical violence, for instance, are often most visible in McCarthy’s depictions
of the non-human world, but no less are they a major component of his understanding of
narrative. Likewise, the centrality of agency within McCarthy’s vision is difficult to address
without considering the intertextual matrix of thought, word, and action, typical of McCarthy’s
presentation of narrative. However distinctly any of these conceptual motifs may appear within
or between McCarthy’s works, the critic is hard-pressed to discuss without recourse to their
convergence. The most sensible way forward, then, seems to start with the rudiments of his
vision as they first appear. In my first chapter, Narrative, I use McCarthy’s novels The Orchard
Keeper, Outer Dark, and Child of God to present the hallmarks of McCarthy’s narrative strategy.
Here I establish the ground rules for reading and interpreting McCarthy’s fiction in terms of
political philosophy.
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1. Narrative
In a rare interview published in The New York Times Magazine edition of April 1992,
McCarthy reflects briefly on his artistic philosophy, his influences, and the general tenor of his
fiction. Woodward, his interviewer, offers the reader this brief summation of McCarthy’s
expansive and hopeful vision for his medium: “He still believes that the novel can, in his words,
‘encapsulate all the various disciplines and interests of humanity.’”1 McCarthy openly
acknowledges his influences: “The ugly fact is books are made out of books,” he says. “The
novel depends for its life on the novels that have been written.” McCarthy notes his regard for
only a short of list of ‘“good writers’—Melville, Dostoyevsky, Faulkner—[and] precludes
anyone who doesn’t “deal with issues of life and death.”2 In the same interview McCarthy
further states: “There is no such thing as life without bloodshed. . . . I think the notion that the
species can be improved some way, that everyone could live in harmony, is a really dangerous
idea.”3
In almost all of McCarthy’s fiction the astonishing bleakness of the natural world
combines with the overwhelming violence of the human sphere and suggests violence as the
enduring common denominator of reality. McCarthy plays with the aesthetics and thematic
tropes of genre but is very seldom identified as an author of horror fiction; the philosophical
implications of his writing are horrific nevertheless. McCarthy places his reader in a position of
encountering the realities of life from a position of maximum insecurity but his motive is more
instructive than cautionary. The terrifying and destabilizing effect of his bloody pasquinades
creates a tensional field in which the reader must ponder the place and the role of the human
1
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amid an omnipresent atmosphere of “ambiguous nihilism.”4 The importance of McCarthy’s
“metaphysics of violence” notwithstanding, the interview quoted above presents another deep
insight into McCarthy’s overall project that is of more immediate concern for this study: the idea
of focusing, if not reducing, the plurality of individual stories or narratives into ultimate
questions coalescing into a single theme or story; the one true story.5
All of McCarthy’s novels dwell upon the ultimate human question of life and death in
one way or another. However, many of the “various disciplines and interests of humanity” he
may take on in a particular work, his commitment to his craft requires that he return, inevitably,
to the central question of human existence—what it is to live, and to die, in a mysterious and
hostile world that threatens to devour us at every turn. For McCarthy, this story is the story,
standing as the unique testimony of each man and of all men. “Rightly heard all tales are one” is
the great lesson of experience for one of McCarthy’s young protagonists.6 In the same novel,
another character makes a similar pronouncement: “There are no separate journeys for there are
no separate men to make them. All men are one and there is no other tale to tell.”7
In both interview and artistic enterprise, McCarthy subtly hints at a worldview in which
both the idea and practice of storytelling come to represent something fundamental to humanity.
The idea of the one man and the one tale common to all permeates McCarthy’s vision with
increasing frequency and nuance as his career has progressed, though the ideas are no less visible
in his earliest work. From The Orchard Keeper (1965), to the present, McCarthy’s fictional
works are largely meditations on the idea of narrative. McCarthy writes stories in which the act
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of storytelling itself is a central feature. In McCarthy’s vision, this very activity is in many ways
its own life and death struggle.
McCarthy’s concept of narrative is not a singular or static idea, but rather a multifaceted
and dynamic interplay of symbols, emphasizing different ideas at different times in his fiction.
His prose engenders a sense of sublimation—of men, roads, journeys, and tales, representing the
penultimate expression of a theory of narrative in McCarthy’s fiction. Within McCarthy’s
fiction the paradigmatic isolation of an individual man on a journey begins to converge with the
journey itself. This journey becomes the story of a life. Consider the following pronouncement
McCarthy places in the mouth of one of his oracular characters:
The events of the waking world...are forced upon us and the narrative is the unguessed
axis along which they must be strung. It falls to us to weigh and sort and order these
events. It is we who assemble them into the story which is us. Each man is the bard of
his own existence.8
Theorized in this way, narrative is created when certain events in time are rendered coherent by
their ultimate outcome, implying the sense of an ending and, as will be shown, the presence of
some storyteller or witness. Thus, the activity of storytelling comes to constitute meaning in
common life. The freedom to construct meaning is central to McCarthy’s artistic and
philosophical enterprise. And yet, for all his preoccupation with this idea, McCarthy never
offers concrete answers to the questions he raises. Rather, he increasingly points away from the
storyteller and toward the story’s hearer; in the language of McCarthy’s prose, this is the
witness. The reception of the story, the translation of its meaning, and its retelling by this same
agent, a witnessing other, substantiates an essential ethics embedded throughout the majority of
McCarthy’s fiction. And this relationship between the self and the other is the primary ground of
moral inquiry to begin a political analysis of McCarthy’s fiction. But, one might ask, what is the
8
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substance of this story? Further, what are the limits to this purported freedom of telling,
understanding, and retelling? Through narrative, I contend, McCarthy begins to insert the
various elements of his political vision. Through this medium of narrative McCarthy is able to
render political questions that form the interpretive framework of this dissertation: the question
of moral obligation and ethics, the question of the individual’s will against the undeniable
possibilities of fate and chance, the question of man’s sovereignty in the world, and the ultimate
problems of knowing and being.
The narrative strategies employed in The Orchard Keeper, Outer Dark, and Child of God
shape and give context to a discussion of McCarthy’s later work. Mythos is best understood in
this context as a set of stories embodying the values that define its characters as well as the world
of the reader. In this manner, the characters McCarthy creates stand less as complex individuals
with compelling histories of their own, and rather as interlocutors inhabiting a mythic space in
which some truth is interrogated. Remembering that “all tales are one”—at least on some level
in McCarthy’s oeuvre—the witness, perhaps standing in as a proxy for the reader him or herself,
becomes the torchbearer of whatever truth may be disclosed in this exchange. This notion would
necessarily include the implicit freedom to define this truth however the hearer may be able.
Using the narrative techniques of rupture, dislocation, and discomfort, McCarthy is able to
explore “the authority of competing narratives and the complex relationship of experience,
witness, and tale.”9 The ancient political and philosophical notion of mythopoesis is integrally
important to all of McCarthy’s fiction. Later works in his corpus more focused on the aesthetics
of the frontier show this most clearly. Still, even in his earliest published works, McCarthy
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clears his path of preconceptions, creating a mythic setting to time and space in which the
ultimate questions stand forward most clearly.
My interpretation finds in McCarthy a philosophical vision through which he establishes
“the role of fiction in our lives and the validity of our lives as fictions.”10 Thus, McCarthy has
something to teach his reader, both about him or herself, as well as something about the act of
reading. At issue here is the question of freedom: the freedom or agency to create or narrate the
“story” of one’s life. Vereen Bell comments that “McCarthy is an expert at manipulating the
conventions of reading, setting us up frequently so as to require us to consider some of the main
differences between books and the world.”11 This opposition between books and the world
opens a door into the tradition of using fiction as a medium for political inquiry. Using the
poetic imagination as a basis for philosophy and, by extension, the substance of poetic texts as a
basis for political theorizing engages the political imagination, questioning the ground or
substance of reality as well as how that reality can be known. Martha Nussbaum’s formulation is
instructive on this point.
Novels…present persistent forms of human need and desire realized in specific social
situations. These situations frequently, indeed usually, differ a good deal from the
reader’s own. Novels, recognizing this, in general construct and speak to an implicit
reader who shares with the characters certain hopes, fears, and general human concerns,
and who for that reason is able to form bonds of identification and sympathy with them,
but who is also situated elsewhere and needs to be informed about the concrete situation
of the characters. In this way, the very structure of the interaction between the text and
its imagined reader invites the reader to see how the mutable features of society and
circumstance bear on the realization of shared hopes and desires—and also, in fact, on
their very structure.12
Such an epistemology forces the theorist into a different mode of observation and analysis than
that typically used in describing political phenomena. The world as lived often differs markedly
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from the world as observed by the objective and detached social scientist. This is a world
mediated by human consciousness and it exists as a matrix of intersecting personal and
communal narratives.
Importantly, this is the ground upon which individual actors and political communities
construct a sense of identity and purpose. Here, I draw on the work of Stephen Crites.
Stories, and the symbolic worlds they project, are not like monuments that men behold,
but like dwelling-places. People live in them. Yet even though they are not directly told,
even though a culture seems rather to be the telling than the teller of these stories, their
form seems to be narrative. They are moving forms, at once musical and narrative, which
inform people’s sense of the story of which their own lives are a part, of the moving
course of their own action and experience.13
Engaging this world of stories as a field for inquiry, the political theorist must deal with premises
that may not be explicit. Often the operative concepts are only exposed through the subtlest
arrangement of metaphors. Taking an author’s narrative voice at his or her word—and always
weighing whether or not that word is completely trustworthy—the philosophically minded reader
can begin to sketch theories about the world contained in a text. To understand the political in
such a fictional world is to have some idea of its limits, as well as the possibilities it offers for
human interaction, social engagement, establishing order, and the building of institutions. To
know this world, the theorist must observe or infer its laws whether natural or conventional. One
must examine questions regarding individual and collective will versus a cosmos of competing
wills, and never excluding the possibilities of chance and fate. Political theorist Catherine
Zuckert writes:
Novels…present a very special or peculiar kind of political thought. Theorists abstract
by generalizing, while novelists abstract by selecting certain elements to represent the
whole. Where the abstraction is, or ought to be, explicit in a theory, in a novel it is veiled
by the specificity of description for the sake of engaging and involving the reader in the
characters' experiences. Such an involvement is necessary for the reader to understand
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the novelist's vision, but it is not sufficient. In order to comprehend the vision of the
author of the novel completely, the reader must also be able to make the significance of
the setting and structure, the implicit interpretation of the personal experience, explicit.14
McCarthy begins and ends his work as a novelist with an emphasis on the human being as
storyteller. And, as all beings are to some extent storytellers, all fiction is to some extent a
commentary on the political milieu from which it emerges. Having established the basic
premises upon which political theory may engage the world of fiction as a source of political
thinking, it remains to explore the manner in which such a philosophical view of narrative
informs McCarthy’s artistic vision in his own work.

Atmospheres of disequilibrium
McCarthy is a story-telling artist. He is also, to a great extent, a theorist of storytelling
itself. His fiction directly engages the role of storytelling in the world of human existence. This
is also a theoretical enterprise through which he challenges commonplace cultural assumptions
regarding the idea and purpose of the novel as a form of political thinking. These conceptual
hallmarks and their political impact are visible even in his earliest published novels. In broad
terms, The Orchard Keeper (1965), Outer Dark (1968), and Child of God (1973) are unified by
particularities of their specific regional setting: early to mid-twentieth-century East Tennessee
(The Appalachian Mountains). Each incorporates nuances of topography, demographics,
folklore, and regional speech patterns specific to that region. In all three novels, the reader
almost immediately becomes aware of a pervasive atmosphere of the grotesque, of a
disequilibrium between the human and non-human elements; a world in which both character
and reader can never feel quite comfortable or at home. This world stands forward—vividly real,
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and yet so strange as to create some doubt as to which planet is being referenced. The following
passage from The Orchard Keeper illustrates this point.
In the relative cool of the timber stands, possum grape and muscadine flourish with a
cynical fecundity, and the floor of the forest—littered with old mossbacked logs, peopled
with toadstools strange and solemn among the ferns and creepers and leaning to how their
delicate livercolored gills—has about it a primordial quality, some steamy carboniferous
swamp where ancient saurian lurk in feigned sleep.15
Consonant with the overwhelming and mysterious strangeness of the world McCarthy
portrays, his first novel, The Orchard Keeper, introduces powerful metaphors of rupture and
distortion in the imagery of its opening passage, a prologue. In this, I find a major interpretive
insight into the political vision of McCarthy’s fiction. The rupture of chronology, an “ironic
chiasmus,” as Jay Ellis terms it, of the inherent ordering of events in time as being endowed with
coherence or even meaning is at issue and faces a serious challenge.16 In this vein, a closing
scene in the novel offers the suggestive phrase “hallucinated recollections,” to describe this
phenomenon.17 Programmatically, the governing motifs of rupture and distortion of
chronological time establishes narrative as a potent creative and destructive force. I deal first
with rupture in this section because it is how the novel opens, and because it provides such a
fitting and emphatic statement of one cornerstone of McCarthy’s vision.
Having established the power of narrative as a creative and destructive force in the world
of the novel, as well as in the world in which novels interact with their readers, McCarthy begins
his career-long exploration of the manner in which the human perception of time is bound up in
the substance of memory, which is itself a narrative. Distortion is a direct result of this rupture in
the temporal dimension of conscious perception. Although treated indirectly in this early novel
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from his oeuvre, the question of history and its ability to convey meaning is a major theme of
McCarthy’s later work.
A similar development is discernible in Outer Dark. My interpretation of this work is
directed toward the philosophical impact of McCarthy’s use of dislocation. Here, instead of the
distortion of time, through ruptures in individual and communal memories, McCarthy does much
the same thing to the idea of space. Space, in Outer Dark, as well as in other works throughout
McCarthy’s corpus, functions metaphorically, even unto the point of allegory. The wandering of
the novel’s protagonists through a landscape that is (and yet, most definitely, is not) the
Appalachian South comes to stand as something emblematic of all men at all times; a narrative
space of responsibility and judgment that cannot be escaped. This idea of the road narrative or,
more properly, the central image of the man on the road—imagery of movement and the sense of
a journey—serves as a major conceptual theme in much of McCarthy’s fiction and is the
interpretive key to his artistic enterprise. Important here is the allegorical use of space through
dislocation, a technique that raises questions of moral and ethical relationships, all of which
McCarthy expresses through narrative.
Child of God, McCarthy’s third published novel, extends this tripartite discussion of
themes, incorporating the idea of discomfort to the discussion. The novel extends this same
moral reasoning inaugurated in Outer Dark in some particular and noteworthy ways, as they
more directly invoke the reader and open up important considerations regarding empathy and
membership. While McCarthy is fairly famous for his preference for the seamier side of the
tracks, peopling his imagined communities with an array of outcasts, misfits, ne’er-do-wells,
“anomic types,” and, in several cases, outright criminals, his protagonist Lester Ballard, is,
without doubt, his boldest foray into the recesses of human depravity embodied in an individual.
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In casting a murderous necrophiliac as the titular “child of god, much like yourself perhaps,”
McCarthy overtly challenges the outer limits of his reader’s empathy.18 Ballard has almost no
redeeming quality whatsoever and yet the conditions of his ostracism are not entirely his own.
In Part One of the novel, the main narrative voice (or direct narrator) is fragmented by
italicized first person asides offering commentary on the character of Ballard and, obliquely, the
action of the plot. This technique of back story conveyed in fragmentary first person accounts,
identified as anonymous voices of the community, offers insight into the novel’s moral universe.
It suggests that the stories we tell, even in recounting our memories, is in a very real and
powerful sense a way of recreating our world, so as to absolve ourselves of uncomfortable truths
in our own history. Such realizations are liable to be disquieting, particularly in a novel that
raises the stakes so high as to suggest joint or communal complicity for crimes of rape, murder,
and the mistreatment of the dead.
In the three sections that are to follow, I interpret and analyze McCarthy’s first three
novels in an effort to establish the centrality of narrative to his political vision as it bears out in
Blood Meridian. Broadly, the effects of distortion, dislocation, and discomfort establish the idea
of narrative as a creative and destructive force at the core of human reality. The one tale—the
tale of each and of all—is a story of human consciousness and its isolation in the world. This
will be the central topic of interpretation in my chapter on witnessing. Yet here also McCarthy
establishes the essential human impulse toward community. Within each section, I identify a
relevant major theme within that novel that illustrates some prominent component of McCarthy’s
overall style and its effect on the political concepts that form the organizational framework of
this dissertation.
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In the section that follows, “Rupture and distortion in stories and storytelling in The
Orchard Keeper,” I analyze McCarthy’s first published novel as a form of political storytelling.
His narrative technique poses a challenge to the reader’s preconceptions regarding the way in
which the interplay of time and memory conveys meaning. Said in another way (and perhaps
more accurately), the interplay of distortions in time and memory may be said to thwart
traditional conceptions of meaning. This tactic exposes direct challenges to the reader’s most
basic assumptions about time and memory projecting perceptional distortion through
anthropomorphic bias in the perception of reality. The conceptual dichotomy of appearance and
reality becomes a major theme in McCarthy’s later work, especially Blood Meridian. Examining
its early and less mature appearance here will facilitate the later discussion and its conceptual
vocabulary. The Orchard Keeper foregrounds the idea of storytelling as way of presenting a
narrative version of reality that, chronologically, makes no sense. Yet it is, ultimately, a closer
approximation of reality than a strictly linear presentation. Here, McCarthy indicates his earliest
assumptions about the way in which both act on reality as well as establishing its basis in the
sphere of human consciousness through memory.

Rupture and distortion in stories and storytelling in The Orchard Keeper
Rupture and fragmentation are the dominant images of McCarthy’s first published novel.
The Orchard Keeper provides a convenient context to talk about McCarthy’s use of time, a
“broken world of divisions and borders where fragmentation overwhelms holistic perception.”19
McCarthy’s treatment of time in The Orchard Keeper anticipates his later treatment of history in
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Blood Meridian and The Border Trilogy. The work is structurally complex: a multi-layered
story constructed in narrative fragments centered around one young boy’s coming of age in the
isolated mountain region of east Tennessee. The reader has a difficult time identifying a main
character or even a linear plot, so I opt to discuss it in terms of theme.
Like many of McCarthy’s works, The Orchard Keeper is built around the structure of a
modern bildungsroman—a boy with no father struggles to come to some sense of being in the
world. The story of a boy’s moral development and, importantly, in the absence of his father,
progressively emerges as a dominant theme in many of McCarthy’s works, notably in Blood
Meridian.20 In this first novel, McCarthy’s narrative construction of selfhood depends
foundationally on the idea of discontinuity, rupture, and distortion. Its narrative is disjunctive,
frequently switching between an omniscient and impersonal third person, to the viewpoints of
various characters, including a mountain lion, without any warning to the reader or regard for
linear temporal sequence. Speaking toward this theme of ruptures in time and their distorting
effects on perception, Vereen Bell observes the following:
This odd and thought-provoking contrivance enables McCarthy to emphasize the
disconnection of these people’s lives, by showing from an aerial perspective connections
that they at their level cannot possibly see. Again the experience of reading is
manipulated, forced into play. We become ironic metaphysicians making order out of
random data, though that order is as meaningless, finally, as the incoherence it
supersedes: what ought to be or might have been is never a serious issue in this novel.21
McCarthy’s rhetorical strategy presents his reader with a world in which the reader’s
assumptions about time, space, and even empathy, are thrown off balance, calling into question
their most basic premises. Descriptive passages often skip over large and indeterminate temporal
20
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expanses, arriving at some disjunctive next scene that, in terms of linear progression of plot,
often seem wildly eccentric. Yet despite these temporal disruptions, the sequences never wander
so far as to deplete the impact of the whole.
McCarthy melds a principle of his artistic or philosophic stance on narrative into the very
form of the novel itself in The Orchard Keeper. This is that the nature of story is more process
than artifact, an activity transcending the life of the character, the experience of the reader, and
even the craft of the author. Referring back to his statements in the Woodward interview, I
postulate that since there is only one story, one tale to tell, which is the man on a perpetual
journey, the narrative cannot be said to have a beginning or end. Through its coming into being,
McCarthy’s first published novel literally opens with an opening. Even before plot or characters
are introduced, The Orchard Keeper begins with a rupture: a tree cut down and the crew cutting
it into lengths. The novel’s prologue is quoted here in full:
The tree was down and cut to lengths, the sections spread and jumbled over the
grass. There was a stocky man with three fingers bound up in a dirty bandage with a
splint. With him were a Negro and a young man, the three of them gathered about the
butt of the tree. The stocky man laid aside the saw and he and the Negro took hold of the
piece of fence and strained and grunted until they got the log turned over. The man got
to one knee and peered into the cut. We best come in this way, he said. The Negro
picked up the crosscut and he and the man began sawing again. They sawed for a time
and then the man said, Hold it. Goddamn, that’s it again. They stopped and lifted the
blade from the cut and peered down into the tree. Uh-huh, said the Negro. It sho is now,
ain’t it?
The young man came over to see. Here, said the man, look sideways here. See? He
looked. All the way up here? he said? Yep, the man said. He took hold of the twisted
wrought-iron, the mangled fragment of the fence, and shook it. It didn’t shake. It’s
growed all through the tree, the man said. We cain’t cut no more on it. Damned old
elum’s bad enough on a saw.
The Negro was nodding his head. Yassa, he said. It most sholy has. Growed all up
in that tree.22
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In the trunk of this “elum” tree the men find a “mangled fragment” of wrought iron fence,
twisted and awry. The fence, observes one of the men, is “growed all through the tree,” and
conspires to thwart the bite of their saw.23 The tree is a living thing while the fence is inanimate
and so, in actuality, their observation reverses the obvious story of what has happened: a fence
was built and, at some later point, a tree has grown up and enveloped it. While the error is
obvious to any reader familiar with the nature of plants and inanimate objects, the narrative voice
offers nothing to correct it.
The dialogue between the three unnamed characters here reveals the novel’s dominant
themes: a spurious relationship between the workings of nature and the realm of human activity;
a perception of time that is distorted or out of joint. Bell states: “We are being reminded, in
relation to the novel’s principal agenda, of the place of our identity in the impersonal scheme of
things.”24 McCarthy scholar Matthew Horton contends that this “condensed image of perceived
history, giving shape to the passage of time” illustrates the manner in which “human hindsight
objectifies the passage of time.”25 The pronouncement of the three mysterious characters is left
to stand, while the tree that has grown into a fence, as well as the integrity of the fence itself, is
not. The novel’s italicized prolegomenon (quoted above) is one of many such interstitial or
parenthetical passages scattered throughout the rest of the novel. Through a variety of voices
and viewpoints, it serves as an aside to the main narrative strand, disrupting the temporal
sequence of the events to create new openings into the world of the novel. Horton explains:
If this initial metaphor for storytelling generates tension between coherence and disorder,
it does so in part by bridging the apparent perceptual gap separating time and space.
McCarthy projects a temporal concept (history) through a spatial lens (tree fragments)
and so foregrounds distortion as an integral part of conveying historical perception. The
fallen and fragmented tree represents the mind of man struggling to recollect and
23
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reassemble the past. Just as the scattered segments indicate that the tree has been
fractured, so must the events and sensations of a story told about the past be extracts from
the temporal order of sequential history. But McCarthy’s style of storytelling, his
narrative technique, goes beyond the idea of distortion as a consequence of limited
memory. He deliberately warps conventional appearance, reveals multiple dimensions of
perception, and jumbles the sequence of his narrative to simulate how man reconceives
the past within memory. Thus, the aesthetic engine of storytelling gives birth to and is
sustained by distortion, the predominant means by which McCarthy undermines the
boundary between time and space and uncovers the structures that exist hidden within
chronology.26
McCarthy presents the idea of narrative as a creative and destructive force. He begins and ends
his first novel with the image of an opening wrenched out of a matrix, composed of things
human and things nonhuman, and creating a gap in space and in time.27 Bell adds the following:
The characters [in the prologue] and the location are not identified. For the time being
the episode remains unassimilated. We can then only assume that some arcane metaphor
is at hand and later on attempt to construe it. The fence that is supposed to have grown
up into the tree, we assume in retrospect, has reference to the theme of man and nature
interfused. In fact, the image is interesting in those terms because the fence that the
baffled observers think has somehow grown into the tree—an odd instance of human
vanity as well as ignorance—has of course been grown around by the tree, absorbed into
it.28
Though McCarthy typically offers no direct insight into the interior consciousness of his
characters, his presentation of the young protagonist, John Wesley, offers a few more narrative
details than those found in later incarnations of the character type. For one, the course of the
boy’s childhood is described in terms of its history, a rupture in time between what was and what
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is. The narrative moves in and out of past and present tense, creating a sense of disjuncture
through “illusions of proximity.”29 This is significant because, like the rest of the novel, the
disjuncture of time and memory is an essential motif through which things happening in the
present clash against things long passed. The story told, so the novel closes:
They are gone now. Fled, banished in death or exile, lost, undone. Over the land sun and
wind still move to burn and sway the trees, the grasses. No avatar, no scion, no vestige of
that people remains. On the lips of the strange race that now dwells there their names are
myth, legend, dust.30
As I have discussed in this section thus far, The Orchard Keeper, McCarthy’s first
published novel, presents some important and enduring themes germane to the political vision
found throughout his body of fiction. McCarthy’s concern for the opposition of the natural order
and its radical separateness from the history of men foregrounds the non-human element and in
doing so opens a large space for the exploration of man as man. His commitment to a certain
depiction of reality—a world in which beauty and horror are somehow unified, and in which man
is not altogether welcome overwhelms his characters, along with his reader, page after page.
And yet however vividly the non-human world stands forth in McCarthy’s prose, he presents the
position of the human in such a way that the substance of that reality is constantly called into
question. The interpretive key for this stylistic hallmark turns on the centrality of narrative in
McCarthy’s vision. Horton presents the following:
Storytelling in The Orchard Keeper similarly infuses time frames from the past into the
present. As stylized performances of intact memories, storytellers and their stories in the
text come closest to embodying how perceiving history and composing narratives
interact; moreover, performances, unlike flashbacks, require an audience to hear them,
adding another layer to the idea of perception.31
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Another way of understanding the pervasive concept of rupture in the novel is the word
deracination, as evidenced in the image of the stump in the bookended opening and closing
scenes. Indeed, one gets the sense that the author may have built up the novel conceptually from
a playful take on the word ‘deracination’ itself which, means stump. Ergo, the entire arc of John
Wesley’s character is one of a rootless existence: truncated and unregenerative. And yet his
homelessness ultimately proves to be his salvation, carrying him away from the decay of the
homeplace and the petrification of the cemetery, out and away out onto the road.
The imagery of the prologue, the tree in the fence in the cemetery, provides a perfect
backdrop. “John Wesley Rattner is in flight from the enclosing spaces of his home and even the
largest town nearby—the sizeable Knoxville, Tennessee. He is also a character in flight from the
entrapment of epilogue. Above all, he is in flight from the graves of his ancestors.”32 A space
has been opened where before there had been a continuum: the falling tree has carried with it the
ingrown fence, wrenching open a gap. Horton adds the following:
[John Wesley’s] attempt to reorder his fragmented past, to tell a story that revitalizes the
initial harmony of the whole of what has occurred, is met with the intrinsic barriers of
history to human perception. Moreover, as he considers where he stands in a changing
world, the impenetrable composite of the old and new orders resists his inquiry. The tree
grows around the fence, and the fence infiltrates the tree. That section of history is
removed, in a sense, by the telling of it, and John Wesley finds a gap through which he
can walk away.33
In this space, after a profound moment of self-realization (or actualization), John Wesley Rattner
chooses to go out, to move or emigrate out of the confinement of his previous life, his history,
and heads off down the western road. Here I detect a theme in McCarthy’s fiction that will serve
as a central feature for the analysis of his fiction. More than any other single image or motif
found throughout his corpus, the road—or more properly, the image of the man on the road—
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most fully expresses the concept of human nature found in McCarthy’s fiction. Roads, and
journeys on roads, are themselves phenomena through which consciousness must mediate the
constructs of time and space. Certainly in challenging these assumptions in this particular way
McCarthy is not arguing that they do not exist. Rather, he is interested in contrasting them as
constructs against the void that, for McCarthy, is the world itself.
The image of the road provides a nice segue into the discussion of the individual’s
condition of displacement in McCarthy’s fiction. Outer Dark, McCarthy’s second published
novel is his first example of a road narrative. His dislocated and dispossessed protagonists, the
siblings Culla and Rinthy Holme, spend the majority of the novel in separate journeys in search
of an abandoned child. Of interest to my dissertation here is McCarthy’s presentation of
dislocation: protagonists wandering through allegorical space stands as a metaphoric exploration
of the position of man in the world. The lack of direction, of getting anywhere on the road, is the
operative metaphor and demonstrates a further manner in which McCarthy challenges his
reader’s assumptions about things familiar in the world in order to explore underlying truths of
existence—that we actually know very little about the world in which we find ourselves. The
dominant motif of allegorical space in Outer Dark, when combined with its analog of time in
The Orchard Keeper, intensifies the role of narrative as a force of creation and sovereignty in
McCarthy’s fiction.

Dislocation and allegorical space in Outer Dark
Outer Dark bears some structural similarity to The Orchard Keeper but is formally
simpler. The novel’s main characters, Culla Holme and his sister Rinthy, live in the mountains
of an unspecified, but implicitly Southern locale. Here they abide in a region remote enough,
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especially considering its time period, to exist beyond the reach of civil law. The siblings’ home
is some four miles from the nearest store and outside of any appreciable sense of human
community. As such, they are thus beyond the reach of any custom, common law, or moral law
regulating the relations of human beings, and no one has disturbed this seclusion for “some three
months.”34 This is a common and important trope appearing frequently in McCarthy’s fiction
and bears considerable weight for the political implications of his vision. As Jay Ellis notes, the
sense of dislocation and disconnection of characters is circumscribed by the spatial domains of
the natural and the conventional. “McCarthy’s characters often seem at odds with the facts of
nature as much as culture. As antinomians, they exist in such stark opposition to the normative
constraints of the dominant culture that they seem all the more at home in the wilderness than in
civilization.”35 This insight offers an important early glimpse into an important political
consideration made throughout McCarthy’s corpus as a whole: the narrative presentation of
sympathetic characters in direct violation of the most universal of moral taboos. The siblings
have committed incest and conceived a child.
As I have discussed in the previous section, McCarthy uses fissures or disruptions in
chronology to create an opening for story in The Orchard Keeper, reflexively calling attention to
the reader’s subjective notion of time itself. In Outer Dark, McCarthy adapts this technique
somewhat, preferring instead to focus on what I term dislocation and allegorical space.
Allegorical space functions much in the same way as metaphorical time. By reducing
either or both to the quality or character of experience, McCarthy engages a level of myth in his
novels, opening the door to phenomenological or existentialist philosophy. Just as time through
memory becomes discontinuous, space through dislocation becomes allegorical, in which
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wandering comes to represent the fundamental human condition. The world of Outer Dark has
no map, no direct correspondence to the real world. Its geography is self-contained and this
bears a strong connection to McCarthy’s use of narrative as a world-creating enterprise.
McCarthy’s tactic in establishing these allegories is to give familiar names to towns, counties,
and rivers, and even relative distances between them, but corresponding to no known map.36 In
this way, Outer Dark stands as another reworking of one of McCarthy’s favorite forms: that of
the road novel.
In many respects, it presents a kind of prototype for later novels. My discussions of
Blood Meridian and the Border Trilogy in later chapters reveal these to be later manifestations of
the same basic philosophical question. In the context of Outer Dark, spatial imagery returns to
the man on a journey motif within McCarthy’s canon. The image of the isolated wanderer
figures significantly into McCarthy’s political imagination, a foundational component of his
ethical or moral philosophy. Blair presents a typology:
Cormac McCarthy's novels have always centered around the figure of the isolato—the
man alone in a naturalistically indifferent and shockingly violent world, trying to keep
flesh and soul together in the face of existential doubt and terrible tribulation and
suffering. That world in which McCarthy sets his lonely characters is thoroughly
postlapsarian and thoroughly undifferentiated; the same unpleasantness is everywhere,
and whether in Kentucky or New Mexico is largely a matter of detail.37
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While this motif is developed more thoroughly in Blood Meridian and later works, the basic
ideas are present in McCarthy’s presentation of Culla Holme in Outer Dark. And the motif is an
important political component of McCarthy’s overall narrative project. Its appearance in this
early work demonstrates the centrality of freedom within the context of a journey narrative to
McCarthy’s mode of storytelling. Why is this important? A partial answer is that the imagery
establishes something elemental about McCarthy’s portrayal of human nature—man as
homeless, isolated, and spiritually blind.
The dislocated wandering of the siblings Culla and Rinthy Holme typifies this idea of the
destination-less journey in McCarthy’s fiction. The object of the quest for Rinthy is her
unnamed child, for Culla, it is his sister. The child is the object of Rinthy’s desire, and yet she
has no idea where to go, what to say to any would be helpers, any description of the tinker she
believes is holding her child, any sense of distance or geographic relationships. She cannot tell
anyone where she is going, of where her home is located, the name of the child (or of the tinker).
She knows only a few things: that she has a child in the world, that her brother is the father of the
child, that the tinker most likely has the child and, that she wants him back. When asked where
her she lives she cannot answer: “I don’t live nowhere no more, she said. I never did much. I
just go around huntin my chap. That’s about all I do any more.”38
The tension between Culla and Rinthy in the allegorical space they inhabit is one of being
bound to each other, and yet driven apart. The travelling, the movement, the not admitting to
needing anything like help or empathy or sympathy, the point of it all, is that the narrator
presents them recessively and the reader’s perception or judgment of them becomes a difficult
matter of choice. So few clues are available, and so few opportunities for redemption,
reconciliation or conclusion remain, save for the “frail agony of grace” that Rinthy inhabits, or
38
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Culla’s “terror of the open land.”39 While their respective journeys have a purpose, they are
undertaken with little knowledge or forethought; hence, the wandering. The two spend the
majority of their time in the narrative simply on a road to somewhere although they don’t where
they are going or how to get there. The reader gets no sense of how long the journey takes or
where it leads. They have no sense of a destination or any real sense of themselves as they
correspond to their journey. They move about in no apparent direction and this recursiveness of
movement heightens the significance on their encounters with other characters. In opposition to
Rinthy and Culla, these characters are defined by their staying put, rather than their moving on.
In this sense, the encounters themselves serve as the only waymarkers of their journeys. Noting
this, Giles observes something significant about the characters’ general situation. “Until Culla’s
ill-fated journey to town to find help for Rinthy, one wonders whether they have ever known
anything like an established human society.”40
Throughout their episodic wanderings, the two encounter a myriad of eccentric
characters, provincials and grotesques, who offer either assistance or scorn, and with little
apparent motive. These “others” encountered by Culla and Rinthy occupy an altogether different
type of space. Typically, they do not live closely with anyone else, and any sense of community
among them is conspicuously absent. Townspeople readily become mobs in this narrative and
are generally suspicious of each other and particularly of newcomers, at least in the case of
Culla. The talkative ones—typically serving as interlocutors with the protagonists in dialogic
scenes—live more simplistic, isolated lives. They seem less suspicious than townspeople, less
judgmental. They appear to regard wandering vagabonds very much in stride, rather than
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something strange; all of these exchanges, however, are not so benign. Here, McCarthy
introduces Culla to the novel’s villains:
When he entered the glade he could see men seated about the fire and he hobbled on, one
hand raised, into the firelight. When he saw what figures warmed there he was already
among them and it was too late. There were three of them and there was a child
squatting in the dust beyond them the tinker’s car with the hung pans catching the light
like the baleful eyes of some outsized and mute and mindless jury assembled there
hurriedly against his coming.41
Three murderous outlaws, archetypal emissaries of darkness, “foot soldiers of the
apocalypse,” flirt about the periphery of Outer Dark. 42 They drift in and out of the primary
narrative strands, encountering Culla in his own aimless wandering, and eventually
reencountering him in the novel’s concluding scenes. They dispense death and violence
everywhere they go and exact on Culla a repulsive and malignant version of authority and
judgment over life and death. In terms of political themes, it is important to note that in their
metaphoric role, the trio represents a version of absolute freedom and sovereignty of action in
McCarthy’s political world. Though in later works the character type will take on even greater
significance in its role as foil to a protagonist seeking to avoid judgment, even in this debut, the
predatory nature of authority figures helps to add focus to McCarthy’s philosophic program.
“What is at stake in the cryptic exchanges between Culla and these smugly grotesque outlaws is
the simple, premetaphysical use of human identity.43 Somehow Culla manages to survive these
encounters, but his ultimate fate is to be lifelong wandering, blind and destitute, within a spiritual
wasteland. Human society seems neither prepared to accept him nor able to kill him, but only to
sit in silent judgment of his unspeakable guilt. Toward this hostility, he seems unable or
unwilling to offer much resistance. Bell comments on this lack of agency: “Culla appears to
41
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have punished himself by giving up, and everyone else’s guilt has become his own. He has
managed to have himself cast out from a tiny place that ruled absolutely into a world in which he
is absolutely ruled.”44
Judgment and guilt are dominant themes in many of McCarthy’s novels. Interestingly,
they are commonly connected to tensions between fathers and sons. In The Orchard Keeper,
John Wesley Rattner combats the stern visage of his erstwhile father in the portrait on the
mantle. In Outer Dark the paternal tensions are inverted, but the element of guilt is intensified
by both the landscape, and by the necessity of naming one’s sin. This is the definitive image of
Culla: face clutched between his hands in sheer horror, hounded, fugitive, wanting to hide and
terrified of being found. Culla’s guilt over his commission of incest animates his own
dislocation and journey on the road. His pointless search for his sister is his way of keeping on
the move, of avoiding the reckoning for what he has done, of naming responsibility. Thus,
Culla’s freedom is totally curtailed. He is in the opposite position to everyone else, he cannot
judge, but only be judged.45 His position in allegorical space is one of banishment—the exile of
outer darkness. For Culla there can be no redemption, no healing, absolution, or reconciliation.
Drawing on the biblical overtones of this theme of judgment and guilt in the novel, especially
with reference to its title, Edwin Arnold finds a life-affirming moral center animating the moral
and ethical questions presented in the novel. “In McCarthy’s highly moralistic world,” he writes,
“sins must be named and owned before they can be forgiven.”46
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Things that are named may be said to exist, and not so the other way around. Thus, things
that exist must always have some witness to substantiate their reality. McCarthy’s world, despite
what critics contend, is not solipsistic. However tightly locked in upon itself, consciousness is an
interactive phenomenon in McCarthy’s world. A witness is needed, and this is Culla’s greatest
fear—that his name is known even though he tries to hide it. That his deeds or transgressions
have a life on their own, even though he has tried to keep them hidden by refusing to name them.
In this way, Culla is metaphorically emblematic of all men as McCarthy views them.
Man’s only hope is to be witnessed by someone, as the conclusion of the Border Trilogy makes
clear. Like Culla, most men do not listen or heed this. Men do not wish to have to answer for
themselves, accepting the burden of responsibility that follows an act of naming. We do not
want to acknowledge or need or neediness of others. Our greatest fear is that we will be
discovered, and yet this remains our secret suspicion: that we have already been found out. We
fear the ultimate judgment of God, but we encounter it only in the world. This is ultimately the
strongest argument against the allegation of existential nihilism in McCarthy’s artistic and
philosophical project.
The true horror of McCarthy’s vision is not that there is no God, but that there is, and that
the world is in some way an expression of what God is really like. Somehow who and what we
are and what we have done and whatever we may do, out of choice or necessity, is already
known. That we cannot change this narrative is our plight as humans—that whatever we might
come to think of as ourselves individually or the expression of some independent will is already
written in some other book. Thus, like individuality—and its expression through will—the
conclusion must be considered that freedom, too, is just an illusion. Even in the boundless
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expanses of the world, with an infinite array of other possibilities, we are never truly free to
create.
The ideal of the open land is both compelling and terrifying for McCarthy’s characters.
Yet this paradox would appear to lie at the heart of something deeply true in all of McCarthy’s
philosophic imagination. Of course, the open land symbolizes freedom. Yet while McCarthy’s
later fiction is deeply preoccupied with this question, it becomes increasingly complicated. The
open land symbolizes freedom—human freedom. It does not inherently or essentially symbolize
anything further in and of itself. The imagery sets up a confrontation between the human will
and the impersonal ordering of the world. A further confrontation is seen here between the idea
of the individual itself and a matrix of word and flesh independent of any individual actor.
Thus, space, narrative, and freedom connect with the ideas of naming and moral
judgment by the novel’s conclusion. This development turns the conversation toward the issue
of sovereignty in McCarthy’s fiction: Who has the authority to pass judgment, and what makes
this authority legitimate? This feature serves as something of a paradox because the ultimate
symbols of this kind of absolute authority are a trio of ghouls who transgress every basic taboo
imaginable, and yet their power over the general direction of the plot is undeniable. These
characters must be reckoned with, and they only obey rules that they impose upon themselves. It
would seem that their authority is derived from some higher order than any social or political
institution or entity. They recognize laws of a different kind and thus live either in an existential
vacuum, or the opposite of one. Chaotic, wholly unaccountable, discriminately lethal—but the
basis of this discernment is known only to them. They are wholly “free men.” And as free men,
they may transgress when, where, and however they please.
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All of the facts of our existence, signifiers of our identity, are already known. And thus,
all of who we are and what we will do is already foreordained, judged, and the executioner of
sentence is actively seeking us in the world. Characters like the grim triune here, and others that
follow in later novels embody a duality and a certain charm, because they possess this ultimate
knowledge and thus, we are attracted to them even as we are repulsed. In a gnostic formulation,
their knowledge of the truth exposes a deeper division in the world between appearance and
reality. And this is precisely what the average human lacks, and even seeks. This need is
precisely what animates the journey of the man on the road. Thus, while the story is already
written, perhaps McCarthy’s moral teaching is that man must act as though this were not so. He
must hope that, somehow, somewhere further on down the road lies some later man, some
unforeseen witness, who will overtake the story and continue it. 47
Having considered the stylistic effects of rupture and dislocation in McCarthy’s theory of
narrative, a final brief survey of McCarthy’s third published novel remains to round out this
conceptual triad. Heretofore, I have presented concepts in McCarthy’s fiction that are mostly
bound within or contained by the works themselves. However a large component of McCarthy’s
political vision is found in the interaction between the narrative voice and the reader. Child of
God, McCarthy’s third published novel offers the clearest expression of this idea.

Empathy and discomfort in Child of God
Child of God (1974) is based on historical subject matter: an actual murder case that took
place in the Knoxville area. The newspaper accounts date to a time that McCarthy was living in
Knoxville, and it is possible that he had knowledge of the case. The novel chronicles the process
47
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of alienation, banishment, and final descent into total madness of its protagonist, Lester Ballard.
In the novel’s opening scene, Ballard is forcibly removed from the small farm he has inherited
from his father. Ballard’s deranged mental state of derangement is exacerbated by his father’s
death was a grisly suicide by hanging. Nobody seems to know why. Some indication is given
that it was ostensibly either for nonpayment of taxes or because, as an unnamed character
narrates: “The mother had run off, I don’t know where to nor who with.”48 Ballard is stripped to
the most meager trappings of humanity, which he combines with his vengeful wrath, and his
ability to shoot a rifle with deadly accuracy. His life is thus constrained and marginalized, and
his choices for belonging within human society become increasingly constricted by both
circumstance as well as his own maladjustment. In what has been aptly described as “an
inexorable progression of events that bear a horrifyingly logical relationship to one another,”
Ballard becomes a necrophiliac and then a serial killer. Pursued by authorities, he takes refuge in
a cave in the mountains. Ballard is beyond the pale, challenging the most primitive taboos often
thought to separate man from beast, and yet he remains a child of God, despite his essentially
human perversions.
This novel finds McCarthy at his most grotesque and horrifying extremes, yet the novel is
not devoid of moral judgment or even empathy. The central moral question of the novel turns on
whether Ballard— “a child of God, much like yourself perhaps,” has been born into his blighted
fate, or whether he is the creation of a community that needs to create pariahs, and is thus,
through its scapegoating, rendered accomplis in his crazed acts of depravity. The sense of
discomfort conveyed by the narrative voice in Child of God points out that the reader (both as
audience and as witness to Lester Ballard’s acts) is not willing to acknowledge certain disturbing
realities—“monstrosities of moral deviance”—about him or herself and, further, that the
48
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evidence for this fact can be found in the reader’s subjective inability or refusal to acknowledge
Lester Ballard as one of “our own.” 49 And yet, McCarthy asks, on what authority can we reject
him? The sense of discomfort is located in the very possibility of such deviance within a
community of “normal” people. We are discomforted because the familiar moral terrain has
become confused. It is located in the reader’s moral imagination and in the realization of the
extent to which every one of us is partially complicit in such deviance in our midst. McCarthy
plays on our fears that the greatest horrors imaginable in human behavior might, in fact, stem
from a failure of compassion, and not reason.
As the reader watches Lester’s descent into the monstrous and deadly moral terrain of his
actions, he becomes increasingly aware of the community’s complicity. McCarthy is never a
moralist. Nevertheless, he offers a damning critique of the nomos—a critique that shakes the
foundations of traditional assumptions about identity and history. His outcast and wandering
characters are dispossessed as much (if not more) than they are dislocated or discontinuous with
reality. Lester Ballard stands as a sort of apotheosis of this kind of moral reasoning found
throughout McCarthy’s corpus, but particularly during this period. His monstrosity is a
difference of degree, not of kind.
To watch these things issuing from the otherwise mute pastoral morning is a man at the
barn door. He is small, unclean, unshaven. He moves in the dry chaff among the dust
and slats of sunlight with a constrained truculence. Saxon and Celtic bloods. A child of
God much like yourself perhaps.50
His humanity is consistently affirmed in the text; as well as his love. Lydia Cooper states that
“the narrative voice in Child of God seems intent on making the point that the reader ought to
interpret Ballard as a sympathetic, or at least pathetic man—an interpretation that grows
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increasingly absurd as Ballard’s depravity sinks to new depths, literally and metaphorically.”51
She continues:
In the dark worlds of McCarthy’s corpus, human affinity is always endangered if not
practically extinct, but it is also the source of human hope. The urge toward
connectedness with others becomes absolutely primal in these novels. When a
character’s internal thoughts and motivations are revealed, such revelations almost
always serve to emphasize that character’s visceral need for others.52
For the reader, just the same as for the community depicted in the novel, the discomforting
aspect of Lester Ballard is the reader’s sense of obligation toward him, or a sense of
responsibility for what society has made him. This is partially achieved by the novel’s narrative
style. It is also achieved by the direct narrator’ appeal to the reader’s empathy. Consider the
following passage (an aside):
He could not swim, but how would you drown him? His wrath seemed to buoy him up.
Some halt in the way of things seems to work here. See him. You could say he’s
sustained by his fellow men, like you. Has peopled the shore with them calling to him. A
race that gives suck to the maimed and the crazed, that wants their wrong blood in its
history and will have it. But they want this man’s life. He has heard them in the night
seeking him with lanterns and cries of execration. How then is he borne up? Or rather,
why will not these waters take him?53
The problem presented in Child of God is ultimately social in nature. But in its fullest
expression, it is also a matter of political philosophy. “Reality itself can be rather dark, and
perhaps McCarthy’s complex, knotty ethical arguments demand attention precisely because they
offer necessary insights into an increasingly complicated nonfiction world.”54 The discomfort,
then, comes from the reader’s suspicion that these “rather complicated ethics” of McCarthy’s
vision have bearing in the world outside his novels.55 This is how McCarthy conducts his
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political philosophy in this early work—though he will continue this in later works in more
expressive terms, as I discuss in later chapters of the dissertation. The invocation of the audience
as witness here, though, is something not to be missed. Narrative disruption is a stylistic
technique pointing to key insights for McCarthy’s political project.
The continuity of the narrative is interrupted seven times over the course of the novel.
There are levels of storytelling: the first is the voice of the direct narrator—the omniscient, third
person voice that serves as the primary vehicle for character and plot description in all of the
works.5657 The second level of storytelling is the one created by the tales of characters
themselves in the novels. The man on a journey frequently encounters an array of prophets and
oracles, often blind or prescient, offering reflection or wisdom that is typically of limited use.
McCarthy’s fiction relies heavily on the voice of the omniscient third person narrator.
The function of this voice is to introduce the reader to the world of any particular novel. Yet this
voice is frequently interrupted by other voices interwoven into the text that serve to recount
events from differing perspectives based on characters’ viewpoints. Child of God is a
particularly clear example of this. Through this stylistic device, McCarthy establishes a narrative
technique of discomfort through the grotesque. The operative political considerations, I contend,
are not bound up in whichever particular trope is in play, so much as what the effect achieves in
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terms of a political program directed toward the basic assumptions of human sociability and the
nomos of the tribe.
In McCarthy the settlement is confronted, as is all else which threatens to striate space,
through violence of the most extraordinary kind—violence as a sustained intensity rather
than a simple reaction, a constant which smooths away all custom and law to facilitate
unfettered movement.58
A final dimension, the tragic, is also worth mentioning here before moving on. A sense
of tribalism pervades Child of God. And when we find it, the nomos of the tribe is definitely
under attack in all of McCarthy’s moral vision. But no less is logos. Both, I believe, inevitably
must die in the descent into chaotic violence that typifies the middle works of McCarthy’s
oeuvre. Tribalism presents an outlook on the political world that casts all questions of sociability
into the narrow dichotomy of “us” versus “them”. Considering the moral context presented in
Child of God, the question he poses may be phrased thus: can we bear it that one of our own is
deviant? At what point does the particular case of Lester Ballard no longer make demands on
our sympathy? At what point does he no longer have any sense of a claim to our empathy?
The narrative disruptions serve the following purpose: they show the disjunctive nature of
nomos. In Euripidean fashion, they call out the basic suppositions about the nature of order into
question. Empathy is essential to human attachment or affection, and this says something
significant about human sociability. Can order be maintained impersonally? Can we extend
membership to even the most loathsome examples of humanity? Can we deny such humanity
simply due to acts of deviance and transgression? How does our human community process
such evil in our midst? The historical record of history, as witness, attests something very
different. Such moments of wondering are remarkable when placed into the thoughts of
McCarthy’s famously unreflective characters. These scenes stand as an expression of empathy,
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particularly in Child of God. Lester thinks to himself in both: “Disorder in the woods, trees
down, new paths needed. Given charge Ballard would have made things more orderly in the
woods and in men’s souls.”59 “[Lester] watched the hordes of cold stars sprawled across the
smokehole and wondered what stuff they were made of, or himself.”60 The idea, of course, is to
imply the reader’s moral complicity in the morass of moral chaos found in any (and every)
McCarthy work. The “disorder in men’s souls” passage, quoted above, intensifies this feeling
and is echoed by one of Blood Meridian’s most important and memorable passages. Before
turning to that work, however, some conclusions need to be made in the present area of analysis.

Conclusion
While McCarthy’s first three novels do not present the entirety of his political
philosophy, or even his narrative vision, his Appalachian period does serve as a useful hors
d’oeuvre (in the literal sense) because in it he presents some of the essential or signature
elements of his style in less complicated forms. The applicability of distortion, dislocation, and
discomfort as interpretive “hooks” to the first three novels does not do justice to the quality of
the fiction, but they are sufficient to establish the basic terms of the discussion.
First, the opening of The Orchard Keeper provides a demonstration of the metaphoric
and literal power of narrative. The existential void, a continuum encompassing “reality” itself, is
ripped apart. The full potential of this narrative device is never considered by the protagonist,
nor explained to the reader, but its metaphoric value is immense. The temporal fragmentation of
plot conveys distortion between the immediacy of present experience and the largely conjectural
backstory.
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Second, Outer Dark intensifies and complicates elements visible in The Orchard Keeper.
Whereas assumptions about chronological linearity are challenged in the former work, a similar
challenged is posed to spatiality in the latter. Horton adumbrates it thus:
McCarthy frustrates clarity of perception even as he establishes links or patterns of
meaning. In fact, what he does allow his reader to see depends on the suspension of
temporality he forces his reader to endure. The distortion of strict linear chronology into
another shape continually reinforces the inherent tension between narrative space and
time.61
The idea here is to see both the fragmentation motif, but also (and more importantly) to note the
manner in which allegorical space sets up a narrative context in which to examine questions of
moral accountability. My discussion of Outer Dark focuses on the conceptual themes of
identity, naming responsibility, and judgment, all of which are tied to the pervasive theme of
movement. While the idea of human freedom presented in The Orchard Keeper is one of an
individual mostly constrained by external and historical forces, Outer Dark departs from this
strategy. While the power of circumstance and the unforeseeable effects of coincidence
constrain the realm of action, everything that happens in the narrative results from an action.
Whereas Rinthy almost floats along her journey, Culla, by contrast, is pursued incessantly by
superhuman agents of retribution who claim full authority and agency to exact their will. The
baby serves largely as a MacGuffin device—a metaphorical entity whose pursuit animates the
plot. The journey is the essential thing for McCarthy who asks: “what impels us?” The answer
suggested by the conclusion of Outer Dark is that it is our desire not to take responsibility for our
culpability, as well as our need for community. The dislocation of sovereign authority
complicates the action in this novel. The place where things happen (and do not happen) is
significant. Ellis offers the most profound explanation of pace and authority and relationships on
this point. In formulating my own analysis, I have become particularly attached to the phrase
61

Horton, 289.

59

“terror of the open land.”62 The visibility of the open country, or even of the open sky, seems to
be what Culla fears most. The idea of having nowhere to run to, or nowhere to hide, invokes the
themes of witnessing and the natural landscape, the respective subjects of the next two chapters.
Like The Orchard Keeper, the general mood conveyed in Outer Dark is one of profound
isolation. There is no escaping the imperative to account to oneself to a higher authority.
Questions of identity reappear: “Who am I?”, and, “What am I supposed to do?” In the context
of Outer Dark, this question is encountered in the context of unspeakable guilt through moral
transgression. Almost all of the moral or ethical questions opened in Outer Dark remain
unresolved, but its conclusion offers something of a foothold. The theme of spiritual blindness is
typical of McCarthy’s protagonists. So is the idea of wandering through a world created by
allegorical space.
Space and open country are prominent motifs for McCarthy, and are intimately connected
to his portrayal of human freedom. The allegorical depiction here heightens our awareness to the
philosophical depth and complexity of ourselves as storytelling beings; moving, always moving,
stumbling our way through a world that does not care that nobody wants us. And if the reader
finds him or herself made uneasy by the lack of a locus of certainty in moral reasoning in these
matters, this feeling is only intensified when one proceeds next to McCarthy’s third published
novel, Child of God.
Child of God discomforts the reader first by breaking the fourth wall between the
narrative voice and the audience. This is a tactic McCarthy’s reader will encounter again and
again. But in Lester Ballard’s story, I find a rehearsal of established themes, with the added
wrinkle of implying the reader’s complicity as a witness to the protagonist’s monstrous acts of
moral transgression. Empathy is an interpretive problem in all of McCarthy’s fiction. Cooper
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presents this issue in the context of heroism, and her interpretation is compelling. Lester Ballard
commits his horrifying acts out of a perverse form of love, or a need for the acceptance of some
form of community. The larger society wants his “wrong blood” all the more for this very
reason. Emblematically, they must ostracize and, eventually, kill him for his acts of
transgression, but on what authority? The scapegoat must be killed because society cannot
stomach the thought of accepting him. All that Ballard is and, ultimately, all that he will be is
dissected for study in a medical school. Such monstrous evil in our midst cannot be accepted, so
it must be explained. Somehow we must discover the hidden flaw in the weft of his being, the
physiological seat of his deviance, the thing that makes him other than we. But ultimately,
McCarthy suggests that Lester Ballard wants only the same thing that we all want: community.
And in this context, I think he intends it as another word for love.63
McCarthy’s first three published novels offer insights helpful to understanding his larger
body of work. First and foremost, they establish the place and power of narrative in shaping
McCarthy’s overall philosophic and aesthetic outlook. McCarthy’s disorienting narrative
techniques in his presentation of time in The Orchard Keeper, space in Outer Dark, and empathy
in Child of God anticipate more mature and, important to this study, more political discussions of
these themes in later works. In the next chapter I use the theme of nature to frame my discussion
of Blood Meridian. Here, I use McCarthy’s distinctive treatment of the non-human world as a
commentary on human nature and human art. The vocabulary I use shifts away from this
chapter’s emphasis on space to the term “landscape,” which is more appropriate to that novel.
The landscape of Blood Meridian functions largely as a character itself, and is the best point of
entry to examine the novel’s political themes. Further on, time remains conceptually relevant,
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but reappears later in a discussion of history in chapter three. Empathy is reengaged in chapter
four under the conceptual theme of witnessing. I turn now to introduce Blood Meridian and
begin my discussion of nature in McCarthy’s political imagination.
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2. Nature

The next three chapters of this dissertation will focus on Blood Meridian. In the
chronology of McCarthy’s publishing, his fifth novel, Blood Meridian, or The Evening Redness
in the West, represents a tidal shift in the setting and tone of his literary output, as well as his
biography. His previous four novels are set in the rural Appalachians and are colored by the
topography and local idiom of that place, a few notable exceptions notwithstanding. The
publication of this work marks a decisive turning point in terms of historical and geographical
setting, imagery, and theme. McCarthy has become a Southwestern writer since his move to
west Texas in the nineteen eighties. The novels of this second period in McCarthy’s career are
unified by a few key features: First, many of the works are inflected with prolonged un-translated
dialogue in Spanish; second, many feature pervasive gothic imagery of post-colonial
Catholicism; thirdly, the idea of the borderland, and of Mexico as the embodiment of the natural
or untamed other, become part of a general trend in McCarthy’s concern for landscape.
Beginning with Blood Meridian, McCarthy’s fiction begins an increasingly direct exploration of
la frontera, the border between the United States and Mexico—a source of both attraction and
apprehension for many of McCarthy’s characters. McCarthy uses the reality of this historical
and geopolitical fact to weave a metaphoric liminal zone in which certain philosophic questions
can best be explored.
First, it is worth noting that Blood Meridian represents the last work McCarthy published
as “America’s best unknown major writer.”1 Published in 1985, the novel made few waves
among reviewers and critics when it appeared. It is now, however, widely regarded by many as
McCarthy’s finest novel, and even thought to rank among the most important novels of the
1
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twentieth century. Operatic in tone and epic in scope, it has been called “the authentic American
apocalyptic,” and “the ultimate Western, not to be surpassed,” by eminent literary scholar and
critic Harold Bloom.2 The novel is artfully conceived and rendered as a pastiche or even parody
of the nineteenth century stylistic tropes that constitute its subject matter—its form and style
informing its plot and the underlying philosophical questions. Central to these, perhaps more so
than in any other work of McCarthy’s is the relationship between the world as it is and the world
created by language. Indeed, it is in Blood Meridian perhaps more than in any other work that
McCarthy renders the mythopoeic language of time and space into the realm of the actual, or,
one might say, of history. This chapter and the one that follows are designed to interrogate the
two sides of this dichotomy.
All of McCarthy’s fiction is unified by an overwhelming sense of natural landscape—a
world of power and mystery standing apart or in opposition to the human realm. For McCarthy,
the natural landscape represents a foil to the being and doing of the human characters. This view
of nature is an important component of McCarthy’s political vision. He constantly engages the
question of what it is to be human in a world so categorically inhumane. In doing so he raises
the classic question of the relationship of nature and convention, but his answer serves to cloud
or complicate this question rather than to simplify or answer it. I build upon previous points of
analysis as a means of presenting McCarthy’s naturalistic vision in its fullest expression.
Following the review of scholarly literature, arranged thematically under the heading
“McCarthy’s Erotics of Landscape,” the major sections of this chapter: “Optical Democracy”
and “McCarthy’s Moral Terrain,” treat Blood Meridian’s presentation of nature in terms familiar
to political theory. The major political question to be addressed is the manner in which this
optical democracy of the human and the nonhuman informs the faculties of seeing, being, and
2
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knowing in McCarthy’s political vision. Over the course of this chapter I interrogate
McCarthy’s positioning of man in a nonhuman world and how this establishes a philosophical
commentary on ontology and epistemology. These insights open up further questions of ethics
and action in an existential vacuum. Questions about the place of the Divine loom, but never
find concrete answers in Blood Meridian, or any of McCarthy’s other works.
Throughout his corpus, McCarthy’s view of nature is broadly conceived and subtly
presented. Of primary importance is the profound sense of hostility between the human and the
non-human that pervades many of these descriptions. If it can be said that McCarthy creates a
world wherein humans and nature are locked in a mortal contest, then it may be said that, at least
on the surface of things, that nature wins every time. Nature, for McCarthy, is a concept
representing the unknowable, the irrational, and the anti-human—but this last one is not without
some interesting problems stemming from value-laden assumptions inherited about nature for the
particular (twentieth century) audience of this novel. To wit, it stems from the historical fact of
the human conquest of nature as a consequence of Enlightenment rationalist philosophy.
In all his works McCarthy’s narrator avoids sympathetic language to describe nature,
eschewing Romantic notions in favor of modernist ones. This is paradoxical, as McCarthy is
parodying the style of the modern romance (novel). Nature is quite often presented as ugly—at
least in terms of the vernacular McCarthy parodies. Nature is never simply pretty in McCarthy’s
fiction. It is never homely. Indeed, in most of McCarthy’s narratives, nature is presented rather
as the opposite of home, challenging the common view of nature as an edenic paradise. This
view is not nature’s perspective at all, however much McCarthy’s audience is hardwired to
expect that it is, which is entirely the issue. Thus, McCarthy’s brutal, “tooth and claw” realism,
at least where confined to his narrative descriptions of landscape, functions as an instrument for
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challenging both his characters’ as well as his readers’ assumptions about the world in which we
live. I begin this chapter with a brief synopsis of the novel for readers who may not have the
benefit of familiarity. Following this synopsis, I preface my own analysis with a brief review of
pertinent critical scholarship on Blood Meridian.

Overview of Blood Meridian: plot, characters, and style
Blood Meridian or The Evening Redness in the West begins with three epigraphs. The
first is from Paul Valéry:
Your ideas are terrifying and your hearts are faint. Your acts of pity and cruelty are
absurd, committed with no calm, as if they were irresistible. Finally, you bear blood
more and more. Blood and time.
The second epigraph is from Jacob Boehme:
It is not thought that the life of darkness is sunk in misery and lost as if in sorrowing.
There is not sorrowing. For sorrow is a thing that is swallowed up in death, and death
and dying are the very life of the darkness.
The third and final epigraph comes from the Yuma Daily Sun, June 13, 1982:
Clark, who led last year’s expedition to the Afar region of northern Ethiopia, and UC
Berkeley colleague Tim D. White, also said that a re-examination of a 300,000-year-old
fossil skull found in the same region earlier showed evidence of having been scalped.
The novel is divided into twenty-three chapters plus an epilogue. Mimicking the romance, a
popular nineteenth century literary convention, each of the chapters begins with an overview of
the major plot points of the chapter. Thus, the overview of Blood Meridian’s Chapter One
appears as follows:
Childhood in Tennessee – Runs away – New Orleans – Fights – Is shot – To Galveston –
Nacogdoches – The Reverend Green – Judge Holden – An affray – Toadvine – Burning
of the hotel – Escape.3
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The major events of each chapter are prefigured in these summaries. Their combined
effect partially reveals McCarthy’s interest in finding a means to express what Vereen Bell calls
“the episodic nature of experience.”4 Indeed, the episodes, though linked, reveal very little in the
way of a typical linear plot progression. Presented as a historical romance Blood Meridian is a
pastiche, mimicking the stylistic conventions of the novels of the time period it takes as its
subject matter. McCarthy is ever playful in this regard, yet this textual (or even meta-textual)
enterprise is essential to understanding McCarthy’s philosophic project. He engages in an
interplay of literary conventions: historical romance, bildungsroman, pastiche, and parody. To
begin this synopsis, I must first introduce the novel’s narrative voice. The direct narrator
beckons the reader to moral accountability or witnessing and thus invokes the reader’s direct
responsibility in the moral landscape of the novel. It also serves as a means of introducing the
novel’s protagonist. Here I quote at length:
See the child. He is pale and thin, he wears a thin and ragged linen shirt. He stokes
the scullery fire. Outside lie dark turned fields with rags of snow and darker woods
beyond that harbor yet a few last wolves. His folk are known for hewers of wood and
drawers of water but in truth his father has been a schoolmaster. He lies in drink, he
quotes from poets whose names are now lost. The boy crouches by the fire and watches
him.
Night of your birth. Thirty-three. The Leonids they were called. God how the stars
did fall. I looked for blackness, holes in the heavens. The dipper stove.
The mother dead these fourteen years did incubate in her own bosom the creature who
would carry her off. The father never speaks her name, the child does not know it. He
has a sister in this world that he will not see again. He watches, pale and unwashed. He
can neither read nor write and in him broods already a taste for mindless violence. All
history present in that visage, the child the father of the man.5
Important to note here is the aforementioned narrative voice’s invocation of the reader’s
complicity. The phrase, “See the child…” draws the reader into a sense of connection with the
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kid as an innocent.6 McCarthy uses the voice of his direct narrator as a witness and his
relationship to his reader through the medium of the text is a project in engaging empathy and
then testing its limits.
Also importance in the passage above is the emphasis on optics; the imperative to “See
the child.” “Seeing” is a central feature in reading Blood Meridian and, indeed, in McCarthy’s
entire body of fiction. The “optical democracy” of landscape in Blood Meridian, discussed in
this chapter as a philosophical and political concept, is of primary importance to understanding
one of the key elements of McCarthy’s overall philosophic agenda, what Vereen Bell (discussing
another novel) describes as “the place of our identity in the impersonal scheme of things.”7
Seeing and hearing are both crucial elements to the world of this novel, and both have to do with
the idea of witnessing. Of further importance here is the use of real or actual historical detail:
snow, wolves, the Leonid meteor shower of 1833; all are natural elements. But these elements
have actual historical correspondences to that period in American history, and as such, begin an
interesting interplay between the mythical or metaphorical on one hand, and the historical fact on
the other. Noting this, McCarthy scholar John Emil Sepich writes: “In Blood Meridian are
historically verifiable characters, places and events, though few of these correspondences are
immediately apparent to the novel’s reader.”8
Blood Meridian’s reader is witness to the life and deeds of this unnamed kid, but the kid
is not, in fact, a work of pure imagination but an analog to an actual historical figure: Col.
Samuel E. Chamberlain (1829-1908). Sepich’s research into McCarthy’s source materials for
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the novel discloses that one of the novel’s major influences was Samuel Chamberlain’s memoir,
My Confession: Recollections of a Rogue. Sepich writes:
Union Army general Samuel Chamberlain’s handwritten personal narrative, My
Confession, chronicling his adventures in the Southwest of the late 1840s, rediscovered
by a private collector at a bookseller’s in 1956, was probably written as much as a
hundred years earlier (Chamberlain 2-3). It was serialized in Life in three abridged parts
during the summer of 1956, with, as well, its “obvious mistakes and exaggerations . . .
winnowed out” (July 23, 1956; 68).9
McCarthy’s use of Chamberlain’s memoir as the inspiration for Blood Meridian is significant to
the novel’s interpretation, as McCarthy creates in the latter a dialectic between verifiable
historical dates, places, and names, and a fictional narrative. And into this this dialectic
McCarthy extends his earlier forays into time and space into a new and previously untested
dimension. McCarthy also uses Chamberlain’s recollections to people his novel with other
fictionalized accounts of real people; most notably, the scalphunter John Joel Glanton and his
gang.
Though the novel is presented as a life of McCarthy’s otherwise nameless “kid,”
historical accounts of the Glanton gang are the backbone of the book. Decorated Union
Army general Samuel Chamberlain’s narrative My Confession provides McCarthy with
his core Glanton tales and the historical basis for his essential character, Judge Holden. It
also supplies one analogue to the kid, since the youthful Chamberlain joins Glanton in
midadventure, is occasionally sympathetic to the gang’s Indian victims, is linked in an
attraction-repulsion with Holden, and might have been a filibusterer.10
Like Melville’s Ishmael, Chamberlain’s “confession” invokes witnessing through the
protagonist’s need to tell his story, such as it is. In Blood Meridian no such direct testimony
exists. The witness of the reader is not merely implied, but implored.
Divested of family and nearly all material possessions, this innocent abroad, a wastrel,
leaves home and goes adrift into the wide world of early nineteenth century America. Here I
return to the text of Blood Meridian:
9
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He is taken on for New Orleans aboard a flatboat. Forty-two days on the river. . . He
lives in a room above a courtyard behind a tavern and he comes down at night like some
fairybook beast to fight with the sailors. He is not big but he has big wrists, big hands.
His shoulders are set close. The child’s face is curiously untouched behind the scars, the
eyes oddly innocent. They fight with fists, with feet, with bottles or knives. All races, all
breeds. Men whose speech sounds like the grunting of apes. Men from lands so far and
queer that standing over them where they lie bleeding in the mud he feels mankind itself
vindicated.11
Of interest here is this early glimpse into the kid’s “taste for mindless violence,” being
complicated by the narrator’s description of his face: “oddly innocent behind the scars.” With
the kid, McCarthy raises the questionable reality of an innate moral sense. Somehow, this
human—with no ingrained sense of good, bad, right or wrong, or anything resembling affection
or social obligation—endures. As I will show later in this chapter, the moral of McCarthy’s
protagonists is essential to an understanding of his view of the responsibilities of personhood.
The kid is presented as a loose analog of a “natural man,” understood in a sense akin to
that of Rousseau. He lives wholly in the present moment and is not given to considerations of
social status, or a concrete sense of place in the world; he is asocial. But here the comparison to
Rousseau’s natural man ends. The kid is naturally violent.
Only now is the child finally divested of all that he has been. His origins are become
remote as is his destiny and not again in all the world’s turning will there be terrains so
wild and barbarous to try whether the stuff of creation may be shaped to man’s will or
whether his own heart in not another kind of clay.12
The narrator invokes a challenge: that man’s quest to know himself begins and ends in nature,
formulated in the novel as pre-civilized, pre-political; perhaps even pre-social. Having no
attachments or any visible indication of an independent will, the kid is a pawn of fate and
historical circumstance. Endowed with an innate “taste for mindless violence,” he is recruited by
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into the doomed enterprises of a filibustering expedition led by a Captain White to retake the
state of Sonora from the Mexican government following the end of the Mexican War.
The captain nodded. He folded his hands beneath his knees. What do you think of the
treaty? He said.13
The treaty in question is the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo (1848), which ended the MexicanAmerican War.
The captain leaned forward. We fought for it. Lost friends and brothers down there.
And then by God if we didn’t give it back. Back to a bunch of barbarians that even the
most biased in their favor will admit have no least notion in God’s earth of honor or
justice or the meaning of republican government. A people so cowardly they’ve paid
tribute a hundred years to tribes of naked savages. Given up their crops and livestock.
Mines shut down. Whole villages abandoned. While a heathen horde rides over the land
looting and killing with impunity. Not a hand raised against them. Did you know that?
They kill them with rocks. The captain shook his head. He seemed made sad by what he
had to tell.14
Sepich offers the following instructive historical background on this plot point in the novel. He
writes:
The existence of Captain White’s filibustering expedition into Sonora in the spring of
1849 is not verifiable. A nonmilitary and presumably illegally constituted troop of
freebooters that was attacked and virtually wiped out by the Indians in the desolate
eastern Chihuahua country would leaves few traces in the record. . . . It is possible that
small-scale low-profile expeditions took place in the late 1840s. The time seems to have
been ripe.15
In a famous battle sequence, the company is slaughtered at the hands of a band of mounted
Comanches in a grisly scene aptly described as “death hilarious."16
During the time in which Blood Meridian is set the Comanches were following an
established economic pattern of raids based in part on the productivity of the Mexicans,
but also in part fueled by what Ralph A. Smith calls “a taste for European manufactures”
(“Mexican” 103). The Indians at this time also found swelling numbers of westwardbound caravans of gold seekers: “As the Forty-niners swarmed across the vast vacancies
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of west Texas, there were hardly enough warriors to go around, but the Indians did the
best they could” (Sonnichsen, Pass 130).
The lone survivor of the massacre, the kid is later saved from the hangman by joining the ranks
of Captain John Joel Glanton, a real historical personage, who in 1849 was granted a contract for
clearing the state of Chihuahua of Apaches by its governor, Angel Trias.
The decade of the forties saw the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua, in its attempt to
break the cycle of Indian incursions, hire Anglo aliens to kill the raiders. James (don
Santiago) Kirker, in particular, brought hundreds of “proofs” of the deaths of the Indians
and thousands of head of livestock to Chihuahua City during the first half of the decade.
“Proofs”: that is, the scalps of Indians, or “receipts.”17
Much of the material presented in this section, “though ‘historical’ in its events and experiences,
exists as a vehicle designed to introduce the world of the late 1840s and the Glanton gang.18
Captain John Joel Glanton and his assembled gang are retained as scalphunters, state-sponsored
genocidal mercenaries, when the kid joins their ranks.
The identity of these regions [between El Paso and Chihuahua City] with the names of
certain stormy characters supports the law of the survival of the fittest. Among the
hardiest of these persons were certain Apache chiefs and scalp hunters like Captain
Santiago Kirker, Captain John Joel Glanton, Major Michael H. Chevallié, Major J. S.
Gillet, Colonel Joaquín Terrazas, and Captain Juan de Mata Órtiz. (Smith, “Indians” 38)19
The novel’s second section spans the period of their contract in scalp-hunting and ends
with their arrival at the ferry on the Yuma river. Their brutal career is assisted by the presence of
a mysterious and malign polymath known as Judge Holden of Texas, who serves as an
antagonistic foil and ersatz father figure to the kid. Holden is the greatest villain in all of
McCarthy’s fiction and possibly even in all of American fiction. Joshua Masters’ introduction of
Holden is fantastic. He writes:
At the center of…Blood Meridian, we find Judge Holden, a Mephistophelean figure who
seduces a nomadic horde of scalp hunters into a "terrible covenant" (126), which
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consigns both their spiritual and physical lives to the judge's jurisdiction. With his
"disciples of a new faith" (130), the judge wanders the Mexican-American borderlands
like an anti-Moses, a lawgiver who has made no covenant with a higher power, save, of
course, war. Amidst the arbitrary violence and mindless wanderings of the Glanton Gang,
we find only the judge's voice, for he provides the coherence, the order, the meaning that
defines the scalp hunter's pilgrimage west. Certainly McCarthy's most articulate, cunning,
and slippery character to date, the judge is a nightmarish embodiment of the myths of
colonial expansion, myths that he extends, rewrites, and reconstructs to apocalyptic
ends.20
The Glanton gang’s arch of dramatic action occurs in their inevitable gory comeuppance
at the hands of a band of even more vicious and vengeful Yuma Indians on the Colorado River,
but this is not its conclusion. Having betrayed the company in the desert following the massacre
at the ferry, Holden disappears. At the end of the novel he returns to find the kid, now a man, in
a bar in Fort Griffin, Texas. In a final conversation, the Judge tells the kid his final outlook on
the affairs of men. The subject of this monologue is war.
In such games as have for their stake the annihilation of the defeated the decisions are
quite clear. This man holding this particular arrangement of cards in his hand is thereby
removed from existence. This is the nature of war, whose stake is at once the game and
the authority and the justification. Seen so, war is the truest form of divination. It is the
testing of one’s will and the will of another within that larger will which because it binds
them is therefore forced to select. War is the ultimate game because war is at last a
forcing of the unity of existence. War is god.21
In a scene best left to the novel, the judge kills the kid in an outhouse. Returning to the bar,
wherein pandemonium has erupted after the killing of a dancing bear, the judge is next scene
playing the fiddle and leading the dancing. In the description of the novel, his
feet are light and nimble. He never sleeps. He says that he will never die. He dances in
light and shadow and he is a great favorite. He never sleeps, the judge. He is dancing,
dancing. He says that he will never die.22
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Blood Meridian’s concluding images of the judge, as the immortal, shape-shifting dancer, the
archetypal high-prophet of war and destruction, harkens back to allegations of McCarthy’s
“ambiguous nihilism.” However, we also have the completed story of the kid—an innocent
flung into the world and left to fend as he may by a mysterious, if not malevolent, will. The
kid’s death might be his undoing, but it is not his defeat. And yet, his is not the martyr’s spiritual
victory either. McCarthy would never offer such a trite moral for a novel’s ending. Instead, he
leaves the question entirely open through the creation of an abstract and loosely connected series
of images.
As in several of McCarthy’s novels, Blood Meridian closes with an italicized epilogue,
one of McCarthy’s many “moral parables.”
In the dawn there is a man progressing over the plain by means of holes which he is
making in the ground. He uses an implement with two handles and he chucks it into the
holes and he enkindles the stone in the hole with his steel hole by hole striking the fire out
of the rock which God has put there. On the plain behind him are the wanderers in
search of bones and those who do not search and they move haltingly in the light like
mechanisms whose movements are monitored with escapement and pallet so that they
appear restrained by a prudence or reflectiveness which has no inner reality and they
cross in their progress one by one that track of holes that runs to the rim of the visible
ground and which seems less the pursuit of some continuance than the verification of a
principle, a validation of sequence and causality as if each round and perfect hole owed
its existence to the one before it there on that prairie upon which are the bones and the
gatherers of bones and those who do not gather. He strikes fire in the hole and draws out
his steel. Then they all move on again.23
The line of holes stretching across a darkened plain serves to move the story on, drawing our
attentions and our hopes for meaning further on to other voices and different landscapes.
Blood Meridian’s conclusion leaves McCarthy’s audience with a daunting political
question: On what ground can the kid ultimately resist the judge if he is, fundamentally, a blank
slate? I do not find it sufficient to walk away from this novel resigned to saying that a single act
of compassion generates cosmic ripples, even in the face of the gristmill of time. Blood
23
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Meridian is McCarthy’s witnessing to basic questions of human identity and the ultimate
question of the infinite, as the defining limits of human freedom and agency. This has
philosophical bearing: knowing that McCarthy is pre-eminently concerned with the role of story
and of storytelling in our lives, this tactic in Blood Meridian throws into question of whether a
story is a thing “made” by human arts or whether stories might be said to exist independently of
human convention. This stylistic device intensifies the effect of the philosophic enterprise of
displacing characters within the setting of landscape.
All night sheetlightning quaked sourceless to the west beyond the midnight thunderheads,
making a bluish day of the distant desert, the mountains on the sudden skyline stark and
black and livid like a land of some other order out there whose true geology was not
stone but fear.24
At dusk they halted and built a fire and roasted the deer. The night was much
enclosed about them and there were no stars. To the north they could see other fires that
burned red and sullen along the invisible ridges. They ate and moved on, leaving the fire
on the ground behind them, and as they rode up into the mountains this fire seemed to
become altered of its location, now here, now there, drawing away, or shifting
unaccountably along the flank of their movement. Like some ignis fatuus belated upon
the road behind them which all could see and of which none spoke. For this will to
deceive that is in things luminous may manifest itself likewise in retrospect and so by
sleight of some fixed part of a journey already accomplished may also post men to
fraudulent destinies.25
In the neuter austerity of that terrain all phenomena were bequeathed a strange equality
and no one thing nor spider nor stone nor blade of grass could forth claim to precedence.
The very clarity of these articles belie their familiarity, for the eye predicates the whole
on some feature or part and here was nothing more luminous than another and nothing
more enshadowed and the optical democracy of such landscapes all preference is made
whimsical and a man and a rock become endowed with unguessed kinships.26
Under the hooves of the horses the alabaster sand shaped itself in whorls strangely
symmetric like iron filings in a field and these shapes flared and drew back again,
resonating upon the harmonic ground and then turning to swirl away over the playa. As
if the very sediment of things contained yet some residue of sentience. As if in the transit

24

McCarthy, Blood Meridian, 49.
Ibid., 126.
26
Ibid., 258-259.
25

75

of those riders were a thing so profoundly terrible as to register even to the uttermost
granulation of reality.27
These passages serve as a fairly comprehensive sampling of McCarthy’s presentation of
landscape in Blood Meridian. Of note in the passages are the ideas of mystery’s destiny, and the
altogether unhomely nature of the world created in the novel. One can easily notice the cadence
and vocabulary of the Bible in these; a sort of gnostic sense of separateness from the world
imparted by the voice of the direct narrator.
Questions regarding human nature also abound in passages of this kind. At the core of
these questions is the motif of the substance of men’s hearts that runs throughout the novel.
Below is an example of this from the text of the novel.
Sproule was clawing at his neck and he was gibbering hysterically and when he saw the
kid standing there looking down at him he held out to him his bloodied hands as if in
accusation and then clapped them to his ears and cried out what it seemed he himself
would not hear, a howl of such outrage as to stitch a caesura in the pulsebeat of the world.
But the kid only spat into the darkness of the space between them. I know your kind, he
said. What’s wrong with you is wrong all the way through you.28
Here the phrase “what is wrong with you is wrong all the way through you” is of interest. It
invokes the dialectic of things natural vs. things manmade, as well as pointing toward the
question of knowing in the novel.
The kid seems endowed with certain abilities that set him apart from the other characters
in the novel, both the members of the company of filibusters as well as the Glanton gang. His
knowledge of the false hearts of those around him is connected to both his innocence as well as
his unique capabilities for violence. The kid has a unique ability of sight. He sees certain truths
of men in manner not compatible with his peers. This theme is reinforced by two other traits
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associated with the kid: scenes in which the kid appears as a spectator to violence, and the
substance of his dreams.
Regarding the first of these, I cite a passage that comes around the peak of the novel’s
dramatic action, found in chapter XV. Pursued by Mexican cavalry under Elias, the Glanton
gang is on the run. They leave the kid behind to dispatch wounded men who otherwise await a
fate worse than death at the hands of their pursuers. Hurrying to catch up with the gang, the kid
gets lost in a blizzard. Wandering the snowy peaks of the high desert the kid, attempts to catch
up.
He moved north all day and in the long light of the evening he saw from that high
rimland the collision of armies remote and silent upon the plain below. The dark little
horses circled and the landscape shifted in the paling light and the mountains beyond
brooded in darkening silhouette. The distant horsemen rode and parried and a faint drift
of smoke passed over them and they moved on up the deepening shade of the valley floor
leaving behind them the shapes of moral men who had lost their lives in that place. He
watched all this pass below him mute and ordered and senseless until the warring
horsemen were gone in the sudden rush of dark that fell over the desert.29
This passage is indicative of a general trend in the novel particular to its characterization of the
kid. While the kid is a member of a gang of paid mercenaries engaged in genocide, he is often
notably absent from a number of scenes in which the most gruesome acts of violence are
depicted. Further, in this passage—in which we see the beginning of the end of the Glanton
gang’s activity in the novel—the kid is apart from his comrades as a distant observer or
spectator.
In the world of Blood Meridian, a world in which no thought or reflection precedes
action, seeing stands opposed to doing. The kid is gifted with a form of sight related to intuition
or spiritual insight. But he is also absent when the gang experiences the first strong taste of their
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eventual (and inevitable) comeuppance. This separateness will be the substance of the judge’s
ultimate critique of the kid toward the novel’s conclusion when he accuses him.
You came forward, he said, to take part in a work. But you were a witness against
yourself. You sat in judgement on your own deeds. You put your own allowances before
the judgements of history and you broke with the body of which you were pledged and
you poisoned it in all its enterprise.30
In this sense, the term witness, used in the quotation above, is seemingly compatible with that of
spectator. The kid sits out of the action. He is absent from the scenes of the gang’s greatest
depravity. Often he is described as looking but avoids speech. What he knows, he knows, but
for the reader this remains a mystery.
The kid’s insight is further related to dreams. Dreams and dreaming figure prominently
in Blood Meridian as in many of McCarthy’s works. The discussion of dreams is more properly
at home in my later chapter on Witnessing. For the present discussion, the idea of the substance
of men’s hearts being unknown is key here. The novel’s stance on human nature would appear
to be simply limitless violence. But this is not its final say.
Having introduced the novel’s principal characters and sketched the major movements of
its plot, such as they are, I turn now to consider the scholarly literature published on Blood
Meridian. In the section to follow I discuss critical appraisals of McCarthy’s treatment of nature
and landscape pertinent to the political ideas presented in Blood Meridian.

Critical reception of Blood Meridian:
Nature and the idea of landscape has always been a major focal point for critical
scholarship on McCarthy. McCarthy’s southwestern fiction is one of expansive geography.
Whereas his earlier fiction is also concerned with problematics surrounding a “mapped” or
30
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legible world of actual towns and the literal charted topography of that region, his later, more
mature work moves dramatically from the verticality of Appalachian hills and hollows into the
horizontal axis that typifies his rendering of the expansive flatness of the desert plains of
southwest Texas and northern Mexico. In this second period, McCarthy’s interest shifts toward
the killing fields of the Texas borderlands in the middle of the nineteenth century. The aesthetic
details of McCarthy’s prose style are central to this. McCarthy scholar Steven Shaviro
comments on the transition between McCarthy’s early and later periods and how they reach a
crescendo in Blood Meridian.
Blood Meridian is a book…not of heights or depths, nor of origins or endings, but of
restless, incessant horizontal movements: nomadic wanderings, topographical
displacements, variations of weather, skirmishes in the desert. There is only war, there is
only the dance. Exile is not deprivation or loss, but our primordial and positive
condition. For there can be no alienation when there is no originary state for us to be
alienated from.31
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, McCarthy likes to create atmospheres of
disequilibrium and allegorical spaces in which to invoke the philosophical questions subtextually: not as mere scenery, but as a platform for engaging deeper matters. The reader is often
challenged to know who is speaking and to whom, deflecting his attention from the substance of
any speech. By withholding these important details McCarthy seemingly abandons his reader,
like his characters, to become as lost and morally confused in the immensity of his frontier
landscapes as he does his characters. Shaviro continues:
The prose enacts not a symbolization or a hermeneutics but an erotics of landscape,
moving easily between degree zero of “desert absolute” (295) and the specific
articulations of water, mud, sand, sky and mountains. It leaps from the concrete to the
abstract and back again, often in the space of a single sentence. It observes a fractal
symmetry of scale, describing without hierarchical distinction and with the same attentive
complexity the most minute phenomena and the most cosmic. And its observations
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cannot be attributed to any fixed center of enunciation, neither to an authorial presence
nor to a narrating voice nor to the consciousness of the characters.32
This discussion of nature as a form of literary “erotics” is productive to an interpretation of the
novel’s political themes. It is a well-documented interpretation in political studies of American
literature. Catherine Zuckert develops the paradigm:
The withdrawal from civil society…is not merely a celebration of the freedom that
human beings enjoy in the absence of conventional restraints. In fact, no canonical
American author has presented life in the state of nature as completely satisfying or
simply desirable. On the contrary, these authors have seen that with the veneer of
civilization removed, the state of nature can represent a setting in which certain truths
about human beings become evident—truths that readers of the books could use to order
their own more civilized lives.33
But McCarthy’s frontier hero eschews Zuckert’s typology, or at least requires some
reconciliation. These “certain truths” are very much of at the heart of McCarthy’s project in
Blood Meridian, but are they instructive? Hobbes concluded that the state of nature is
intolerable; McCarthy characterizes it as normal. John Gray elaborates:
Blood Meridian has been interpreted as presenting a Hobbesian view of human nature,
but what it shows is something that Hobbes did not envision - violence as a way of life…
Where [Hobbes] went wrong was in thinking that violence can be tamed principally by
the use of reason, an illusion of the European Enlightenment, of which Hobbes was one
of the first great exponents.
We cannot escape the "war of all against all" by any kind of contract. Learnt slowly
and painfully, the practices of civilized[sic] life are permanently fragile and precarious.
Here the visionary novelist is more realistic than the rationalist philosopher.
Violence cannot be eradicated, because its ultimate source is in the warring impulses
and fantasies of human beings.
This is the truth conveyed in McCarthy's great novel – civilization[sic] is natural for
human beings, but so is barbarism.34
It is in this vein that McCarthy comes close to the philosophy of Hobbes and yet he does not
totally reconcile the position. Hobbes believes that the will to contend that predicates the state of
nature can be pacified, subdued, or constrained by the legitimate application of force. Leviathan
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can, for Hobbes, achieve mastery over those whose pride leads them to create a state of civil war
within the body politic. McCarthy counters this position with Judge Holden who beckons the kid
to give himself over to the ideology (or metaphysics) of total and perpetual war. In the world of
Blood Meridian, the partisans of the Glanton gang do not wish to live in peace, but rather to test
boundaries—to exhaust the possible as “agents of the actual.”35 They eschew the life of the
settlement. On the frontier setting of the Texas borderlands they are fully at liberty to explore
whether in such a state man lives either as a beast or as a god.
The above discussion naturally points toward some tentative conclusions regarding
McCarthy’s position on the law and what it represents. A natural law of McCarthy’s universe is
that nothing stays put, and being a human among other humans is a challenge for most (if not all
of his protagonists). It appears to be a natural law of McCarthy’s fictional universe that we
cannot escape accounting for ourselves and that in this position we must attempt meaningful
ethical action. Other forms of law in McCarthy’s world are purely conventional. Freedom exists
but is circumscribed by the necessity of naming responsibility.
Life’s way in the world of these novels is dialectical, contingent, and transient. In the
background of the novels there may be some yearning for ontological certainty—we
suspect this from the recurrence of preachers and priests, however demented. But this
nostalgia is subordinated forcefully to the opposing conviction, implied everywhere, that
absolute certainty is always a form of unfreedom; that an administered world is, for the
individual, a deprived one; that ideas and systems, the pursuit of essences and first
principles, are as dangerous, and as reifying as imposed social orders. So the structures
are emblematic as well as functional: it is in the pockets of experience, in the particular,
that we in fact live.36
Bell’s insight here is instructive. He sees in McCarthy a persistent sense of searching for some
signification that the world is not really as chaotic and mysterious as it appears to be; that its
ultimate design is rational and that each individual has a place in it. This yearning is palpable in
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so many of McCarthy’s narratives, Blood Meridian not the least among them. Bell’s comments
above identify political questions relevant to the present study. In the Hobbesian-sounding
formulation he uses above he identifies life’s way as dialectical. Here I take Bell to mean that
the “dialectic” of life’s way stands opposed to an experience of life as prosaic or heroic. Purpose
is constantly thwarted by happenstance, meaning coming only after the fact, if at all. Life’s
transience, as Bell puts it, is seen in the constant movement and travelling of his McCarthy’s
characters. They are not homely or domestic but rather the opposite. Unfettered as they are
McCarthy’s characters attain a level of freedom in their living in “the particular” of the moment.
And yet, however particular, they are not endowed with any special recognition of their place in
the ordering of reality. Thomas Pughe comments:
McCarthy writes as though he were depicting an apocalyptic pageant. The narrator’s
vision is superimposed on the scene, turning the individual experience of death into an
anonymous process of dying. This strategy is adopted throughout the novel though the
degree to which the stylistic traits of visionary writing may vary.37
The phase “optical democracy,” taken from the text of the novel, excites the political
imagination, beginning with a basic philosophical position. Initiating a discussion of the
political consequences of McCarthy’s treatment of nature, the work of Vereen Bell is once again
helpful, as it clarifies the depth and complexity of this dense symbol within McCarthy’s vision.
The thought that is difficult to hold in focus is that nature in Blood Meridian, as in all of
McCarthy’s novels, is both a void and an emanation. In either role it is not analogous to
the categories of thought. If we think of the whole of Blood Meridian as a parable, it is a
perfect vehicle for representing the futility of the human will—because of, not despite,
the hubris that the Indian-killers embody and the judge rationalizes. The human beings
constitute one protagonist and the natural world another. Narrative and description
collaborate with each other in conventional ways, but what is ultimately important is that,
even ontologically, they compete.38
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Bell’s statement here is an apt summary of many of the interrelated political and philosophical
concerns congregating around the conceptual theme of nature as it appears throughout all of
McCarthy’s novels. McCarthy scholar Dana Phillips begins from premises similar to those of
Bell and then advances the argument in an important way:
This competition has been decided in favor of description and the natural world even
before Blood Meridian begins. For McCarthy, description and the natural world as
categories contain both narrative and human beings. Human beings and the natural world
do not figure as antagonists—Blood Meridian does not have that kind of dramatic
structure. They are instead parts of the same continuum and are consistently described by
McCarthy as such.39
Using the vocabulary of political theory, the best expression for uniting these themes is
the interplay of nomos and physis. Calling this “the central issue of political philosophy,”
Catherine Zuckert offers the following insight:
To inquire into the relation between nature and convention is to ask whether there is a
standard of right or good inherent in human life by which all the different laws and
customs that the various peoples have established for themselves by agreement
(convention) can be judged good or bad—just or unjust. The issue of nature and
convention is thus the question of political philosophy as such, but different philosophers
have raised that question in different ways.40
This issue of judgment, as I shall show, is a central feature of McCarthy’s philosophic project in
Blood Meridian. It relates to another major theme found throughout McCarthy’s fiction – the
idea of “naming responsibility.” In this we find a certain moral law or moral principle that runs
throughout all of McCarthy’s work. In its fullest expression, this concept comes to be called
witnessing—a subject of analysis in this dissertation. I believe the above quoted statement and
the following statement come as close as any available to positioning McCarthy’s reader into the
heart of its most central philosophical issues. “The writing of Blood Meridian is a catastrophic
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act of witness, embracing the real by tracing it in gore.”41 Witnessing in McCarthy’s fiction
comes to denote the moral obligation entailed in the essential encounter of the self and the other.
The unremitting horror of violence and depravity however is largely a personal story. A
character study that makes frequent use of the negative space created by the opacity of characters
in McCarthy’s fiction; voids, vacancies, the absence of a sense of conscience or consciousness.
But in its amorality Blood Meridian—after reflection and lots of rereading—becomes a sort of
morality tale unto itself.
Turning briefly to what I identify as the novel’s “ontological” or “epistemological”
problem, or the problems of being and knowing in the novel, Bell indicates that, on the whole,
McCarthy’s work generally concerns the nature of truth. Truth, he says, is not created out of a
dialectic between the actual and mere representations of the actual, but rather, “Truth is the
dialectic itself, an unending contest between the stubbornness of fact and the irrepressibility of
desire.”42 These dialectical approaches to the truth cast additional levels of discomfort into the
mind of the reader. With so much in question, the very knowledge of who ‘we’ even are is no
longer certain. McCarthy challenges our deepest assumption about who ‘we’ truly are. And of
how much we are truly capable. And of how deeply we are each truly culpable. First we must
reacquaint ourselves with the image of man in McCarthy’s maturing political vision. This issue
of identity brings my interpretation once again to the issue of human nature.
McCarthy consistently raises the reader’s puzzlement as to what it is be human in the
world he creates. What it is to be human in a world that appears to have no concrete set of
rules—or at least rules consonant with an ordered, peaceful, predictable, safe, world for human
society. What would constitute a legitimate act of transgression in such a society, in such a
41
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world? A further complicating factor on this issue is a lack of clarity on whether we are talking
about the world as a concept or the particular world of Blood Meridian’s setting? This duality is
a general interpretive problem in all of McCarthy’s fiction, but Blood Meridian in particular. In
his immensely insightful Notes on Blood Meridian, John Emil Sepich offers the following
comment addressing this problem:
The initial critical confusion about the genre of Blood Meridian (its scenes were called,
among other things, “wonders of the imagination”) illustrates the uniqueness of
McCarthy’s artifice (Bell, Achievement, 124). It is as if McCarthy has taken Manzoni’s
critical challenge at face value and has made Blood Meridian so particular in its
references that “people of that time” would have found the people and places so
“probable” that “the novel [might have] been written for them” (Manzoni 125). Readers
attempting to identify its genre confront the tension McCarthy creates between the
eyewitness testimony (“bare historical facts”) underpinning Blood Meridian and the
dimension of historical romance that he adds to unify them.43
While McCarthy’s fiction is quintessentially American in its form and in substance, the
scope of his philosophical vision is expansive, addressing universal themes. In all its various
inflections, within and between his works, McCarthy’s narrative voice—arguably a character
unto itself—raises problematic questions regarding the state of human nature itself in the almost
limitless expanses of McCarthy’s Southwestern landscape. In this context, he questions who we
are, as well as those forces of order and disorder—for instance, law on the one hand, and fear on
the other—that constrain our actions. McCarthy’s fiction dramatizes these forces in order to
question when they are effective, and when they are not. Literary scholar Steven Frye
powerfully articulates this insight:
The governing motive of much of the author’s work, especially Blood Meridian, is the
question of meaning, purpose, and value in a universe that yields answers only in bright
but fleeting glimpses. Can human beings speak of possibility, hope, even God with any
validity or intellectual credibility? Can the assumptions of inherent meaning reflected in
the dominant world religions be entertained with any honesty in the twentieth-century
mind. 44
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As ever, the resulting effect of McCarthy’s stylistic choices places the reader in a position
at once removed from basic familiarity or empathy with the characters, while simultaneously
calling his awareness to his own culpability for the atrocities being described. The effect of
which, as one reviewer notes, “displaces our focus from the outer events to the primal archetypes
that underlie them,” continually shifting the reader “from the physical to the metaphysical,
creating a recursiveness of action in which we suddenly catch the ozone whiff of human souls
eking their way forward under an indifferent sky.”45 Phillips confirms this. “The book’s odd
power derives from its treating everything and everybody with absolute equanimity; its voice
seems profoundly alien, but not alienated.”46 This sense of alienation is key and stands as the
major philosophical problem the novel attempts to engage, if not unravel. Into this milieu the
concept of will emerges, invoking the novel’s ethical considerations. The specter of McCarthy’s
preference for extreme violence is related.
In Blood Meridian death does not individualize characters, as it does in the conventional
Western, it makes them disappear into the landscape. The novel’s innumerable scenes of
barbarity, none of which seems distinguishable from the other with respect to its
importance in the overall plot of the narrative, are metonyms of a general death of
civilizations, metonyms, one could almost say, of the << terrain >>.47
The pared down syntax underlines the will to let the landscape << speak >>. Each aspect
of nature…appears as a distinct event that seems not to conform to any human pattern.48
The landscape is thus of and for itself in Blood Meridian, a vast, often terrible and cruel
alterity, unknowable to human beings and beyond their reckoning despite their attempts
to defy or master it.49
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Addressing violence in McCarthy’s work, Phillips adds the following. “In McCarthy’s work,
violence tends to be just that; it is not a sign or symbol of something else.”50
As stated above, in McCarthy’s literary erotics of landscape the overwhelming otherness
of the frontier region initiates the character’s erotic pull toward “wild” and “undiscovered”
country south of the border. This motif animates the early sections of Blood Meridian and
intensifies in the Border Trilogy. And while this stylistic turn of McCarthy’s certainly engages
tropes of Western genre fiction, it cannot be limited to these. Like writers of the Western,
McCarthy employs some of the standard characteristics of the Western, most notably the use of
the West as “not merely a backdrop but in fact a ‘generating force.’”51 Indeed, the desert setting
of Blood Meridian sets the stage for an exploration highly philosophic in nature—a quest to find
out how the substance of reality relates to the agency of humans. Key to this enterprise is the
novel’s “optical democracy” of men and landscape placed in the foreground of the novel. I turn
now to examine the political aspects of this feature in greater detail.

Optical democracy
To interpret the political relevance of McCarthy’s idea of nature some clarification of
terminology is in order. The terms “nature” and “landscape” are related in McCarthy’s vision,
but it is important to note that they are not precisely synonymous. Both terms invoke the nonhuman world, and both are deceptively charged with an anthropocentric bias, the latter more
obviously than the former. Obviously McCarthy’s readers interested in political theory will
question whether, and to what extent, nature as used here is a reflection on human nature. This is
50
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not so simple, particularly in the case of Blood Meridian. The reader has a constant vague
suspicion that Blood Meridian’s narrative voice is up to something. I contend this is McCarthy’s
philosophical attempt to call his audience’s basic assumptions into question. This confusion
between nature, as the timeless and universal realm of inhuman forces, and landscape, as
particular historical setting, is precisely the whole point.52 McCarthy’s reader is seized by the
pervasive sense of impermanence, if not transience, of the human impact upon the world.
Human art and production are always threatened by the clawing chaotic opposition presented by
the material world in McCarthy’s fiction, or, “the way in which nature corresponds to an
imagined condition of being that the facts of life otherwise contradict.”53 But how is this
political? McCarthy displays a strong affinity and for anti-social spaces. In these types of
environments, human interaction, action has greater consequence, as there are no constraints on
behavior but also less consequence as there are fewer (if any) witnesses present to observe and
recollect the events. This is significant because the lack of a visible community present to judge
the action (we might think of the role of the chorus in Greek tragedy) heaps greater responsibility
upon the testimonies of the few witnesses present. Any perceived or implicit responsibility to
get the story right, or accurate, providing testimony to the truth, typically falls upon the shoulders
of other community members who are, obviously, weak vessels. Such characters necessarily
have their own agendas or intentions. But they are somewhat unified terms of the conceptual
role that they play in McCarthy’s style. They alone are capable of facts to the reader—they are
witnesses providing testimony. The reader, likewise, also becomes a witness in this exchange.
These characters are alone and isolated by the fact that their testimonies are a lone or fugitive
testimony to the acts witnessed.
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McCarthy’s preference for the private over the public sphere, for isolated and even antisocial spaces, create an environment in which human action, which is to say interaction, has
particular consequence. Only here do we find the fewest constraints on individual freedom and
no public sphere for action, saving the omnipresent need for the substantiating testimony of some
witness or third party. Once again, the absence of a visible standard of right, or even good, is
withheld, denying the reader an immediate sense of empathy with the individual. Any formal or
even tacit responsibility for the facts lies ultimately upon the voice of the narrator. And even this
voice occasionally betrays a vague sense of an agenda.
The phrase “optical democracy,” taken from Blood Meridian is the most appropriate
expression available in McCarthy’s work for describing the philosophic function of setting. A
strange equality of human and non-human, replete with “unguessed kinships” abounds
throughout McCarthy’s corpus. Considered broadly, their combined effect necessitates a
reconsideration of the question of freedom in a more expansive way, for now the concept must
also incorporate the nature of man amid the flora, fauna, and geospatial terrain of the world
McCarthy creates for humans to inhabit.
The very existence of an “optical democracy” of landscape is predicated or dependent
upon the presence of an eye, a human eye, to perceive and judge the various components of the
“landscape”, which is, again, a human-dependent term. The narrative voice maintains a
tremendous focal distance—panoramic, if not even greater, like from a satellite—from the action
of the scenes. And yet it is also characterized by its voice. The narrator in Blood Meridian
speaks with a powerful and compelling and, most importantly, human voice. Subtly, this voice
invokes the domain of things particular to humanity. Moral considerations arise, even if only
through the highly conspicuous absence of any moral or ethical language—especially when it is
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describing deeply immoral human actions. Indeed, it is perhaps not going too far to say that
“democracy” is not a value-neutral term, especially in the context of Blood Meridian’s narrator.
After such nightmarish dismemberment and evisceration and decay, what is precious to
us may seem immeasurably more precious for being defiled; and yet it seems grotesquely
negligible as well. This is a leveling effect as well as a horrifying one, a democratizing
of species, an enhancement of the being of the world and a relegation of the human.54
This relegation of the human has the effect of calling into question the most basic of assumptions
regarding the sanctity of human life, to say nothing of social and political institutions. And it is
in such a de-humanized world that McCarthy begins to re-theorize the most basic assumptions
about human sociability. Importantly, he accomplishes this task by remythologizing dominant
narratives of American self-understanding.
The phrase “optical democracy” implies more than simple equality within the visual
frame of a space or scene. If extrapolated somewhat, it also implies a certain mutual agency of
everything in a scene. The human characters act, always unreflectively, but no less does the
weather, the flora and fauna, the geological forces under the ground. Everything is equally
capable of acting and does so constantly, a realm of sentient forces acting and reacting with
everything else at any given time or scene in the novel. I contend that the democratic optics of
McCarthy’s narratives function as a philosophic device for challenging the anthropocentric bias
of the reader’s assumptions in an effort to examine the very basis of knowing. This will require
some further explaining.
Blood Meridian’s direct narrative voice switches in and out of modes. In the abundant
similes used by the voice of the direct narrator the reader encounters a mode of description of the
Glanton gang in which the particulars of time and place, setting and character, are sublimated to
the level of myth. Here is an example:
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Deployed upon that plain they moved in a constant elision, ordained agents of the actual
dividing out the world which they encountered and leaving what had been and what
would never be alike extinguished on the ground behind them. . . . Above all else they
appeared wholly at venture, primal, provisional, devoid of order. Like beings provoked
out of the absolute rock and set nameless and at no remove from their own loomings to
wander ravenous and doomed and mute as gorgons shambling the brutal wastes of
Gondwanaland in a time before nomenclature was and each was all.55
The characters in the novel begin to stand forward like symbols for something more elemental,
primal, and closer to the natural essence of the world. In this manner they come to stand as
avatars for the reenactment of ancient myths. Phillips describes this phenomenon:
It is Blood Meridian’s adherence in its descriptions of events to the protocols and
paradigms of natural history that gives it epic resonance. The present world as McCarthy
describes it is an ancient world not of myth but of rock and stone and those life forms that
can endure the daily cataclysms of heat and cold and hunger, that can weather the
everyday round of random, chaotic violence.56
Consider the following quotation:
Rather than representing a specific place at a specific time the desert becomes the
central metaphor of Blood Meridian, a metaphor for transgression, for that which cannot
be contained or controlled, and for that which is not human.57
Before the idea of transgression can come to the fore, however, some indication of knowing must
be accounted for.
The idea of optical democracy throws open the question of whether there are gods of any
kind in McCarthy’s fictional worlds. Perhaps it is ultimately less important to posit some
provisional answer to the yes/no question of the gods in McCarthy’s fiction than it is, simply, to
note with emphasis the fact that the issue seems so uncertain. On this issue McCarthy’s fiction
taps into a deeper, that is to say, ‘un-ideological’ truth about human existence. For even if God
or some panoply of lesser deities does exist in this world, His hand is conspicuously absent from
the deeds of men; particularly (if not ironically) those deeds done in His name. The questionable
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existence of a higher power is never resolved, indeed, the author’s silence on this question
becomes more maddeningly opaque at every turn. Why is this? Because in McCarthy’s world,
the very idea of civilization itself is just as questionable as the existence of The Divine, or some
other transcendent power.
McCarthy is similar to Nietzsche on this point, insofar as he is serious about giving voice
to the boundless empty space at the heart of human existence. Like Nietzsche, McCarthy is a
poet of the abyss. So the question of freedom, how men behave in the absence of any
conventional forms of constraint: would range from the city and its laws, down to the levels of
society or culture—some sense of the public sphere. Reinforcing this trend in his work is the
omnipresent concern with witnessing. Action, classically understood, is possible only within the
city, that is, within the public sphere. McCarthy’s fiction eschews this tradition of political
thinking.

McCarthy’s pursuit of man’s natural state
“In Blood Meridian there is no masquerade; almost everyone in McCarthy’s wilderness is
fundamentally bestial, barely recognizable as human.”58
Becoming bestial is indeed the fate of McCarthy’s characters who cross the fragile
boundary separating the civilized from the uncivilized, from the settled East into the
unsettled West. . . . Violence lies at the heart of humankind; it always has, it always will.
Because of McCarthy’s focus on the elemental nature of humanity, characters who roam
about in his West often are described as creatures from primitive, if not prehistoric, times;
they are manifestations of our forebears, humanity in its original state.59
What is elemental about the way men act in their natural state? The state of nature as envisioned
in Blood Meridian perfectly captures the idea of maximum insecurity typified by the
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formulations of Hobbes. While the actions of the Glanton gang are motivated by certain
necessities of commerce one cannot conclude that their ability to engage in unbridled savagery
simply due to psychopathology. This can be said of all in the gang except Judge Holden—who
is not simply crazy but who acts in the service of higher obligations.
Still, man in his natural state is a killer in the world of Blood Meridian, that much cannot
be denied. And while each member of the gang is “discrete unto himself,” the narrator says,
“conjoined they made a thing that had not been before and in that communal soul were wastes
hardly reckonable more than those whited regions on old maps where monsters do live and
where there is nothing other of the known world save the conjectural winds.”60 Further, each
member of the Glanton gang appears to have some sense of what awaits him in the event that
their marauding ceases and they are made to account for their actions. They exist in a state of
borrowed time. Bell adds that the gang “live only from one day to the next, in a perpetual,
moving present…coercing themselves back to their primal state.”61
Deployed upon that plain they moved in a constant elision, ordained agents of the
actual dividing out the world which they encountered and leaving what had been and
what would never be alike extinguished on the ground behind them. . .. Above all else
they appeared wholly at venture, primal, provisional, devoid of order. Like beings
provoked out of the absolute rock and set nameless and at no remove from their own
loomings to wander ravenous and doomed and mute as gorgons shambling the brutal
wastes of Gondwanaland in a time before nomenclature was and each was all.62
To understand the novel McCarthy’s reader must treat these characters symbolically for they
represent all men at all times. As forces, rather than forms, they show as manifestations of the
primeval interplay of the elements. They stand as elemental forces at work in a symbolic
landscape.
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The foregoing has established that McCarthy starts doing political theory from an “all
things being equal” position, and has established that the forms—particulars of character, setting,
and context are intended as symbolic representations of larger, timeless forces set in motion by
an unseen and possibly malevolent prime mover. It remains now to explore the case of the
novel’s protagonist. One must consider the kid as a vision of “natural man.” Who is he and
what must he do?
The kid has had some taste of civilization. So while he may not be a “wholly natural”
man he is, nevertheless, presented in that imagery.63 McCarthy presents his teenage protagonist
in the mold of the “western hero.” He is as close to a natural man as can be conceived. True,
there are even more natural men depicted in the novel, but the reader is given little information
about them. The kid, then, stands for McCarthy’s audience as the emblematic natural man—he
is the dependent variable in an experiment that inquires into the nature of the human soul:
Only now is the child divested of all that he has been. His origins are become remote
as is his destiny and not again in all the world’s turning will there be terrains so wild and
barbarous to try whether the stuff of creation may be shaped to man’s will or whether his
own heart is not another kind of clay.64
Jarrett offers the following comment on this passage:
Apparently, the narrative will inquire first into the relation between nature and man—
specifically the extent of man’s autonomy and authority over nature—and then into
man’s ethos to judge whether the “heart” signifies a moral principle inherent in the
self…or whether it denotes merely a biological function.65
How to interpret this? The complex relationship between nomos and physis displayed
throughout McCarthy’s fiction invites reflection upon the bases of our institutions and our
reliance upon them. It inquires into the manner in which man orders his existence in a world that
often presents only chaos. If it can be said that the ultimate function of political organization is
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to provide for an ordered environment in which man is protected from himself and from others,
then McCarthy’s fiction offers a powerful mirror for self-appraisal. He questions how much
faith ought we have in the established order. He challenges both the rational and, importantly,
the pre-rational bases of our assumptions.
Thus, a primary question governing all of McCarthy’s work concerns whether man can
truly see or know himself. How can man possibly change the essential nature of his being, and,
assuming that he could, should he? Conversely, if man cannot change, is it then better to
perpetuate an order based on false assumptions about the nature of man and society through
participation, or at the very least, complicity in it?
McCarthy’s portrayal of the kid in Blood Meridian offers insight into three important
features of McCarthy’s overall theory of nature. First, the kid falls into the established mode of
the western hero as natural man due to his departure from civil society presumably out of a sense
of dissatisfaction with it, glimpsed in the novel’s opening passage in which his childhood in a
home with an absent mother and a dysfunctional father is depicted in very negative terms. This
period is ended by the start of the novel’s third paragraph: “At fourteen he runs away. He will
not see again the freezing kitchenhouse in the predawn dark. The firewood, the washpots.”66
His dissatisfaction propels him out into the world, but it appears to be his experiences in New
Orleans where he “walks in the streets and hears tongues he has not heard before.”67 Here is the
second feature, intimately tied to the first: The kid’s very identity is connected to his status as a
natural man and his “taste for mindless violence.” The kid begins to learn lessons about life that
will contribute to cleanse him of his past and set the vague course of his future: “He lives in a
room above a courtyard behind a tavern and he comes down at night like some fairybook beast to
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fight with the sailors. He is not big but he has big wrists, big hands. His shoulders are set close.
The child’s face is curiously untouched behind the scars, the eyes oddly innocent.”68 In this
fighting with strange men from all over the world, “standing over them where they lie bleeding
in the mud he feels mankind itself vindicated.”69 Indeed, his taste for mindless violence sets him
on this path. The third insight concerns the kid’s relationship with Judge Holden and concerns
agency. Will the kid join in the life of total warfare as instructed by the man who claims to have
“loved him like a son”?70 This final insight invokes important political questions of freedom and
agency.
As stated, the kid represents the dependent variable in the equation that forms the novel’s
central point of philosophic questioning: whether the stuff of creation may be shaped to man’s
will or whether his own heart is not another kind of clay. Phrased politically, the substance of
this question is whether human will exists as something apart or distinct from nature, or whether
this idea itself is not simply an illusion—whether the mind itself is not simply “a fact among
others.” This latter position is articulated by Judge Holden in one of his memorable orations, the
gist of which is found in this line: “For existence has its own order and that no man’s mind can
compass, that mind itself being but a fact among others.”71
The judge stands symbolically in the novel as one potential answer to the central question
of human will. His philosophy of the will, scattered throughout the novel’s scenes, is articulate,
even eloquent. Interestingly these passages tend to come out when the judge is commenting on
his “hobby;” that he is a naturalist. He carries a sketchbook and makes notes and drawings of
flora and fauna and interesting historical objects that he encounters along their travels. His
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notebooks are the subject of much speculation among the other members of the gang and even
suspicion for some, particularly Toadvine. In a memorable scene between the judge and his
suspicious interlocutor, the following important details emerge:
Whatever exists, he said. Whatever in creation exists without my knowledge exists
without my consent.
He looked about the dark forest in which they were bivouacked. He nodded toward
the specimens he’d collected. These anonymous creatures, he said, may seem little or
nothing in the world. Yet the smallest crumb can devour us. Any smallest thing beneath
yon rock out of men’s knowing. Only nature can enslave man and only when the
existence of each last entity is routed out and made to stand naked before him will he be
properly suzerain of the earth.72
Here, in the judge’s famous “suzerain” speech, he articulates a major component of his
philosophy—the overlordship of the world itself. He seeks the power of knowledge and mastery
in an effort to forestall the “devouring” effect of nature.73 As the speech continues, he explains
his reasons why. Placing his hands down upon the ground, the judge makes this pronouncement:
“This is my claim, he said. And yet everywhere upon it are pockets of autonomous life.
Autonomous. In order for it to be mine nothing must be permitted to occur upon it save by my
dispensation.”74 The judge dislikes it, nay, cannot permit it that livings things exist that answer
to some other law than that which he pronounces. “The freedom of birds is an insult to me[,]” he
says, and then responds, “I’d have them all in zoos.”75
The judge’s naturalism, then, is not so much an appreciation of nature but rather a desire
to overcome it. He rigorously adheres to the scientific method but with a different purpose in
mind. While his ultimate purpose is to gain knowledge useful to the conduct of war, he also
hints at a metaphysical component to his philosophical outlook. He states:
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The man who believes that the secrets of the world are forever hidden lives in mystery
and fear. Superstition will drag him down. The rain will erode the deeds of his life. But
the man who sets himself the task of singling out the thread of order from the tapestry
will by the decision alone have taken charge of the world and it is only by such taking
charge that he will effect a way to dictate the terms of his own fate.76
Here the judge articulates a position that echoes antagonists in other McCarthy works. The
leader of the grim triune in Outer Dark I have discussed in the previous chapter, the father in
Suttree also makes similar claims about the idea of taking responsibility. The phrase has echoes
throughout all of McCarthy’s corpus and will be discussed directly in my chapter titled Agency.
For the present moment, however, if we restrict the judge’s statement to its immediate context,
some helpful insights emerge.
While the character of Judge Holden is depicted as a sort of courtly and erudite country
scholar for much of the novel, the scene quoted above gives insight into deeper motivations
behind his ways. He proposes an answer to the novel’s operative question (“whether the stuff of
creation may be shaped to man’s will…”) and it is that not only can it be, but that it must be.
The alternative, Judge Holden suggests, is to consign oneself a lowlier position than that befitting
man. Man’s fate, as the logic runs, can be known and dictated. To what end? That the man who
has set for himself this task may achieve sovereignty: the authoritative allocation of violence not
simply over other men, but even the world itself.
Using the trappings of enlightenment rationalism, Judge Holden sets forward a sort of
philosophy of subjectivity. Shaviro describes it thus:
Our order is never the world’s order, not even in the Nietzschean sense of an order that
we impose. We mark out paths in the desert or we read the tracks of others, but we
cannot thereby master futurity or compel events to our liking. For subjectivity is not a
perspective upon or projection into the world, not even a transcendental condition for our
perception of the world; it is just another empirical fact, an inherence within the world
like any other. There is no interiority, no intentionality and no transcendence. The
radical epistemology of Blood Meridian subverts all dualisms of subject and object,
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inside and outside, will and representation or being and interpretation. We are always
exiles within the unlimited phenomenality of the world, for we cannot coincide with the
(nonexistent) center of our being[.] . . . And so, just as we can never possess the world
(since we cannot even possess ourselves), by the same logic we can never transgress the
order of the world or estrange ourselves from it—no matter how hard we try.77
Shaviro’s comment points out that the judge’s enterprise runs into problems almost immediately.
His effort to use war as a way of getting out of the world in some way, to render all potentiality
into the actual is, ultimately, a failure. Men are more than simply free to become suzerains over
the world itself. McCarthy’s concern for freedom in terms of human beings (and their behavior)
turn on the essential interaction of two humans—demonstrated by the parable of the essential
encounter with the other.
The freedom enjoyed by the characters of Blood Meridian is total insofar as they are able
to act in the absence of any proscriptions at the hands of a sovereign authority. But their
nihilism, their hostility, their belligerence would seem to indicate that their author finds such
freedom as a thing to be feared. In a comment on place, the narrator makes the following
political observation: “Here beyond men’s judgements all covenants were brittle.”78
To inquire into the relation between nature and convention is to ask whether there is a
standard of right or good inherent in human life by which all the different laws and
customs that the various peoples have established for themselves by agreement
(convention) can be judged good or bad—just or unjust.79
The question of nature and convention in Blood Meridian turns on the issue of what Zuckert calls
the “countertradition.”80 Does the “reason and morality” developed in civil society work a
refounding? No, according to McCarthy. Indeed, the question McCarthy presents is whether the
state of nature can ever be overcome at all, in society or apart from it.
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Moral landscape
The desert upon which they were entrained was desert absolute and it was devoid of feature
altogether and there was nothing to mark their progress upon it.81
The country in Blood Meridian is a proving ground of wills. History is its witness but
holds no meaning beyond a scattering of bones across the desert sand. McCarthy in Blood
Meridian presents this terrain as a battleground and the “desert absolute: is one of the absolutes
of moral action. The law—the only law it would seem—is kill or be killed. And yet the kid
proves unable, ultimately, to give himself fully over to war as practiced in its purest form.
Where Nietzsche psychologizes this place, McCarthy renders it mythically, as a literal and
metaphorical landscape. The central question that emerges out of this enterprise is whether there
is such a thing as a natural moral law. It is from the orations of Judge Holden that this line of
questioning comes to a point.
Moral law is an invention of mankind for the disenfranchisement of the powerful in
favor of the weak. Historical law subverts it at every turn. A moral view can never be
proven right or wrong by any ultimate test. A man falling dead in a duel is not thought
thereby to be proven in error as to his views. . . . Decisions of life and death, of what
shall be and what shall not, beggar all questions of right. In elections of these magnitudes
are all lesser ones subsumed, moral, spiritual, natural.82
McCarthy is closer to Hobbes here than Nietzsche: the only solution to such a crisis would be a
power mightier than that of absolute war. For him who desires peace, the only answer could
possibly by the erection of a sovereign power with enough strength to overcome the forces of
war and destruction. The kid’s longing for community toward the end of the story indicates his
desire for peace; for a way out of the state of nature. Fate, personified in the form of the orphan
boy named Elrod, forestalls this ambition (if we can call it that). There will always be more of
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these “kids” to come along and test themselves upon the open plain. They seek it to be
unrestricted by the fetters of civilization and society and they will, inevitably, run out of country.
Contra Glanton, who acknowledges and embraces his eventual reckoning in a sort of amor fati,
the kid, Toadvine, and others like them seem to think another world purer world, may yet exist in
some as yet undiscovered country. Glanton knows that he will reach the western shore
eventually. He just plans to fight back until he is destroyed. Glanton needs no further world. He
is reconciled to have it out with this one. The judge, being unconstrained by time, is blithely
content to dance between the western and eastern shores. His place is in the enduring now and
he has all the time in the world.
Blood Meridian’s concluding images of the judge, as the immortal, shape-shifting dancer,
the archetypal high-prophet of war and destruction, harkens back to allegations of McCarthy’s
“ambiguous nihilism.” However, we also have the completed story of the kid—an innocent
flung into the world and left to fend as he may by a mysterious, if not malevolent, will.
The kid’s death might be his undoing, but it is not his defeat. And yet, his is not the
martyr’s spiritual victory either. McCarthy would never offer such a trite moral for a novel’s
ending. Instead, he leaves the question entirely open through the creation of an abstract and
loosely connected series of images.
As in several of McCarthy’s novels, Blood Meridian closes with an italicized epilogue,
one of McCarthy’s many “moral parables.”
In the dawn there is a man progressing over the plain by means of holes which he is
making in the ground. He uses an implement with two handles and he chucks it into the
holes and he enkindles the stone in the hole with his steel hole by hole striking the fire out
of the rock which God has put there. On the plain behind him are the wanderers in
search of bones and those who do not search and they move haltingly in the light like
mechanisms whose movements are monitored with escapement and pallet so that they
appear restrained by a prudence or reflectiveness which has no inner reality and they
cross in their progress one by one that track of holes that runs to the rim of the visible
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ground and which seems less the pursuit of some continuance than the verification of a
principle, a validation of sequence and causality as if each round and perfect hole owed
its existence to the one before it there on that prairie upon which are the bones and the
gatherers of bones and those who do not gather. He strikes fire in the hole and draws out
his steel. Then they all move on again.83
The line of holes stretching across a darkened plain serves to move the story on, drawing our
attentions and our hopes for meaning further on to other voices and different landscapes.
Blood Meridian’s conclusion leaves McCarthy’s audience with a daunting political
question: On what ground can the kid ultimately resist the judge if he is, fundamentally, a blank
slate? I do not find it sufficient to walk away from this novel resigned to saying that a single act
of compassion generates cosmic ripples, even in the face of the gristmill of time. Blood
Meridian is McCarthy’s witnessing to basic questions of human identity and the ultimate
question of the infinite, as the defining limits of human freedom and agency.

Conclusion
McCarthy’s prose often can be said to stand as a witness to the moral imagination of his
audience. The reader is free, in an existential sense, and may extend or deny empathy to any or
all of his characters in any particular work. Furthermore, the reader is free to assign condemning
moral judgments on the culpability of McCarthy’s troubled protagonists. They will find few
possibilities for redemption within any text. Such a freedom, by the time Blood Meridian
appears in the chronology of McCarthy’s catalog, is likely to lead the reader toward a sense of
doubt regarding his or her attachments to his or her national history and thus, to some extent, his
own identity. This, I think, is McCarthy’s point, but not his message or teaching in any of his
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works. Hope is an orphan in search of a home and few stories have happy endings in
McCarthy’s fiction.84
In addition to the idea of matrix and mystery, the world of McCarthy’s fiction is a
colossal boneyard: a random midden of sediment and artifacts from which may be assembled the
elements of a story. The question of whether meaning can be imposed upon this collage of loose
fragments remains mostly open. This world is not simply ‘primordial,’ it cannot be ordered, at
least in the traditional sense. The very idea of order itself only emerges out of the presence of
the narrative that creates it. The only real human activity is to gather up bones off the plain and
to move on, a migration of specters: nameless, faceless, and without origin or terminus, only
nexus.
The effect of such passages is important because it heightens our awareness of the
mysterious bonding and separation of the human and non-human, of a first rhythm of life
that is antecedent to thinking and structures. 85
The world to come will presumably be a more “ordered” reality, but ultimately it is just
another story, another story about people trying to locate themselves by stars or the sun, tracks or
postholes left in the sand. Each posthole contains a spark, a brief flicker of something: bearing
no literal relation to the one that comes before or after it. Yet from this apparent sequence
emerges a tale: the only tale, because there are and can be no others. Out of a billion “possible
stories” (because a possible story is not a story) arises the one tale, which is the only tale. This is
because storytelling is a human activity, every story is in some sense a story about men and what
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they do—which is live and die. This is the reason life and death are the only subject matter of
interest to McCarthy, because any story that does not deal with humans on this elemental level is
not “the tale,” properly understood. “The tale” can be told and retold perpetually. Its basic
elements can be rearranged in infinite combinations because nothing can negate “the tale,”
nothing can un-tell it. The tale cannot be subsumed or overpowered by the world like an artifact
can, because the tale creates the world. Without it there is no world at all. Thus, the storyteller
bears witness. The tale does not re-create the world it only creates another one. As every tale is
the first tale, it can never be told the same way twice. This is the poet’s first task: he is witness
to the fire.
Every volitional act is ironically both meaningful and meaningless, meaningful insofar as
it is an essential part of an ultimate destiny, meaningless since its consequences cannot be
controlled. The course of history and human lives proceed independent of free will, and
prediction is impossible in the closed and highly complex physical system that is the
world.86
For McCarthy’s characters, to run out of country means that time has caught up to them. The
world begins to intrude in these moments. In my next chapter, History, I return to conclusions
reached in Narrative, regarding McCarthy’s concern for the personal experience of time. Here
the conversation expands to the level of national mythology.
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3. History
This chapter serves as the second in a series of three chapters focusing on the politics of
McCarthy’s novel, Blood Meridian. Here, I interpret the historical elements of McCarthy’s
literary vision as well as the idea of history itself as it stands in relation to the story and structure
of the novel. In this chapter, a review of existing scholarly literature on McCarthy’s treatment of
history serves to frame my own analysis. I then give a conceptual overview of history as an
operative political concept in McCarthy’s overall vision in the form of an introduction to the
novel’s most memorable character, the inimical Judge Holden. Third, I begin the political
analysis of history by approaching history in Blood Meridian as an extension of the concept of
optical democracy, developed in the previous chapter. I then use the insights established in the
first analytical section to explore the manner in which McCarthy’s fifth novel reveals an attempt
to uncover the origins of war in the basic structures of language and myth. Finally, I draw
conclusions about history with a recapitulation of narrative and nature, anticipating witnessing. I
turn now to review the critical literature on the idea of history in McCarthy’s work, particularly
with regard to Blood Meridian.

Review of secondary literature
One cannot say precisely whether the novel is about the true nineteenth-century historical events
it describes or about the nature of history itself.1
History, even in McCarthy’s fictive world, does not so much stand opposed to nature, but
rather it partakes in the same sort of ambiguities and deceptive qualities—rendering them elusive
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to human conventions or even intellectual modes of description and analysis. One of these
fallacies, presented in the last chapter, is that through knowledge the mystery of the world can be
overcome. This idea is equally true for our modern sense of history. The doctrine of progress in
historical thinking creates the false impression that history is a natural thing, rather than a purely
human construct. As discussed in the previous chapter, Blood Meridian’s “optical democracy”
scene puts into doubt the privileged position so often accorded to human identity in an
impersonal world. Indeed, and as many scholars have noted, Blood Meridian presents the fullest
expression of McCarthy’s engagement with the idea of history. Luce notes: “Blood Meridian is
seen by many as a culmination of McCarthy’s career-long concern with humankind’s dark
history and with its feeble contention against spiritual wilderness.”2 In terms of national
mythology, our dominant narrative asserts that American identity has been forged against the
backdrop of such a natural and spiritual wilderness. McCarthy challenges this claim with his
own mythopoeic enterprise. At the heart of this project of McCarthy’s is a serious philosophical
interrogation of things natural and things made by human art. To accomplish this, McCarthy’s
publication of Blood Meridian reveals a distinct shift in creative focus.
McCarthy scholars have been quick to point out that Blood Meridian represents a
departure in terms of a change of setting due to the novel’s appropriation of actual historical
subject matter. Though earlier works deal with episodes taken from the pages of the newspaper
and regional lore, Blood Meridian is a singular work in McCarthy’s corpus due to its use of
actual historical personages, places, and events. Scholars use the terms “historical novel,”
“historical or frontier romance,” and “gothic pasquinade,” among others, to describe the form,
though no consensus exists on this point in the extant literature. Still, almost every critical
2
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approach to Blood Meridian attempting to classify it as a piece of genre fiction develops its
paradigm by focusing on the preeminent themes of human history and natural violence in the
novel.
One example of this trend in the scholarly literature comes from Dana Phillips. In
dealing with the novel in terms of scale—epochal time and expansive geography—Phillips offers
the following comment on the location of meaning and value. He writes:
Blood Meridian does not wholly reject the notion of value, but the values it describes are
not ones for which we have ready terms. For McCarthy, the history of the West is natural
history. This is a history of forces and the processes by which these forces evolve into
the forms to which we give names are not our own. Thus the present is also a “time
before nomenclature3
Here Phillips touches back on the idea of “forces” that I discussed in the previous chapter. At
the core of Phillips’ argument is an insight into McCarthy’s appreciation for language. From his
analysis, it would seem that human impulse to assign names to things stands itself as a form of
transgression, or even violence.
Blood Meridian shows us how history is destroyed, even as it is unfolding. And to this
end, it stands as both a document and an illustration or allegory. The knowability of the world
slips past in our impulse to contain it in language, what Vereen Bell describes as “the ordered
categories of thought.”4 The world, it would seem, is something other than what humans make
of it—in both substance and mind. Timothy Parrish calls the novel “distinctly a-Derridaean in its
insistence that nature, or the things of nature, have an equivalence with human constructions.”5
History, then, emerges as something made rather than something that exists independently of the
affairs of men. Against the Hegelian view, McCarthy sees history as a purely human construct.
3
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While most of McCarthy’s works are placed in the “real” or actual world, and often
referenced with an exacting and precise specificity of geography and regional dialect, Blood
Meridian is singular in this regard. No other of McCarthy’s works documents actual historical
events. Jarrett comments on this:
Why base a novel on the sordid history of Glanton’s troop of Indian killers? The
narrative’s violence achieves not merely a revisionary western but something perhaps
something superior to revision—an attempt at a dramatic and ritualized reexperience of
American history as it was lived. Or as we wish it were not lived. It insists that readers
not only be reminded intellectually of the violence of the nation’s history but, in the form
of the novel’s dramatic representation of the living present, experience firsthand the
horror and fascination of that violence. . .. Our postmodern detachment from our own
history assumes a superior, “uninvolved” angle of vision that McCarthy suggests may be
an illusion of our historical distance (or ignorance). Blood Meridian’s attempt at the
reenactment of history through fiction is all the more tragic in its failure—for it is finally
only a fiction—but as a dramatic fiction it may more successfully express the bloody
tragedy of Western history than any historian.6
McCarthy’s attempt to re-mythologize the American West (or, for some, the American Western)
is a core issue for my interpretation of Blood Meridian. This idea of “an illusion of historical
distance (or ignorance)” is, in my analysis, another formulation of the same idea found in the
“optical democracy” of McCarthy’s landscapes. The issue in both is the place of humans as
situated in a world consisting of time and space created by narrative and charged with meaning.
Of further interest is the issue of human consciousness in such a world. What is to be made of
the issue human knowledge—how do we know what we know? Timothy Parrish offers the
following regarding the epistemological question at the core of McCarthy’s fiction:
For McCarthy, history is possibly the only means by and through which humans know
themselves in a manner that can be communicated to others, but its insights obligate us to
a kind of necessary form of collective self-deception about what is possible to know
about humans’ interaction with the world. In Blood Meridian, history can be known, but
humans cannot necessarily know themselves through history. In this respect, the novel is
neither postmodern nor premodern. It is instead an assertion about why history allows no
6

Robert Jarrett, Cormac McCarthy (New York: Twayne, 1997), 92-93, (emphasis added.)

108

progress and an astonishing attempt to create a narrative context that would contain
within it the history of the world as it has been known and, paradoxically, not known.7
Noting the ambition of McCarthy’s project, Parrish hits on themes pertinent to a political
analysis of Blood Meridian. The idea of flawed perception and even deception is key here.
Even divorced from the language of the Hegelian system, history is commonly understood as a
progression of events and ideas. However animated, the substance of history lends itself to the
language and imagery of linear forward movement. One’s position in “the present” is
understood in relation to a succession of prior positions, now relegated to “the past.” Most
significant to this most basic description of historicizing is the implicit suggestion that this
movement is intelligible, if not intentional. In working out McCarthy’s relationship to the tropes
of pre, post, or, simply, modern fiction, Parrish delineates something integral to McCarthy’s
entire artistic outlook when he calls it “an attempt to create a narrative context.”8 Positioning
humans in a world both familiar and strange, a world both known and not known, McCarthy
engages in a fictional medium as old as the idea of history itself—that of mythmaking.
Approaching history as a product and/or form of myth brings the question of substance
immediately to the fore. McCarthy’s effort to recreate the world through language is more a
project than a product; the process is more important than the outcome. Commenting on this,
Thomas Pughe offers the following:
[McCarthy] employs a de-individualizing and de-historicizing language that draws on
myth, legend, the Bible but also on geology and paleontology, and thereby outgrows the
generic conventions of Westerns to which he also alludes. This language generates a
powerful dialectical movement within his text, for it does not just signify a historical
narrative of horrifying violence and human depravity, but that narrative also signifies the
transgressive power of McCarthy’s writing. I mean by << transgressive power >> the
way in which his writing suggests a non-anthropocentric point of view, the way in which
7
8
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in their process of barbarization his characters become << other >>, like the territory
through which they ride. Though Blood Meridian represents the history of the West
negatively, as the destruction of a Eurocentric form of sense making, McCarthy’s writing
appears as (to quote a phrase from Bataille) a << commentary on [the text’s] absence of
meaning >>.* It is here that we must look for justification of McCarthy’s << stylization
>> of violence and brutality.9
Here Pughe echoes several points of analysis from this dissertation’s previous chapter.
The optical democracy of humans and natural landscape renders subjectivity questionable—
even suspect. This is accomplished, Pughe asserts (along with others), through a “dialectical
movement” of language. Narrative does not merely signify violence in McCarthy’s text, it also
engages in it. Like nature, history, for McCarthy, is compatible with violence. Both terms have
dual purposes or meanings, as both invoke the content of human or natural or political history
(ie., the content of the terms as well as the activity of doing the terms—historiography or
historicizing). Both, as imputations of meaning, are meant to express inherently violent
activities. Here James Dorson adds to this conversation:
Blood Meridian’s violence, then, is not the result of a violent strain in the human genome,
but the product of a chronic yearning for narrative meaning to make sense of the world. .
. . Because this desire for certainty against the ever-baffling mystery of the world has a
strong tendency to preclude critical reflection on where our beliefs and self-imposed laws
are leading us, Blood Meridian leaves us with the uneasy feeling that we are trapped
within an endless cycle of fear and mythical violence.10
My interpretation follows Dorson’s in this regard. In Blood Meridian, history and nature
do not stand apart as opposites, nor is there any tangible dialectical tension between them,
though at times this may appear to be the case. Delineating where the two concepts stand
9
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opposed and where they converge is a daunting undertaking, though worthwhile for an attempt
to penetrate the novel for political insights. However difficult they may be to articulate, I agree
with Dorson that such conclusions speak in favor of the novel as a source for political inquiry.
He writes:
The critical merit of Blood Meridian is that it confronts readers with the modern
predicament of a social order that believes itself to be rational, but which is rational only
to the extent that it has repressed its own mythical origins and metaphysical origins. By
so doing, it calls into question the presupposed rational basis and value-neutrality that our
law and social order are predicated upon.11
The place, value, and substance of this complex of myths is at the heart of my
presentation of history in Blood Meridian. As demonstrated, the existing scholarly literature
gives emphasis to this underlying epistemological question at the heart of McCarthy’s vision.
Through the relationship and interplay of the concepts of nature and history, McCarthy creates a
field of mystery in which the position of man in a non-human world throws doubt upon the
dominant narratives we rely on for our self-understanding. In this manner, Blood Meridian
begins to question the basic legitimacy of the regime and its institutions at the level of their
mythic underpinning. The primary voice McCarthy adopts to establish this profound uncertainty
is in his remarkable character Judge Holden. To establish my analysis of history in Blood
Meridian it will be necessary, then, to give the reader some additional context for the character.

Notes on Judge Holden
McCarthy remains true to the historical source of his novel while reorganizing the
material, unwinding threads in its maze, into the world of the historical romance. In
Holden, McCarthy makes a fine distinction between historical authenticity, a mortal
Holden, and the wildness, the romance, the immortality of the evil that is apparent in his
fictional character. The novelist has, after all, used references to historical people and
11
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situations—Van Diemen’s Land, Sloat, the Anasazi—to involve the world beyond Blood
Meridian’s temporal and geographic limits. As the Aztecs fell to the Spaniards’ guns, so
too the buffalo, and hence the Native Americans, fell to the white hunters’ guns. One
senses a powerful universality in the novel. A deepened sense of diabolical ubiquity in
the magnificent yet monstrous Judge Holden could not be more appropriate.12
To orient the reader to history as a political and philosophical concept in Blood Meridian
a brief return to the novel itself may be helpful. The exploits of the Glanton company on the
Texas-Mexico border during the mid-eighteen thirties is the setting. Many of the personages are
real historical figures, taken from published accounts from the period. Of all the novel’s
characters the figure of Judge Holden seems the most fanciful or far-fetched, but he appears in
Chamberlain’s account as much the same man: huge, bald, and pale, an accomplished geologist
and botanist given to lectures on natural history, a fearsome shot with a rifle, and an outright
scoundrel.13
The character of Judge Holden serves as a useful vehicle into the idea of history in Blood
Meridian because, of all the novel’s characters, he is the most concerned with, and preoccupied
by, it. Particularly important here is the status of the judge as a learned and enthusiastic
exponent of Enlightenment rationalist philosophy. In his several sermons or orations to the
company, Judge Holden’s supreme faith in the knowledge of natural history comes to the fore as
the ultimate expression of human mastery over the natural environment. The following scene
depicts one of the judge’s early lectures on geology. Here, some of the gang members challenge
his speculations on the age of his geological specimens by quoting scripture:
Books lie, [the judge] said.
God don’t lie.
No, said the judge. He does not. And these are his words.
He held up a chunk of rock.
He speaks in stones and trees, the bones of things.
12
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The squatters in their rags nodded among themselves and were soon reckoning him
correct, this man of learning, in all his speculations, and this the judge encouraged until
they were right proselytes of the new order whereupon he laughed at them for fools.14
Important to understanding this scene is the following observation: that while the judge is
thoroughly committed to truth, as defined by reason rather than revelation, he uses his superior
knowledge playfully, as a way of confounding his contemporaries for his own amusement. Of
all the characters in the novel, it is “the expriest” named Tobin who appears to understand the
judge better than anyone. It is from Tobin that the judge’s backstory is presented to the kid. The
reader learns that he is enormous in stature, rotund, totally hairless, and a renaissance man.
Tobin speaks:
He glanced across the fire toward the judge. That great hairless thing. You wouldnt [sic]
think it to look at him that he could outdance the devil himself now would ye? God the
man is a dancer, you’ll not take that away from him. And fiddle. He’s the greatest
fiddler I ever heard and that’s an end on it. The greatest. He can cut a trail, shoot a rifle,
ride a horse, track a deer. He’s been all over the world.15
In addition to this appreciation for the judge’s learning and cultivation, however, Tobin’s story
reveals two other important characteristics of the judge: first, that he is endowed with certain
more-than-human abilities (“Every man in the company claims to have encountered that
sootysouled rascal in some other place.”), and second that, on a very deep level, Tobin knows the
judge is evil and fears him even more than he hates him, alleging that he cannot decide whether
the judge had been sent among the gang for a curse.16 One thing for certain is clearly established
in this introduction and backstory episode from Tobin regarding Judge Holden: that the gang is
involved in absolute warfare and that in this area of expertise, the judge is the indisputable
master. Being something of a professor, the judge builds upon his worldview in occasional
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orations (or sermons). His early scientific insights gradually come to dwell on the subject of
war: its cause, nature, and substance. Later in the novel, Judge Holden begins referring to war as
a game:
It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge. War endures. As well ask
men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited for
him. The ultimate game awaiting its ultimate practitioner. That is the way it was and
will be. That way and not some other way.17
Judge Holden is a character like no other in the novel, and perhaps like no other in all of
literature. He stands in such stark contrast to the all too human other characters in the novel that
McCarthy’s reader may begin to conclude that he is, in fact, not human. A number of critical
explanations are available: that he is the embodiment of evil, if not devil himself, that he is a
gnostic demiurge sent to bring about the unity of existence, the Hindu god Shiva—a destroyer of
illusions (if not worlds), a folkloric trickster figure, working at the margins to undo the deeds and
affairs of humanity and, thus, expose their hubris folly. All of these readings are compelling. To
understand the judge, however, in the terms of a political reading of Blood Meridian, I wish to
consider as the embodiment (or perhaps agent of) the idea of history itself, which I intend to
describe and analyze in the remaining sections of this chapter.

The illusion of historical distance (or ignorance)18
In chapter two, Nature, I centered my analysis on the ideas of sight and of seeing,
wherein McCarthy’s idea of sight or of vision is more than a simple stylistic device or choice of
aesthetics. McCarthy invokes something more philosophical with this device, he hints at the
very idea of knowing. Evidence for this is found in McCarthy’s dislocation of the human in the
17
18
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allegorical spaces he creates through his attention to landscape, and the supposition of man’s
exile as man’s primordial condition.19 This challenge of knowing is a pervasive concern for
McCarthy’s critics as well.20
McCarthy is preoccupied with the idea of illusions. Sometimes his narrative voice slips
into a kind of essentialism akin to that of Plato—things themselves versus their representations.
And in this, amid the natural imagery of landscape, McCarthy always courts an atmosphere of
hostility. The idea of illusion here is primary, and it may be helpful, then, to reflect on my
earlier argument from chapter one, Narrative, in which I discussed the idea of distortion and time
in The Orchard Keeper. McCarthy’s use of allegories is again helpful to the analysis on this
point. In the current context, allegory must be discussed as an essential element of McCarthy’s
myth-making or mythopoeic enterprise; a calling into question of our most basic assumptions.
In Blood Meridian, the idea of history itself is an allegory for the process in which the
thing itself is destroyed by the creation of its narrative representation. Thus, Blood Meridian is a
philosophical novel that puts the idea of history itself into question. History, particularly as
Judge Holden presents it, seems to point toward meaning or intelligibility. Indeed, American
idealism at its romantic core is fairly grounded in the Hegelian (among others) idea of linear
historical progress—that from the study of the past, or natural history, we can come to know
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ourselves and even our purpose in the present, perhaps even using this to shape the course of the
future. Certainly all of the canonical American novelists take on this trope.21
The title of this section follows Jarrett’s interpretation of the text. Jarrett takes his cue
from this scene in The Orchard Keeper: “Lighting glared in threatful illusions of proximity and
quick shapes appeared in the road, leapt from ditch or tree in configurations antic and bizarre.”22
Following this, Jarrett writes: “Our postmodern detachment from our own history assumes a
superior, ‘uninvolved’ angle of vision that McCarthy suggests may be an illusion of our
historical distance (or ignorance).”23 By ignorance, we may take Jarrett to mean our modern
belief in detachment—that we are somehow uninvolved in the violence of our present. In the
reasonable assumption that McCarthy thinks of history as a narrative or story, what, if anything,
does he indicate that history is a story of? Is it, we well might ask, a story of anything more than
pure violence? Perhaps McCarthy is trying to question the whitewashed effects of the dominant
myths of American national identity with counter-myths, or, anti-myths, designed to look our
history’s grim truths squarely in the eye.
Blood Meridian is unflinching in its “revisionist” account of the darker realities of
westward expansion, as the Glanton Gang begins with a legal mandate to take scalps and
assist in quelling the alien land. But any attempt to read the novel as a single-minded
allegory revealing the avaricious impulses of Manifest Destiny is undermined by the
character of the judge. He is a ubiquitous figure who transcends race, nationality, or
political purpose, and he becomes many things, among them, the richly symbolic
incarnation of “mindless violence,” a propensity that lies latent even in the kid, in spite of
his stoic resistance.24
The mythic complex we are accustomed to is one that requires a hero. This is
particularly true in the context of the American frontier romance (stories embodying ideals of
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rugged individualism, conquest of nature, native savagery, etc.) McCarthy’s project with nature
is to show us that the world is what it is and not what humans make of it. With history,
McCarthy is saying that we are all who or what we are, and not what we believe ourselves to be.
Textual episodes testifying to this are numerous: the idea expressed in the formulation “the child
the father of the man,” from earlier in the novel, the mirrored shields of the Comanche warriors,
the necessity of a witness to substantiate the veracity of an event, come readily to mind. In these,
McCarthy is not merely saying that human society is caught up in its own myth, but that it is
constantly writing and revising this story to reflect our preferences of how to view ourselves.
Our past is violent, as is our present, and our future is, if nothing else, uncertain. The novel’s
protagonist, known only as “the kid,” is typified by that which he lacks: reflection, obedience to
a moral principle, or acknowledgement that he is participating in acts of horrible violence. If a
modern hero such as this is problematic for McCarthy’s audience, I agree with Timothy Parrish’s
conclusion as to McCarthy’s purpose. He writes:
In Blood Meridian no society exists for the kid to accept or reject; rather, the reader
constitutes the society that determines what role the kid has played in the history of the
novel. See the child; see yourself. The reader will want to see the kid redeemed, because
otherwise the reader is implicated in a history that is very different from the one he or she
has been taught to celebrate.25
Like the kid, we are all thrust into the world to be cleared of the usual determinants of identity: a
personal past, a place to call home, a name. We are empty vessels to be filled by the “history”
that comes to us.
The idea of the illusion of historical distance resonates with the concept of optical
democracy in Blood Meridian: the thought that we are somehow detached from history, and not
caught up in it. Indeed, one of the primary thrusts of McCarthy’s overall corpus is to throw this
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supposition into question. The privileged position of the observer—the individual doing the
seeing—is removed. The equalizing of the human and nonhuman causes us to doubt whether
history can be said to be a thing made by us, or something that contains us—like a story.
Meanwhile, the act of history itself is the larger process at work. The equivalence of all things
seen, the “optical democracy” of things human and non-human in McCarthy’s fiction, is at work
in the discussion of history. The illusion, of course, is that things have meaning. That history
tells a story that is important to us, both corporately and individually. McCarthy’s creation of
Judge Holden as a draftsman and a theorist of war is the at the center of this enterprise in the
novel. I now turn to examine the relationship of history and violence in the context of Judge
Holden. In the section below, titled, “The Origin of War,” I try to contextualize Judge Holden’s
pronouncements as a series of aphorisms and parables expressing a vision of political
philosophy.

The origin of war
In Blood Meridian, McCarthy seems to be saying something about the nature and origins
of war. In the speeches of various characters, the reader suspects these origins may be traced
historically. I contend, however, that they are presented philosophically, because that origin may
be found in nature; or in the nature of humans. Judge Holden, Blood Meridian’s grand theorist
of war certainly locates it there. But is this an expression of the will to power or something
else? Judge Holden is more of a metaphysician than Nietzschean in this regard. Furthermore,
unlike Nietzsche, the judge is a practitioner of war. Judge Holden actually does the things he
describes, or the ideas he promotes in his oratories. As a work of fiction, Blood Meridian stands
forward most brilliantly because we, the audience, must believe what is being described. In the
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fictional reality of the novel the primary interlocutor is the ultimate practitioner of unrepentant
evil. And yet, he calls it holy.
This is the nature of war, whose stake is at once the game and the authority and the
justification. Seen so, war is the truest form of divination. It is the testing of one’s will
which because it binds them is therefore forced to select. War is the ultimate game
because war is at last a forcing of the unity of existence. War is god.26
You came forward, he said, to take part in a work. But you were a witness against
yourself. You sat in judgement on your own deeds. You put your own allowances before
the judgements of history and you broke with the body of which you were pledge a part
and poisoned it in all its enterprise. Hear me, man. I spoke in the desert for you and you
only turned a deaf ear to me. If war is not holy then man is nothing but antic clay.27
The novel allows us to analyze characters not just by what they say, but also by what they do (or,
in the case of the kid, don’t do). But Judge Holden’s nihilism does not encapsulate the world.
The origin of war is found in the essential encounter between any two individuals. It is a
fundamental animosity between men. Here McCarthy is more like Hobbes, except, as John Gray
notes, the violence of Blood Meridian is normal, not intolerable.28 Inverting a formulation of
Walter Benjamin’s, Dorson offers the following:
Blood Meridian is a document of a barbarism that is also a document of civilization, a
barbarism not external to law and order but one that pulses just beneath its surface. It
undermines the distinction between savagery and civilization, chaos and order, war and
peace. Each is related to the other, as two sides of the same coin, and Blood Meridian
flips the coin to show us the darker side. It lifts the bar that we have constructed between
violence and non-violence, showing us that our conception of violence is blinded to the
violence of the order that sanctions it.29
Dorson’s analysis is provocative. He hits on one of Blood Meridian’s most profound
philosophical insights, and in explicitly political terms. The basis of law, the foundation of the
regime, all within a unifying myth designed to explain away the inherent violence attendant in all
26
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civilizational acts. Order cannot be brought to disorder without violence. And yet, while
McCarthy accepts this, he does not celebrate it, even while much of the text of Blood Meridian
would indicate otherwise. Indeed, McCarthy leaves a large space for skepticism, not merely of
violence, but also for its concealment. Is order just a myth among myths? Judge Holden would
seem to think so.
The universe is no narrow thing and the order within it is not constrained by any latitude
in its conception to repeat what exists is one part in any other part. Even in this world
more things exist without our knowledge than with it and the order in creation which you
see is that which you have put there, like a string in a maze, so that you shall not lose
your way. For existence has its own order and that no man’s mind can compass, that
mind itself being but a fact among others.30
Whether in its mythic dimension or a more purely academic sense, History is a form of ordering
the world. Judge Holden loves natural history and sees in the rocks and trees the story of all
creation.31 In this I think McCarthy is attempting to call into question the veracity of history to
illustrate how susceptible such a narrative is in the hands of an “old hoodwinker” like Judge
Holden.32 In an exchange with another of the novel’s characters, Judge Holden offers insights
into the origin of war. He begins by talking about trades. “My trade?” Davy Brown asks, to
which Judge Holden responds:
War. War is your trade. Is it not?
And it ain’t yours?
Mine too. Very much so.
What about all them notebooks and bones and stuff?
All other trades are contained in that of war.
Is that why war endures?
No. It endures because young men love it and old men love it in them. Those that
fought, those that did not.33
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Judge Holden has first identified himself as a practitioner or tradesman of war. In the quotation
above he has proclaimed the state of war as eternal and natural to the affairs of mankind. As a
polymath, Judge Holden responds to Davy Brown that “all other trades are contained in war,”
and also that “war is the ultimate game.” In this speech Judge Holden begins to expound an
erotics, or even, a metaphysics of war. This lust or zeal or eroticism springs from the passion
and élan of young men who crave the test, engage in the struggle, and romanticize the outcome.
War “endures” in the case of old men because these old men see themselves reflected in the
young men—even if an idealized projection of their former selves.
Judge Holden then takes the discussion further:
Games of sport involve and strength of the opponents and the humiliation of defeat and
the pride of victory are in themselves sufficient stake because they inhere in the worth of
the principals and define them. But trial of chance or trial of worth all games aspire to
the condition of war for here that which is wagered swallows up game, player, all.34
His remarks here take on the gnostic tone that culminates in the “unity of existence” speech,
quoted below. War absorbs the individual, removing any sense of individuality and replacing it
with its own totality. War is like a game—it partakes of the quality of a game—but it becomes
something more. The “presencing” feature of war takes it out of time, and being outside of time
renders man godlike. At this point, Judge Holden begins referring to war in terms of the dance: a
perpetual coming together of partners moving in tandem but going nowhere.
History purports to chronicle or offer an account of what “really” happened. McCarthy’s
myth of one man, absent any traditional signifiers of identity (i.e., name, place, history, norms),
stands as a symbol for all men. To have no history is to be totally in the present. In this, the kid
and Judge Holden are linked. And yet they also diverge in an important way: Judge Holden’s
relationship to history is his effort to absolutize all the knowledge of existence and deprive other
34
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symbols of their power. The kid’s is seemingly opposite: a solitary figure with no history,
knowledge, or much discernible will confronting the problem of making choices. And in this
divergence between the judge and the kid we once again may glimpse McCarthy clearing a space
for moral action.
The metaphysics of violence, as depicted in McCarthy’s world, stands in strong (if
uncertain) relationship to nihilism. A violent action gives meaning to one’s existence (example:
if I can hurt you, then I must exist.) This action might be undertaken, not to accomplish some
end, but to participate honestly in the world as it is. War, as the judge puts it, is the ultimate
question because it beggars all other questions of right or wrong.
Moral law is an invention of mankind for the disenfranchisement of the powerful in favor
of the weak. Historical law subverts it at every turn. A moral view can never be proven
right or wrong by any ultimate test. . . . Decisions of life and death, of what shall be and
what shall not, beggar all question of right. In elections of these magnitudes are all lesser
ones subsumed, moral, spiritual, natural.35
The judge places a high value on the truth. The fact that this truth is brutal or amoral does not
make it untrue. The law of life, it would seem, is negation. Only that which is can be said to be
true, and that which has been negated is, thus, untrue. The ultimate triumph of the human will is
to remake the world and to give it a name. His pursuit of this goal is his metaphysics. He
actively and joyfully participates in negation. Parrish writes:
To the judge, history is the most powerful form of dominion because it seems to order the
world. Actually, nothing orders the world, and this is why violence is the world’s only
sustained, permanent, form of expression. History, however, is the form by which
humans displace this knowledge into something that we can claim to control. History is
inevitably created as a consequence of destruction, just as the past enters the judge’s book
as it is destroyed. Moreover, if the judge can expunge from the memory of man what he
puts in his book, then the judge’s book becomes the only true record of the world. No
rival versions can exist, because the judge’s version will contain within it all possibilities.
This point is important, because the judge lends order to what might otherwise be seen as
35
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chaos, random bloodshed, killing for its own sake. Yet the opposite to the judge does not
exist—some readers may want to make the kid into the judge’s opposite, but he can no
more be opposed than the Hindu god Shiva can.36
Judge Holden actively and participates in negation. His metaphysical principle is the
game. For him, war is the ultimate game because through it man participates in forcing the
unity of existence. As a result of this, war stands paradoxically as both the ultimate creative and
destructive act.
This is the nature of war, whose stake is at once the game and the authority and the
justification. Seen so, war is the truest form of divination. It is the testing of one’s will
and the will of another within that larger will which because it binds them is therefore
forced to select. War is the ultimate game because war is at last a forcing of the unity of
existence. War is god.37
The point in all of Judge Holden’s extensive notetaking and attempts to appropriate the entire
world to put into his book is not so much to preserve it or transmit it to future generations.
Rather, it is to unify time. As he says, he will never die, and we should take him at his word.
Like the mythological trickster figure, he will always show up in the margins or borders between
things, because that’s where the action is to be found. And what will the judge be doing there
when we find him? He will be actively involved in un-doing whatever is, particularly whatever
has been built or made by human art. A similar conclusion leads Parrish to say: “The judge is,
arguably, human history incarnate.”38 He will put all the birds in cages in zoos. Why? Because
once there are not free birds left un-understood to offend him he will have undone the thing with
which he is truly at war: freedom itself. Freedom to Judge Holden is an illusion—a remnant of
man’s will to innocence. As long as war—or participation in the dance—can no longer be seen
as a choice then there will no longer be any false dancers.
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This insight seems to be the more question par excellence of Blood Meridian. The
disunity of truth, when men resist the recognition that freedom is an illusion or that man has a
certain matter of choice, even when reduced to the most elemental and extreme circumstances, is
the novel’s animating spark. McCarthy seems to be positing that, by creating extreme doubt as
to the existence of choice or free will, that man still retains some freedom in the face of
overwhelming necessity. If the unity of existence is ever completely forced, then we are out of
history; we will have run out of stories. The only reason for such a book as Blood Meridian is
the fact that the question remains open. There are no terrains so wild and barbarous so as to
settle the question of the true nature and substance of the human heart. This is the only question
worth exploring, the only story worth telling for McCarthy. The question of right and wrong is
beggared by negation because the question of men’s hearts remains unresolved.
McCarthy’s Judge Holden articulates a powerful argument in favor of negation. But why
doesn’t he just kill everyone and settle things? The answer is because as long as one person
remains unwilling (or maybe even hesitant) to challenge the rules of the fame, then the question
persists. The judge, whether he or not he ever truly dies, can never kill himself and so end the
game. There must always remain at least one other player, or the game will end. Negation, as a
life’s work, requires something to negate. This is why the judge functions best in many ways as
a trickster figure. He can only blur the lines so long as there are lines to blur or boundaries to
cross. Without them where would he go? Who, or what, would he judge? The final thing that
the judge cannot undo is, ultimately, himself. His only hope, then, if he can even be said to
hope, is to find the one who can undo him. He seems to see this potential in the kid. Why? The
answer would seem to lie with the kid’s innocence. The kid is never completely cleansed of his
will to innocence. His resistance to the life of the darkness marks him a failure in the judge’s
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esteem. As the judge’s chosen successor (if we can even call him this) the kid should accept his
mantle as the judge’s rightful heir to the father’s death. When he refuses to kill him in the desert,
the kid refuses to fully commit to the game. His inaction, then, pluralizes truth.
By the end of the novel we can clearly see the way in which the judge serves as the
vehicle through which the two other main characters (the kid and Glanton) come into contact and
contrast them. All three have alien hearts. The judge would kill Glanton even if Glanton might
have lived to fulfill the destiny the judge has proclaimed for him. Losing Glanton is, for the
judge, akin to losing a good horse. For the judge, Glanton is a vehicle, a puppet, a tool. With
Glanton dead, the judge’s one remaining task is either to erase the remaining records of their
deeds together, or to recruit a new mentee and continue them. Does the judge’s wooing of the
kid extend beyond a mere stratagem for bringing him into his clutches? Not entirely. The
judge’s kinship of the kid, their predestined linkage, would seem to inhere in the kid’s
innocence—a history-less carte blanche with no discernible motives save a taste for mindless
violence.
The master of time gobbles up everything that the kid is, has been, and will be. In this act
the judge negates the kid and all that is contained within his history, save for one thing: the
existence of the novel itself. The end of any poem (at least any good poem) leaves the reader
changed. Such a change can be said to negate some shadowy corner of illusions still lurking in
the recesses of the reader’s mind, as it can be said to create an opening or a new vista for
thought—a way of constructing meaning from the little fragments of bone, foundations of
shelter, scratching on rocks, a face, a name. The essential substance of myth, legend, dust is
human memory. And the truth of memories is that they have no meaning in themselves.
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Memory, in the context of Blood Meridian, is equivalent the bones that are picked up and,
certainly, the bones that are not.
They did not speak. They were men of another time for all that they bore Christian
names and they had lived all their lives in a wilderness as had their fathers before them.
They’d learnt war by warring, the generations driven from the eastern shore across the
continent, from the ashes at Gnadenhutten onto the prairies and across the outlet to the
bloodlands of the west. If much in the world were mystery the limits of that world were
not, for it was without measure or bound and there were contained within it creatures
more horrible yet and men of other colors and beings which no man has looked upon and
yet not alien none of it more than were their own hearts alien in them, whatever
wilderness contained there and whatever beasts.39
The Glanton Gang is depicted allegorically here as the entire history of westward
expansion on the American continent. This contains, however, the paradoxical reduction of their
spiritual horizon as a result of their actions. The country they have found on the lawless frontier
becomes less immense and was less alien to them than their own hearts. The “wilderness
within” forms one of the great thematic linkages between Blood Meridian and McCarthy’s
successive works: The Border Trilogy. Any kind of storytelling is violent because in its creation
of a world it negates all possible other worlds. The person who gains understanding of this, the
storyteller, becomes the master of time.
The content of history, its subject matter, might be a natural, or human, or even a political
accounting of the sum of forces contributing to shape the “present.” In the meta sense described
above, the act of recalling, or recounting, is a pervasive feature found throughout Blood Meridian.
This act or process of witnessing is inherently violent and violative with regard to its impact on
the sphere of human reality or truth. McCarthy makes much of the divergence between what it is
to know a thing, and how the truth of such knowledge is both fragmentary and vulnerable. The
recreation of an event as history, through its mediation into language, or “witnessing,” as
McCarthy frequently terms it, erases the objective historical fact; destroying it through the
39
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inscription of meaning. What remains, even though it may be presented and even generally
regarded as “true,” is only a representation; some that, ultimately, becomes the chattel property of
the soul surviving witness. History, in McCarthy’s world, is the process through which nature is
subjugated through the imposition of meaning.
For McCarthy’s sympathetic characters the task of narrating their biography, of choosing
of a story, is similar to the task of McCarthy’s reader—a herculean effort to discern meaning and,
eventually, to extend sympathy or empathy to the most despicable of human characters; or at least
to be fascinated by them. McCarthy complicates this enterprise, asserting the implicit challenge
that the appearance of such momentous choice is ultimately a great misconception, if not
deception. Human activity is much less durable or lasting in the face of cosmic or natural forces
than humans would prefer to believe. History, as such, is not an accurate reflection of meaning or
value, but simply one possible story thought to convey some form of meaning. The authority or
legitimacy of this sovereign power is derived from a purely human supposition that our ability to
explain, describe, or, ultimately, predict the various phenomena of our world implies our natural
fitness to rule, or our lack of it.
McCarthy’s nuanced style subtly subverts the foundation of this legitimacy without
denying its potency. He directly parodies any claims to the legitimacy of conventional sovereign
power or, for that matter, any legitimacy of the claim that life is inherently sacred. “In such a
world,” he seems to ask, “how can life be defended for its own sake?”40 Yet McCarthy also
demonstrates the futility of this line of questioning, creating a world of humans with no
discernible internal language of thought or reflection. Indeed, it is for this very reason that
McCarthy’s style commends itself to the political imagination. When the form of the human is
so reduced, the substance of action stands forward most visibly.
40
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Conclusion
The image of the hole digger at the epilogue of Blood Meridian is a perfect metaphor for
McCarthy’s vision of history. History is the building of fences. It is the act of assigning
meaning to things; of instituting order. But in its undoing of the chaos it enacts a kind of
violence of its own. In terms both of the surface and meta-narrative, not only is the story of
American history violence, but also the very nature of doing that history itself partakes in
violence. In a related way, the fence is also a metaphor for law; it circumscribes freedom. But
where absolute freedom is equated with absolute chaos, perhaps we ought to reappraise our
valuation of freedom. Violence in history does not negate the potency of choosing moral actions
and of taking responsibility. The rippling waves, or impacts, of this may never be known but
there is always a witness because, undeniably, things do happen.
History relates to the concept of witnessing as an extension of McCarthy’s myth-making
enterprise. History invokes witnessing through the education and journey toward selfunderstanding of the reader, who also occupies the position (and responsibilities) of the witness.
And in the reader’s coming to accept the role of witness to history, he may once again encounter
the problem of knowing and the lingering question of responsibility. For McCarthy, the witness
to history is compatible with the problem of knowing. History may create a problem of meaning
but can never eclipse the possibility of value. Progress, ultimately, is McCarthy’s philosophical
enemy. The illusion of progress is what gives rise to our collective self-deception of safety in a
chaotic world. Yes, the wild and barbarous terrains of the western frontier are now tamed, but
not really. The layered stories within stories of McCarthy’s writing express the idea of
witnessing, as it is in the exchange between the storyteller and hearer, and the hearer’s retelling
of the tale that gives the story its meaning. This becomes all the more poignant when one
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considers McCarthy’s position on the role of narrative in constituting life itself. The story only
has meaning insofar as it is heard, to say nothing of its being understood.
In the specific context of Blood Meridian, the conceptual linkage between history and
witnessing can most clearly be seen in the “lethal congruences” scene.
As they rode that night upon the mesa they saw come toward them much like their
own image a party of riders pieced out of the darkness by the intermittent flare of the dry
lightning to the north. …
They parleyed without dismounting and the ciboleros lighted their small cigarillos and
told that they were bound for the markets at Mesilla. The Americans might have traded
for some of the meat but they carried no tantamount goods and the disposition to
exchange was foreign to them. And so these parties divided upon that midnight plain,
each passing back the way the other hand come, pursuing as all travelers must, inversions
without end upon other men’s journeys.41
Though different, the mirroring of the two groups embodies something of an essential encounter.
While this phenomenon will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter, one fact remains
inescapable. Blood Meridian must, on some level, answer for its obvious dependency on
American national history. The novel’s engagement with American national mythology must be
addressed. How best to do this? The first avenue into this question is the epistemological
question. And McCarthy engages this question mythically. Anti-myth and counter-myth are
nice buzzwords. McCarthy does not pick apart the political structures or institutions that enacted
the doctrine of Manifest Destiny so much as he sheds light or gives intimations toward the spirit
that enabled it. My chapter on nature has set up this problem of knowing. What lies at its heart
is the duplicities of reality and illusion: “Between the wish and the thing the world lies
waiting.”42 In my next chapter, titled, Witnessing, I conclude the discussion of Blood Meridian
and turn to examine McCarthy’s next published novels, referenced collectively as The Border
Trilogy. Across all of these works a deeper and richer moral vision comes to typify McCarthy’s
41
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fiction. At the heart of this enterprise are more fully wrought considerations of essential
confrontation between the self and the other than glimpsed in McCarthy’s earlier works. As an
act, witnessing expands the idea of self-narration discussed earlier in this dissertation, by
invoking questions of what the self owes to the other in a world where mindless violence still
persists. Is ethical action just another illusion embedded in our political or cultural mythology,
or is it something irreducible? The tentative conclusions to this question offered in Blood
Meridian find stronger expression and greater profundity in the trilogy’s second novel, The
Crossing. I turn now to examine this unmistakable pivot in the maturation of McCarthy’s
political vision.
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4. Witnessing
This chapter continues and concludes my three-chapter examination of McCarthy’s fifth
novel, Blood Meridian, and inaugurates the discussion of his next major published work, the
Border Trilogy. My focus on the concept of witnessing forms an interpretive key to Blood
Meridian because it is presented as the central focus in some of the novel’s most philosophically
compelling scenes.1 The concept of witnessing expresses three of McCarthy’s most significant
political formulations.
First, witnessing is seen as an extension of narrative and sets the course for more
expansive directions of interpretation in the later chapters of this dissertation. Recalling some of
the conclusions reached in chapter one, storytelling and witnessing are creative acts in
McCarthy’s vision. Within and between his texts, McCarthy uses the activity of storytelling to
examine the place of the self and its relation to the world. McCarthy’s pronouncement that all
stories are one, and that there is only one tale to tell is significant here. Narrative emplotment
implies a certain sense of activity, or agency, for the individual consciousness situated in the
external phenomenality of the world. All of these are, in their ultimate impact, expressive of the
political concept of freedom. The author of a story acts as a free agent, asserting himself into the
world through narrating his own autobiography. To do this he must be endowed with a sense of
authority to act, imposing upon the world yet another strand into a matrix of stories that is, in a
very powerful sense, the substance of the world itself.

1

Another reason that I favor witnessing is more pragmatic, as it allows me to cut to the heart of my analysis without
first having to account for the laundry list of “isms” dominating most of the critical and interpretive literature on
McCarthy’s fiction broadly, and Blood Meridian in particular (among which number Gnosticism, mysticism,
determinism, historicism, eco-criticism, postmodernism, feminism, Marxism, etc.)

131

In an essay detailing this matrix of intersecting stories and the lives of the characters who
tell them in The Crossing, McCarthy scholar Dianne C. Luce shares a revealing anecdote
regarding this conceptual trend in McCarthy’s biography and artistic vision:
McCarthy was thinking about the role of narrative in our lives and had done some
reading in Hegel that seems to have influenced his ideas at least by Fall 1991, when he
traveled by train from Washington D.C. to New York City with Douglas Wager. . . .
Wager recalls that during their three hour trip McCarthy talked about “how narrative is
basic to all human beings, how even people who are buried alive go over their life stories
to stay sane. Verification of one’s story to someone else is essential to living...; our
reality comes out of the narrative we create, not out of the experiences themselves”
(Arnold, Stonemason 121).2
This connection to Hegel is not to be missed. Storytelling is man’s essential function for
McCarthy. It takes on two significant dimensions. Luce writes: “McCarthy is concerned with
the role or function of story in human experience of life, not only our own stories, our
autobiographies, but our biographies of others, our witnessing.”3 This formulation is of
particular use to an analysis of McCarthy’s political vision, as it sets up the comparison of
narrative as an expression of the human being in isolation against witnessing, invoking a basic
impulse toward community.
Turning now to the second of McCarthy’s political formulations. In the context of Blood
Meridian witnessing expresses a kind of phenomenology in McCarthy’s vision. It comes to
stand as the grounds or authority that allows an event to be substantiated. The idea is presented
by Judge Holden. Concluding a private discussion with a certain sergeant Aguilar, Judge Holden
informs a member of the company that “it is consistent with right principle that these facts—to
the extent that they can be readily made to do so—should find a repository in the witness of
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some third party.”4 This idea of a third party, sometimes also described, significantly, as the
“third path,” is of central importance in a number of important scenes involving Judge Holden
and the kid. The relationship between two entities or “principals” and the third party, the
witness, is reformulated a number of times throughout the text.5 It comes to represent a way of
grounding the real or the actual (a sort of re-theorization of the old “if a tree falls in the woods”
paradox). McCarthy uses this formulation throughout Blood Meridian to enliven ideas expressed
in his theory of narrative. This constitutes an attempt to place an isolated individual person, or
consciousness, in the world toward a vision in which the individual lives among others. As such,
witnessing expresses a social and ethical dimension to McCarthy’s theory of the self. If the
impulse to tell stories is the essential act of humans and thus story becomes a medium or
mediating force for how McCarthy places man in the world, then witnessing becomes the
manner in which McCarthy places man among other men; an impulse toward community.
Intimations of these two ideas are peppered throughout much of McCarthy’s early fiction
but it is not until the appearance of Blood Meridian that he starts using the term ‘witness’ or
‘witnessing’ to express the idea. Indeed, Blood Meridian famously opens with the phrase: “See
the child.” Because of this, the idea finds strong resonance with the “optical democracy”
construct through which McCarthy explores equivalences between the human and non-human
world. To witness is, first and foremost, to see.
At its truest, narrative is equivalent to spiritual insight into the world itself: a vision that
is not related to eyesight, but that penetrates to the black mystery at the core of things.6
The visual metaphor is key here. Whereas the idea of the tree falling in the forest is linked to the
sensation of hearing, McCarthy’s formulation is expressed visually. In a key passage, found
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right in the middle of the novel and paraphrasing the judge, the narrator states: “what could be
said to occur unobserved?”7 As the novel works toward its conclusion, the usage of witnessing
begins to shift somewhat. Increasingly, the idea of the witness or witnessing comes to indicate
an activity of sharing or a having in common with other people; of testimony to what has been
done. This new connotation is subtle, however, and easily missed, as Blood Meridian is
certainly McCarthy’s most anti-social work. It must await later works for further and fuller
development.
To witness is also to hear. The theme of storytelling is central to The Crossing. In this
work McCarthy depicts an assortment of memorable characters whose sole function in the novel,
it would appear, is to tell a story to the young Billy Parham, the novel’s protagonist. As the
ethical and social dimension of McCarthy’s narrative vision, witnessing stands for the manner in
which meaning, if not value, is transmitted between two people. While witnessing is to see, it is
also to hear the stories of the others and, importantly, to then tell and retell these stories to others.
McCarthy lavishes no sentimentality on this process, nor does he offer any hints as to what the
content of a life might be in this exchange. Nevertheless, the pursuit of the one tale that is the
tale of all inevitably leads back to the essential relationships between humans—and all of the
moral baggage appertaining thereunto. Drawing on this general trend in McCarthy’s fiction,
Lydia Cooper adds the following: “In the novels, stories construct meaning and instruct in
empathy and as such form a bulwark against the overwhelming tide of human degeneracy.”8 The
autobiographies of our lives are not lived out in isolation, but rather are a part of a multiplicity of
interconnected stories. McCarthy’s vision of man is not solipsistic, nor is it nihilistic, as some
scholars contend. For him, human reality is socially constructed, entailing moral obligation and
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freedom of choice, an individual’s need for community as well as its attendant need to be needed
by the community. What is the substance of this choice? A partial answer will suffice for now:
it is the choice of story for a character. It is also, importantly, the choice of assigning empathy
for McCarthy’s reading audience.
Interpreted in this way McCarthy’s novels read less like traditional prose narratives and
instead display elements more closely associated with the traditions of epic and myth,
particularly in the case of Blood Meridian. As has been shown, McCarthy works playfully with
traditional conceptions of plot and character in a manner that subtly expresses something deeper,
though constantly resistant to the imposition of meaning. Myths often appear in narrative form,
but McCarthy subverts traditional conceptions of the tale as a means of expressing the deeper
pools of terror and desire at the heart of the human experience. Blood Meridian thus constitutes
a myth of evil and of tragedy clothed in the trappings of an American national epic, as well as a
symbolic exposition of the most basic elements of human sociability.9
The third of McCarthy’s political formations can be seen in the context of Blood
Meridian, where witnessing comes to express an imaginative enterprise through which McCarthy
envisions and continually re-envisions the essential human encounter. It is in witnessing that one
finds McCarthy seeking out some possible solution to the problematic solipsism of human
isolation. As always, the relationship between the rightful places of man and the gods is in
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question—frequently invoked in McCarthy’s fiction by the idea of keeping promises in a world
without gods requires the presence of a witness and some sense of moral accountability. But in
Blood Meridian, McCarthy’s narrators are deeply preoccupied by the notion of some
intermediary. Shadowy traces of this intermediary or third party permeate the novel, invoking its
moral philosophy. The ultimate function of this element of the novel is left ambiguous to the
reader.10
As if beyond will or fate he and his beasts and his trappings moved both in card and in
substance under consignment to some third and other destiny.”11
You are fine caballeros, he said. You kill the barbaros. They cannot hide from you.
But there is another caballero and I think that no man hides from him. I was a soldier. It
is like a dream. When even the bones is gone in the desert the dreams is talk to you, you
don’t wake up forever.”12
The tracks of the murderers bore on to the west but they were white men who preyed on
travelers in that wilderness and disguised their work to be that of savages. Notions of
chance and fate are the preoccupation of men engaged in rash undertakings. The trail of
the Argonauts terminated in ashes as told and in the convergence of such vectors in such
a waste wherein the hearts and enterprise of one small nation have been swallowed up
and carried off by another the expriest asked if some might not see the hand of a cynical
god conducting with what austerity and what mock surprise so lethal a congruence. The
posting of witnesses by a third and other path altogether might also be called in evidence
as appearing to beggar chance, yet the judge, who put his horse forward until he was
abreast of the speculants, said that in this was expressed the very nature of the witness
and that his proximity was no third thing but rather the prime, for what could be said to
occur unobserved?13
McCarthy uses witnessing, at least in part, as a means of establishing the ground of
ultimate reality. Without the witness, “what can be said to occur unobserved?” inquires Blood
Meridian’s Judge Holden.14 Indeed this paradox is frequently repeated or reformulated
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throughout McCarthy’s body of fiction, particularly in the later works. The testimony of some
witness is at the basis of common law assumptions regarding the truth of any event disputed
between two parties with competing claims. Thus the testimony of a witness, some uninterested
third party, a spectator to the events in question, is required to establish the facts concerning any
particular case. The validity of the witness’s testimony, however, is often the subject of dispute
in any case by questions of his proximity, the clarity of his memory, and the persistent threat of
his latent prejudices that may, by extension, reveal some significant virtue or defect imbedded
within his inner character. In other words, while the testimony of the witness is required to
substantiate the very fact of the event in question that the matter in question actually happened,
his testimony is always regarded with scrutiny if not outright skepticism. And though the
reasons for this skepticism may cover an array of concerns, they are unified around the perpetual
and inescapable problem of identity; the questionable objectivity of the uninterested observer.
This is at the crux of witnessing as expressed by Judge Holden in Blood Meridian:
The judge smiled. Whether in my book or not, every man is tabernacled in every
other and he in exchange and so on in an endless complexity of being and witness to the
uttermost edge of the world.15
Earlier in this dissertation I made the argument that the uniting strand for all of McCarthy’s
fiction is the image of the single man who stands in for all men. McCarthy continually returns to
this imagery throughout his fiction. The formulation “every man is tabernacled in every other”
represents a milestone in McCarthy’s fiction, a fully articulated vision of witnessing. Blood
Meridian’s language of “endless complexity” will be advanced in The Crossing to the idea of the
matrix of stories and lives, of word and flesh. A further advancement of this idea is the ethical
dimension endowed on it.
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Witnessing in McCarthy’s fiction instantiates a ground for the act of choosing: a complex
terrain of moral obligation. While the one tale of all men inevitably portrays the essence of
humanity through the deep isolation of the man on the road, the paired concept of witnessing to
narrative necessarily invokes an equal need for community. What is it that McCarthy is
witnessing to? Undoubtedly, it is the certain horror of each other’s potential for denying the
basic humanity of the other, thus enabling the same chaotic violence of a world that we can never
fully understand. So much of what we make of this world amounts to ephemera. Our testimony
is witnessed by our leaving behind only the faintest traces of our presence, the myth, legend and
dust of our being.16 Many of our acts and their anterior motivations may seem chosen, often
entailing a critical moral dimension. Against this, Lydia Cooper asserts the following: “In
general, McCarthy’s moral characters tend to recognize—and often agonize over—the frailty of
their belief in the worth of their own choices.”17 Yet this appearance belies a reality in which
impersonal necessity compels our unreflective action.
The preceding considerations on the significance of witnessing to McCarthy’s overall
political vision round out this conceptual overview. McCarthy’s artistic project invites the moral
and political imagination of his readership. Its demands, however, are not always easily met.
Page after page, McCarthy’s prose assaults society’s most basic norms, eschewing our most
unquestioned taboos. His vision presents chaotic, irrational violence between humans on a level
not commonly seen in American literature. For this reason, some scholars assert the charge of a
nihilistic core at the heart of McCarthy’s vision. I resist this interpretation, positing instead the
social dimension embodied by the concept of witnessing.

16
17

Borrowed from McCarthy, The Orchard Keeper, 246.
Lydia R. Cooper, No More Heroes (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 21.

138

Secondary literature on witnessing
Inaugurated in Outer Dark and then used with increasing frequency in McCarthy’s later
works, the idea that the life of the protagonist being defined by the shape of his journey, his path,
his road through the world, comes to serve as a dominant metaphor in McCarthy’s humane
vision. The journey undertaken is no simple heroic quest in the familiar or romantic sense.
Literary critic Edwin T. Arnold expands this idea in terms of McCarthy’s fiction:
Cormac McCarthy's novels compose an extended journey. His characters travel the
mountain roads and forests of east Tennessee, the city streets of Knoxville, the deserts
and hills of Mexico and the Southwest. For the most part, their wanderings seem without
immediate purpose, or purpose of the vaguest sort: an undefined desire to withdraw or to
explore or to escape. They are descendants of Ishmael, both the biblical outcast and
Melville's nomadic seagoer. I can think of no other author who so carefully charts his
characters' movements from street to street or town to town -- you can follow them on
maps if you wish. And yet his novels usually cease their telling in the midst of journeys,
still on the road, short of destination, for, in the world of McCarthy, the only true
destination is death.18
The principal and guiding image beneath all of McCarthy’s fiction is the man on a
journey, the dispossessed spiritual wanderer, the nomad, the drifter, and the wayward pilgrim.19
In each respective rendering, the arc of McCarthy’s protagonist is determined and defined by this
tendency toward displacement, a voyage of quest or antiquest.20 In the most general terms, the
character is homeless, not just literally so, but also homeless in a spiritual sense. Steven Shaviro
characterizes this fundamental condition as “exiled.” He writes: “Exile is not deprivation or loss,
but our primordial and positive condition. For there can be no alienation when there is no
originary state for us to be alienated from.”21 What is it, then, that impels this sense of exile and
initiates the quest or search typical of a McCarthy protagonist?
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On this point McCarthy scholars are fairly unified in agreement, though differing in
terminology. An exhaustive survey of the interpretative lenses employed here would do little to
advance a political reading. Lydia Cooper comes very close in her summation, touching both on
the need for metaphysical solace and human connection, and the correspondence between these
two. She writes:
In the dark worlds of McCarthy’s corpus, human affinity is always endangered if not
practically extinct, but it is also the source of human hope. The urge toward
connectedness with others becomes absolutely primal in these novels. When a
character’s internal thoughts and motivations are revealed, such revelations almost
always serve to emphasize that character’s visceral need for others. Even the narrative
events underscore the importance of connection. Rinthy’s search for her child, Billy’s
search for his pregnant she-wolf in The Crossing, the father’s love for his son in The
Road, and so many of McCarthy’s characters’ despairing search for an extant God all
suggest that these characters are implacably drawn toward some elusive sense of
connection.22
Central to Cooper’s argument is the central role played by storytelling or narrative in the
construction of McCarthy’s moral/ethical universe. She continues: “Narrative is thus a vehicle
for bearing witness to moral courage, and at times narrative is the only means by which morality
is recognized.”23 Affirming this, Stephen Frye adds the following:
The possibility of a universe absent of transcendent meaning is considered, together with
the present potential of a creation dominated by evil. But alive as well in the world of
Blood Meridian is the ubiquitous “voice” that binds the physical and spiritual into
mysterious unity and reveals itself through discrete gestures of human decency and
benevolence.24
Frye’s concern with the absence of meaning is compatible with other interpretations that find the
search for meaning as central to the quest narrative in McCarthy’s fiction. Robert Jarrett
advances a similar line of reasoning:
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If McCarthy’s fiction springs from a desire to assign meaning and value to the self and
world, this desire cannot be fulfilled either by the journeys of McCarthy’s protagonists or
by fiction itself. Nonetheless the protagonists’ tales must be told—and told responsibly.25
The idea of essential responsibility gets at the ethical dimensions of McCarthy’s theory of
narrative. A final attribute of the McCarthy hero worth mentioning here is that the fundamental
loneliness and ethical quagmire, typical of his situation, is difficult to resolve in isolation. His
homelessness is in one part his rupture with the continuity of identity. It is also a function of his
wandering. His isolation serves to illustrate his need for community and throws him into an
imbalance vis-à-vis his identity.
[In Blood Meridian] such a double displacement—exile so extreme that we are exiled
even from the possibility, the hope and despair, of exile—characterizes the life of these
wanderers in the desert. The oedipal myth of paradise lost and regained, of patrimonial
inheritance and the promised land, has been abolished once and for all.26
Like his counterparts in other works, the kid’s originary state is one of deracination. He
is an isolated orphan on the move, impelled by no visible forces of motivation. Second, due to
his vacuous subjectivity, the kid’s basic ethical outlook is questionable. Thirdly, he lacks a clear
sense of identity.27 Here we get a sense of the mythic construction of the novel. Dwight Eddins
adds the following:
Cormac McCarthy introduces…an ontological ambiguity into Blood Meridian to suggest
a mysterious order of being of which the personae are emanations and a
quasitranscedental agenda of some sort behind the pattern of events.28
The act of storytelling itself is a key feature of all McCarthy’s novels, in which his
wandering protagonists frequently encounter other less sharply drawn characters—an array of
mystics, metaphysicians, hermits, and heretics—who freely engage the hero in prolonged
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dialogic exchanges meant, perhaps, to advise and inform the wayward hero about certain verities
and mysteries lying at the heart of existence, and thus assist him in shaping his own path. The
structure and substance of these exchanges has been a consistent topic of interest for critics and
commentators in the field of McCarthy studies.
Taking to the road, McCarthy protagonists frequently engage in roadside conversations
with an odd assortment of prophets, visionary mystics, and fools who impart to them a kind of
wisdom, though it usually has limited applicability and goes unheeded. As a plot device,
however, this recurrent motif is a strong reflection back to the centrality of narrative to
McCarthy’s thinking. All of McCarthy’s wandering sons are in search of a story (if not the
story) that includes them. This fundamental concern is captured by the profound sense of
isolation and loneliness that surrounds his protagonists, and indeed his work in general. But this
is only one half of the equation. Jarrett writes: “From the early Southern novels to those set in
the Southwest, McCarthy’s fiction enacts the death, absence, or denial of the father.”29
McCarthy’s protagonists are not merely journeying. Quite often they are fleeing—
pursued by mysterious and powerful agents of death, who wield total authority and pronouncing
ultimate judgment. Most of McCarthy’s works, in their broadest outlines, are plotted around the
idea of a chase. I do not agree with Brian Evenson’s characterization of these characters,
however. Calling the grim triune a “cluster of wanderers,” Evenson contrasts these to Culla
Holme, who he typifies as “—a wanderer but not a nomad (as the desire to mend his ways
revealed in his opening dream suggests) – to encounter in his search for his sister, the novel’s
other protagonist.”3031 The protagonist, whether he knows it completely or not, is generally
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impelled to flee from an embodied (or disembodied) pursuer. Most of McCarthy’s pursuing
characters—the über predators—represent more of a totalizing principle, rather than displaying
human characteristics. What is the difference between the protagonist and antagonist? Is it
virtue? Not really. McCarthy’s romances go to some length to deny the reader too much
immediate identification, and thus empathy, with any protagonist. And as the antagonist is often
only nominally a human at all, identification is denied here as well. Thus, the reader has a fair
amount of objectivity in considering the idea of moral judgment in McCarthy novels. The
ultimate conclusion of that tale is never written. Often as not, the action of McCarthy’s novel
closes on some representation of seemingly limitless possibilities of a road that has no end. Yet
however much the journey of one man can stand emblematically for the journey of all men, all
tales being but the same tale, the image of the man on a journey is only half complete. Indeed, it
is perhaps only one-third complete, but this will take some further explaining.
McCarthy ended his seven-year hiatus after the publication of Blood Meridian in 1992
with All the Pretty Horses, the first installment of what has come to be called “The Border
Trilogy.” Taken as a single body of work (though McCarthy scholar Dianne C. Luce asserts that
“it is doubtful that McCarthy himself conceived of the books as a trilogy in any usual sense”),
the trilogy offers a much more approachable version of Western genre fiction than does its
predecessor.32 In All the Pretty Horses McCarthy features “the kind of protagonist he first
explored in John Wesley Rattner in The Orchard Keeper—the young boy who represents an
older way of life and values;” a more standard Western hero than Blood Meridian’s kid.33 While
the story of John Grady Cole in All the Pretty Horses has much to offer a discussion of
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McCarthy’s political vision, it is in the story of Billy Parham—the protagonist of The Crossing,
the trilogy’s second work—that McCarthy returns to the idea of witnessing.
To initiate a discussion of the scholarly interpretation of witnessing, the work of Dianne
C. Luce is especially helpful and worth quoting here at length.
Like All the Pretty Horses (1992), Blood Meridian (1985), and Outer Dark (1968), The
Crossing is a road narrative, but more than in the earlier novels The Crossing employs the
road as metaphor for the life journey or the narrative of a life. . . . The Crossing focuses
on the course of life, sequential and linear, causative, perhaps fated and yet surprising, as
narrative plot—as story. And McCarthy is concerned with the role or function of story in
human experience of life, not only our own stories, our autobiographies, but our
biographies of others, our witnessing.34
The question arises as to the substance of what exactly McCarthy—whether through his
characters, or in the margins of ambiguity he creates in all his works—is witnessing to. In her
essay on the matrix of word and flesh in The Crossing, Luce makes the connection explicit: it is
a communal vision. Paradoxically, McCarthy is witnessing to our need to be witnessed by
others. In doing so, he points not simply to a new value for human connectedness, but of
meaning. To accomplish this, she cites the work of Guillemin. I quote:
The textual whole of The Crossing invites interpretation as not just a circle of stories, but
a thematization of the circulation of stories as the sharing of experienced negative
materiality [of death]. The novel does not simply revitalize old-fashioned storytelling—
though it does that, too—but it illustrates how death remembered allegorically (i.e., in
stories) and collectively (i.e., through the act of storytelling) modifies the very void of
individual death informing these allegories.35
If Blood Meridian expresses the supremely negative vision, as many scholars contend it does
(not just in McCarthy’s corpus but in all of American literature), The Crossing would appear to
present a countervailing vision: that of the hope and power of stories. This is not simply to
project meaning across time but to correct the vision of death and negation Blood Meridian so
34
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strongly creates. In doing so, this new vision of witnessing unites the various thematic threads
this dissertation has traced up to this point.
The connection of witnessing to narrative is obvious but more nuanced than one might
expect. While all of McCarthy’s fiction is populated by characters who tell stories to the
protagonists whose stories we are following, it is not until The Crossing that McCarthy arrives at
the idea of the way in which stories may be seen to constitute meaning. The hearing character,
along with the reader, becomes a receptacle, a witness to the story that has been told. In doing
this, not only does McCarthy find a way of expressing meaning and, importantly, value in human
life, but he articulates something about the mechanism by which this is transmitted. In The
Crossing, McCarthy begins to trace out a very shadowy vision of ethics that, while arguably
present in his previous works, was in need of a vocabulary. Attempting to correct this, Luce
makes this following point:
The Crossing suggests that rather than any physical sense, the human capability for
narrative—not for language, which is another kind of artifact, but for formulating the tale
that carries our past, gives meaning to our present, and right intention to our future—is
our primary means of accessing and perhaps communicating the thing itself: the world
which is a tale. For McCarthy, “the thing itself” carries connotations of truth, ultimate
essence, the sacred heart of things that inspires reverence, and he implies that humans
access the thing itself only by transcending the obstacles posed by artifact, language, and
physical sense in moments of spiritual insight that constitute a direct and immediate
apperception of the “world as given.”36
Luce’s interpretation here offers further illumination into points of analysis already reached in
the preceding chapters of this dissertation. First, the idea that the world is a tale—complete with
all the implications for time and space discussed in chapter one. Second, the idea that the fabric
of the world is mysterious and, ultimately, unknowable. The implications of the mysterious
other realm of nature established in Blood Meridian are heightened by the complexity of a world
which is a tale. The thing itself reveals itself to be not some version of a sinister gnostic alterity,
36
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but rather something deeply humane. The presence or absence of god remains an unresolved
question, as one would expect, but the idea of a world as given points toward some sense of
mystic unity of things human and the nonhuman world that contains us. Third, the idea of
history as a function of chronological time, and the attendant questions surrounding meaning and
intelligibility find resonance in the idea of a tale that subsumes rigid distinctions between past,
present, and future, that dominate our thinking. Instead, the tale—simultaneously invoking ideas
of the journey, the road, and the person upon that road—unifies all, and contains within itself a
new insight. Luce expounds thus:
The long interpolated tales in The Crossing…place less emphasis on this conception of
fiction as an esthetic object or monument. These tales instead stress that narrative is a
means of establishing identity, of lending at least a provisional meaning to one’s
existence—an existence that is completed only in the listener’s reception of the tale.37
The concept of identity arises here and must be addressed. In discussing the idea of
identity in McCarthy’s corpus care must be taken to avoid burdening the term with cognitive
baggage from established discourses in the literature of political science. McCarthy typically
deploys the concept in a context of sublimation, which is to say, mythically or allegorically; the
particular comes to stand for the universal, each becomes the avatar of all. I turn once again to
Luce’s analysis to assist in structuring my own discussion. She writes:
This matrix of witnessing, in which individuals’ tales encompass and are embedded in
one another’s, and in which we are our lives not only as we live them from day to day but
also as we are tabernacled in the hearts and memories of others who participate in
creating the meaning of our lives, validates the story as life itself even where particular
stories may be seen as lies or fiction.38
The interconnectedness expressed by McCarthy’s concept of identity is paramount. While
McCarthy hints at this idea frequently throughout all of his fiction, it is in The Crossing that he
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adopts the term “matrix” to express the concept. Luce is quick to note the mythical dimensions
of this. She writes:
If the world is a tale...then none of us ever quits it. We are embedded in it, and our time
is a manifestation of that tale and us. . . . No one can know the shape of the road he
himself travels; but we can and do witness the journeys and departures of others. To
construct tales of others and of ourselves, not still artifacts but moving images of the
living world that embody the value that is in our hearts, is to connect with life: it is,
perhaps, to fulfill that aspect of human nature that is in God’s image—to imitate Him in
His weaving the matrix.39
I begin the first of my analytical sections on witnessing by drawing on these very insights. Like
Luce, I conclude that McCarthy’s philosophical motivation behind this formulation is to find a
means of grounding not just the place of man in the world, but to couple this idea with some
notion of man’s function. In an attempt to move expeditiously between two texts, I depart
somewhat from the traditional mode of interpretation and analysis. To condense the idea to its
most essential shape and function across all of McCarthy’s body of work, I attempt to interpret it
archetypally, in the form of a brief parable.

Parable
The idea of witnessing for McCarthy deals with the grounding of events in the real or
actual order of things. The record of the thing itself, the representation, ultimately becomes the
thing itself. This is what history is: the process by which the representation of the thing becomes
the thing itself. And it is in this way that witnessing becomes a form of transgression. The
primacy of language cannot be avoided here. Language plays an indispensable role in the
mediation of thought and memory, through which random, chaotic chance becomes endowed
with meaning. From then on, the original narrative is replaced each time the story is recounted.

39

Ibid., 206.

147

After a thing happens, it is only this narrative that can exist as a proxy for the vanished original.
Another way to explain it is with a parable. In chapter one, Narrative, I outlined the man on a
journey motif that dominates much of McCarthy’s fiction. In this model I attempt to isolate what
happens to this man when he encounters another on his journey.
Imagine two strangers meet by chance while walking at night on a road that is no road in
particular. Their immediate impulse, and inescapable course of action, is to kill the other for fear
of being killed. In this, only one can be successful. For the man who is killed, an essential
paradox becomes immediately apparent: Could he have taken any other road so as to avoid this
meeting? Could he have made any other choices regarding his path that might ultimately have
forestalled such a fatal encounter? Had any other contingency intervened, some other possibility
been pursued, might he somehow have avoided this fate? There is no way to know, as his end is
inevitable, and in McCarthy’s fiction, possibly predetermined. This is where the text of Blood
Meridian comes most directly to bear: the idea that when two agents, or principles, collide, one
destroys the other. But the third thing is, as Judge Holden says, not merely the witness but, in
truth, the author of the thing itself. The posting of witnesses by some third and other path might
be used to argue that this particular chain of events could not result purely by chance because
had either man’s path intersected the path of this third party someone else would have been
killed—one way or the other—and, thus, the outcome would be different. The judge responds to
Tobin that in this encounter is expressed the very nature of the witness, and that his proximity is
no third thing but rather the prime.40 “For what could be said to occur unobserved?”41 The
witness, then, creates meaning out of something that, absent this witness, might as well have
never existed.
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The judge says that the witness, the teller or recounter of the event, is no third or ancillary
component, but rather constitutive of the encounter itself. In other words, what has happened is
ultimately as irrelevant as any other possibility of what could have happened, as it represents
nothing more than the larger game being played. Things are killed or negated by other things
that come to replace them, and there is no part of this that stands outside of the grand design or
nature of existence. All that matters is the presence of a witness to become a repository for the
“facts.” By this logic, the person who sees, hears, and, importantly, says that something has
occurred (rather than merely nothing) is himself the master of the story. “Whether in my book or
not, every man is tabernacled in every other and he in exchange and so on in an endless
complexity of being and witness to the utmost edge of the world.”42 In the case of the two men
of the parable described above, it is only after some third party comes upon the body or the
tracks or hears the story told by some other party at some point in the future that the entire
exchange is constituted. In the end, the story comes to be all that remains of whatever existed
prior.
As set forward in the brief parable constructed above, the idea of the convergence of two
paths or agents or lives or stories is typically resolved in the ending of one story and the
continuing of another. It is not that McCarthy simply intends to expound upon the idea that
morality or justice is simply whatever results from the interaction between stronger and weaker
parties—the same basic outlook articulated by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic (i.e., that
justice is always in the hands of the stronger party). Rather, behind the imagery of the encounter
on the road is the idea that the concept of justice itself is no less bound to the text as the stronger
or weaker party. The idea of “posting witnesses by some third and other path” might be
employed to argue that the outcome could not have been purely due to chance because had the
42
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path of this third entity intersected the path of either of the two principle parties at some point
anterior, the same essential kill-or-be-killed scenario would have ensued, and thus this later
outcome would never occur. Had some contingency, some other course of events or trajectory of
lives intervened it would no less result in the appearance of fated action due to the nature of the
witness.
In McCarthy’s world, truth is not exposed by dialogic exchange between two agents or
entities, but rather by the presence of some third party, or witness (the position occupied by Plato
the writer in the case of the Republic). Students of the humanities commonly read Plato’s
Republic as a basic primer for inquiry into the terrain of political philosophy. The dialog’s great
teaching, that our conceptions of things correspond, albeit imperfectly, to the essential forms of
the things in-and-of themselves. These forms, being transcendent, retain their character in total
independence and, we might say, indifference to their approximations in the immanent sphere.
Yet the line of reasoning behind this explanation of the forms only holds up if a certain earthly
consensus is maintained. In other words, while any particular tree might be said to correspond to
the ideal form of the tree, they are mutually dependent upon the text of the dialog for their
existence. Neither the idea of a thing nor any particular example of that thing can ever be truly
said to exist independently of the text. The reality of an idea cannot be detached from the
absolute sovereignty of the narrator. What can be said to exist unobserved? For an “action” to
take place requires an individual with a will to choose between the imagined alternatives and
select one. It also requires a witness to verify and testify that it happened. In the encounter
between two “little nations” in the desert, the presence of a witness in such a moment can hardly
be said to be the result of chance. It carries meaning and substantiates a claim that the affairs of
men are pre-ordained by some higher power. This claim, of course, is refuted by Judge Holden
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who says that the witness is no third thing but is in fact this higher power itself. Thus, the
witness is prime to the encounter.
The testimony of the witness creates meaning out of events that, absent this testimony,
would just as well never have happened. What has happened is ultimately irrelevant, as it
represents nothing more than the game being played. Everything that comes into being will
eventually, and inevitably, be negated by something else. There is nothing outside of this grand
design, as it is the nature of existence itself. What ultimately matters is that some witness be
present to become a repository for the facts. “The third party” corresponds to the third and other
path. Refuted by Judge Holden is the idea that the person who “says,” signifying that something
indeed has occurred rather than nothing, is himself the author of the story. In this sense, the third
path or story is itself the agent that creates the scenario.
The text of Blood Meridian gives a powerful impression that the idea of the individual—a
subjective, embodied consciousness—is mostly an illusion. And yet, paradoxically, it also points
out that the base material of reality is dependent upon the testimony of the witness. The
testimony of the witness, of the detached observer, constitutes a ‘third path’ in the course of
events. This third path, neither principle nor agent, constitutes the ‘true history’ of a story and it,
unlike the first two paths, is never terminated, as it is always being written. McCarthy believes
that the idea of the novel, in terms of form and function, has sufficient power and utility to unite
all the fields of thought: all notions, all the arts of discovering, documenting, and explaining the
world. For McCarthy, the novel can be all things. The one story—taken as the testimony of a
witness—is the fundamental expression of reality, or of truth, and constitutes totality of the
world. The base material of this form is language and symbol. The novel’s preeminence resides
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in its penultimate power to order events in time or, put another way, to construct meaning out of
a midden of found objects, either natural or manmade.

The individual as an illusion
The major philosophic project at work in Blood Meridian is to question “whether the
stuff of creation may be shaped to man’s will or whether his own heart is not another kind of
clay.”43 Put another way, the voice of the narrator inquires whether the individual may be said to
exist in some state separate from the forces of creation and, thus, may be said to exercise the very
will by which he may be said to exist (without such a will, one might say, the individual would
not, strictly speaking, be said to exist), or whether there is in fact no actual evidence for man’s
separateness from nature, no privileged domain of the human in the world. Thus, notions of
individuality and the will are merely illusions. But then, if they are, whose illusions may they be
said to be? Herein lies the paradox of the novel’s great challenge: it sets up an either/or
dichotomy only then to confuse the binary continually with the pressure of some needed ‘third
space.’ If the answer to the first question in the proposition is “no,” then the second question
must then necessarily be “yes.” But if this is true, man’s heart is indeed another kind of clay
(i.e., something separate from creation), and, thus, subject to the same forces that act on the rest
of creation, then the possibly of a distinctly human will must be rejected. The great opening
question of Blood Meridian is that the textual enterprise of the novel will be to explore the very
idea of the individual itself, as something distinct from nature, and possessed of a will. Such a
possibility, if affirmed, would then necessitate a realm for the exercise of this will—something
akin to a space for action—and McCarthy, contra the Classics, chooses the out of doors through
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which to explore the question—giving it legs and setting them in motion. But in doing so, the
essential nature of judgment in the public sphere is never closed. Indeed, it is held the more
widely open due to its conspicuous absence.
This idea of the individual as an illusion connects back to the idea of the man on a
journey. As an avatar of all, he seems so singular, isolated, and self-contained. This is the
illusion at work. What McCarthy wants his reader to come to understand, or at least consider, is
that this isolato, this lone traveler, is indeed all men. Further, as Luce points out so astutely, the
paradox of the image is further intensified when we realize that the traveler and the road that he
travels are one. The traveler creates the road, or visa-versa. They are inseparable. And they rely
on the presence of some witness for their very existence. Somewhere within this matrix of word
and flesh, of chance and fate, and against overwhelming indications to the contrary, choices
remain. And while this is an emotional reality, it is hardly a sentimental one. An individual
exists somewhere, and he is designated by his ability and freedom to make choices.
Of course, we have good reason to be suspicious of the very idea of the individual to
begin with. The regime creates the individual and thus endows him with rights. So, while
McCarthy is not precisely about the state in a direct sense, his exploration of fundamental
political themes (human nature, the state of nature, individual autonomy, human agency, the law)
turns on the experience of both the character in question, and the reader. If the individual is
nonexistent, then he cannot stand as the locus of sovereignty, and thus lend legitimacy to the
modern liberal regime. Thus, the question of the will is primary to McCarthy’s paradoxical
position on the individual.
The individual thinks himself discreet, autonomous, particular, specific, and unique. He
believes that the circumstances of his existence at any moment in time are uniquely his own
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(provided, of course, that they proceed from a multiplicity of alternatives that, when combined,
have given rise to form his reality), but this history (as the story of his particular originating
circumstances) is merely a representation of what has actually happened, ultimately constrained
by the medium of language itself. As such, whatever may be said to be ‘the truth’ in McCarthy’s
universe will always remain somewhat illusory as it remains sternly dependent upon the words
and thus the author of those words to bring it into existence. McCarthy would doubtless affirm
that the power of the story is common to humanity, that storytelling is man’s essential activity.
Thus provoked, his fiction turns to explore the substance and consequences of our desire to
identify with a history—our impulse to narrate ourselves into the larger story of the world. And
yet, the experience of this primordial encounter of the self with the world is never comforting, as
again and again we come to find that even the substance of our own hearts is ultimately strange
to us.
Ultimately, the impressions we have created are portraits that, because of our nature, are
the “passable ghosts” we have conjured and choose to endow with the power to anchor (often as
not they haunt us).44 As long as we believe in these ghosts, we continue to harbor our illusions
of individuality; of fate or destiny. And likewise we will always be haunted by the suspicion that
the entirety of our experience is just as reasonably attributable to chance, a “trance bepopulate
with chimeras,” as Judge Holden explains in a memorable passage.
This, we might infer, is the basic source of our existential angst as humans. Because of it
we are incapacitated by the illusion of our individuality, of our autonomy, of our capacity for
making choices in the face of the sterner substance of the chaotic universe. We believe ourselves
to be the protagonist of a story that is being written without a witness, or at least, that this
witness inheres in the same fact of our own existence. Perhaps out belief is that we can
44
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somehow become the witness of the deeds of our own lives, but to what or to whom do we
submit our testimony? One of McCarthy’s basic insights into human nature is what he sees as
our common respective need to construct a meaningful autobiography substantiating the reality
of our existence, and that this is ultimately the great illusion with which all of his protagonists
are in thrall. The story cannot exist without someone to hear it. And there is only one story.
McCarthy’s notion of the individual as an illusion, however convincing, recursively throws
emphasis back on the concern for notions of fate and chance, or the dialectic of freedom and
necessity, in all of his fiction. The man on a journey is not a particular man on any particular
journey. He is every man and his journey is not simply the physical movement of an ego
through space and time, but the totality of human experience and the idea of the road itself. Yet
this totality also includes, nay relies upon the presence of some third party, some third and other
path, existing independently of the former two. The intersection of parties A and B is a thing to
be pondered. The congruence or intersection of the two paths may seem inevitable viewed a
posteriori, and any possible contingencies that might have intervened, however compelling they
might seem, is rendered null by the ultimate outcome of events. For McCarthy, the substance of
history is the perpetual speculation as to the confluence of factors precipitating the encounter,
and the ultimate meaning or consequence of their effects. From this intersection comes the
event, and this is of singular importance for McCarthy. For humans, who appear to be endowed
with an intransigent will to meaning, the event is never insignificant, however much the
impersonal ordering of the larger world would seem to deny this idea. Yet the very existence of
the event is totally dependent on the idea of the third party. Party C, then, is not the result of the
interaction of Parties A and B, but rather their cause; not some third thing at all but rather the
thing itself.
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Conclusion
McCarthy’s body of fiction presents a dualistic image of the individual human in which
the particulars of any character’s identity or situation may occasionally converge with a more
general image of mankind, each becoming the anonymous avatar of all. In such moments
McCarthy’s reader is likely to sense the pressure of some larger philosophical question at work
beneath the text. Yet such scenes rarely ever resolve in univocal symbols, expressing neither
meaning nor moral. “Ultimately every man’s path is every other’s,” says one of The Crossing’s
oracular hermits. “There are no separate journeys for there are no separate men to make them.
All men are one and there is no other tale to tell.”45 Narrative is created when certain events in
time are rendered coherent by their ultimate outcome, implying the sense of an ending, and the
presence of some witness. This sublimation of men, journeys, and tales is of special significance
to an understanding of the question of individual freedom raised in McCarthy’s work.
The idea of witnessing establishes the terms of inquiry into freedom and fate in
McCarthy’s work. In a world which is itself a tale, and in which the outcome of any interaction
is already foreordained, how can the individual feel free to choose or to act? In word that is itself
a tale, and in which all is telling, who can be said to be the agent of any story, the protagonist or
the teller, assuming these two are not, ultimately, the same person?
McCarthy’s vision of natural man, of the autonomous individual who rejects those laws
that do not come from within or from nature, but from civilization, is complicated by this idea of
witnessing, in which our recognition of the basic humanity of the other becomes the basis of
ethical responsibility. While McCarthy’s protagonists’ journeys are often animated by their
desire to escape this responsibility, they are the thwarted in this attempt by the ethical realities of
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witnessing (and being witnessed by) other people. To paraphrase Blood Meridian’s narrator,
even though the substance of our hearts may be alien within us, we cannot escape our destiny
which seems to be our inevitable discovery that our interconnectedness to others is woven into
the very fabric or substance of our own hearts. Thus, the idea of individual autonomy becomes
the supreme illusion that springs from our faulty perceptions regarding nature and history. The
image of the man on a journey is one of existential loneliness and exile. And while this image
typifies so much of McCarthy’s work, particularly his road narratives, his developing concept of
witnessing begins to shift this imagery.
As I have discussed in this chapter, witnessing emerges as a multifaceted or
multidimensional philosophical construct in McCarthy’s fiction. A first sense of witnessing
emerges in the context of narrative, in which McCarthy uses the idea to convey the sense of
seeing and being seen by others and projecting these memories into the future by retelling the
story to another. The second sense is the phenomenological one in which witnessing is the mode
establishing that something has in fact happened. McCarthy is careful to present this dimension
of witnessing in the most impersonal language and in doing so calls attention to the deeply
humane aspect of this concept. The illusion of the impersonal world, much like the illusion of
historical distance, is the effect of trying to take the presencing of narrative out of the order of
things—pondering a world that exists independently of human consciousness, or time that is not
in some sense of a function of human memory. With witnessing, McCarthy establishes that
world as tale, and as such, all is contained: the entirety of time and space, within a tale that is all
tales, and contains within it both beginning and end. What, we might then ask, is left of the
sphere of human action? How is man to act in a world that is a tale that is, at least in a sense,
already written? I turn now to address this very question.
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5. Agency

If fate is the law then is fate also subject to that law? At some point we cannot escape naming
responsibility. It’s in our nature.1
In this chapter I outline the question of agency. Politically, this term designates the
grounds for moral choice and a theory of action in McCarthy’s fiction. Agency is a problem for
many of McCarthy’s protagonists who, for a variety of reasons centering on the identity and
moral position of the self, fail to see the possibility and necessity of choice in moments of praxis.
Failing to recognize the imperative to name responsibility, they suffer consequences that,
paradoxically, seem inevitable. This latter paradox results from an inherent difference in
worldviews between McCarthy’s protagonists and antagonists and in McCarthy’s later novels
comes to define the main point of moral conflict both existentially and geographically. This
trend would suggest that the origins of human motives are not the same everywhere. Like Blood
Meridian, the Border Trilogy is set in the open and boundless expanse of the frontier. Perhaps
there is no better stage wherein the extent of man’s beastliness or godliness can become fully
visible. In such a setting—expansive, uncivilized, and limitless in potential for the growth or
decline of human sociability—the deep and often troubling paradoxes of philosophy and human
existence can be explored, though often without resolution. The frontier aesthetic is appropriate
in studies of the origins and limits of law because it is precisely such a setting that “magnifies
and clarifies what is at issue” in novels of this kind.2
Free from the constraints of conventional or legal society, McCarthy’s protagonists
engage in social relationships unfettered by the mores or expectations that typically govern the
1
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lives of most ordinary men. Thus, the spatiality (read landscape) of McCarthy’s fiction is
endowed with special philosophical significance for his characters as well, no less, for his
readers. The “country” as a causal force—directing how men act at certain times and in certain
places—is taken here as an inextricable component of the American mythic universe. It is here
that the Western ideals of absolute freedom and rugged individualism are allowed to run to their
fullest extent and where the mysterious forces that constrain this vision have their profoundest
effects. It is also significant that McCarthy is interested in what happens when men “run out of
country” at the western limits of the frontier.3
Approaching this question of agency in McCarthy’s fiction, this chapter focuses on the
road narrative found in the first work in McCarthy’s border trilogy, All the Pretty Horses.
Moving through the novel fairly sequentially, I examine key scenes of dialog in which
McCarthy’s concept of agency is expressed by two related ideas. The first of these is the
question of freedom and choice versus fate and necessity in the relationships between
McCarthy’s heroes and villains. Here again, McCarthy’s ongoing preoccupation with the overall
question of freedom and its relationship to moral action in the face of overwhelming violence
remains a prominent consideration. The second idea, intimately related to the first, is the
question of naming responsibility, an omnipresent concern in all of McCarthy’s fiction. The idea
of naming, or of taking responsibility, serves as the dominant motif for morality throughout
McCarthy’s early fiction. In later works, this same idea come to be expressed in the idea of
carrying the fire. The choice of the Border Trilogy, apart from appearing next in the chronology
of McCarthy’s publishing, is altogether appropriate because in it McCarthy adheres more closely
to the archetypal form of the hero’s journey in the Western literary tradition than in previous
works. It is in the course of the hero’s journey that agency is most clearly seen as a political and
3
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ethical concept. The novels of the Border Trilogy, while of equal philosophic complexity, are
generally considered more approachable than Blood Meridian.
The idea of agency builds on witnessing. While witnessing expresses the moral stakes of
a self that comes to find itself enmeshed in a matrix of other lives, agency expresses the
realization of choice and the necessity of action along with the consequences. What are the rules
that govern action and where do they come from? Where are they applicable and where not?
Who gets to say? Throughout the trilogy, McCarthy is deeply concerned with the interplay of
chance and fate in the unfolding of narrative events, both on a personal and on a broader societal
level. One of the greatest challenges of McCarthy’s fiction is whether, philosophically, his
worldview is constrained by the rules of his aesthetic or stand as a comment on the world of
reality external to his texts, or both. Here again, he continually brushes against the political in
his questioning of causality. The issue of the Divine is persistent and, as always, deeply
questionable in the chaotic violence of McCarthy’s works. In the Border Trilogy, McCarthy
raises these stakes with his repeated allusions to chance and fate. In the laying out of these
events, McCarthy is eminently concerned with the position of the hero; a new and improved
version of the man on a journey from his earlier works. Building on the conclusions reached in
the previous chapter, I first establish the terms of the discussion of agency with a brief thematic
survey of the secondary literature.

Review of secondary literature
All of McCarthy’s journeying protagonists are innocents abroad, typical of the
bildungsroman. Working within this genre McCarthy lays out the parameters of a vision for
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action; compellingly against the backdrop of the U.S. Mexico border, one century after the
conclusion of Blood Meridian. John Blair frames this new development thus:
Whereas the author’s earlier novels dealt primarily with adults in a single relatively
changeless physical circumstance, All the Pretty Horses [the first novel of the trilogy]
details a journey that is both literal and, at least to some extent, a bildungsroman, a
movement from innocence to experience, from purity to knowledge, from the known
world into the unknown world—and the unknown world in this novel is Mexico. For
John Grady Cole, [the novel’s protagonist,] the border between Texas and Mexico is the
line between childhood and its end, at least in the somewhat limited sense that the border
country he crosses through and lingers within becomes the medium through which he
comes to understand certain truths about himself and the world.4
While I disagree with Blair’s comment on the primacy of adults in McCarthy’s earlier novels, he
is correct to note that the protagonist of All the Pretty Horses differs from earlier versions of a
McCarthy hero. While John Grady Cole, like his earlier counterparts, journeys through an
allegorical space of moral development, his progress is chartable and the boundaries of his world
are more clearly defined. McCarthy’s earlier works tend to blur the edges of time and space and
resist the reader’s attempts at empathetic attachment. In the Border Trilogy, McCarthy offers a
much more straightforward rendition of a traditional romantic hero. Specific places come to
represent coherent and opposing worldviews. Driving this point home, Blair continues:
Mexico represents the alien-ness of the Other for McCarthy’s young protagonist, and his
movement away from Texas and away from home is movement in to the signature state
of isolation in which virtually all of McCarthy’s characters live. But Mexico and the
borderlands become something more in this book; they become tierra, a second
homeland, no stranger in reality than the place-from-which-you-come, but by the same
token no less strange and no less hostile. The end of that process of maturation is the
realization that no home is really home, that the Other is really oneself looking out, and
that the details of life—birth, death, love—happen, and in much the same way
everywhere.5
This trackable movement across charted boundaries is singular and suggestive. The
protagonist’s waking up to moral accountability is, to a large extent, the motivational animus of
4
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many, if not most, of McCarthy’s narratives. Further, the “Other” Blair notes here points back to
the theme of witnessing, a theme that develops in McCarthy’s corpus. Still, it is not until All the
Pretty Horses that McCarthy offers his audience such fully realized glimpses into the place and
power of empathy in his moral vision. Lydia Cooper writes:
Given that all three novels conclude with the protagonists having failed comprehensively
in their respective quests, it is hard to deny that, despite the heroic protagonists, the
cosmos of the Border Trilogy is bleak. The trilogy problematically presents good people
coming to sticky ends, good people committing bad deeds, and good people dying
abandoned in shacks, much as a very bad person, the kid, dies in an outhouse in Blood
Meridian. The novels thus seem to suggest that morality is a puny and futile force at
best, at worst, a completely pointless endeavor. However, the narrative events—the
deeds and deaths of the novels—are not the only litmus test for interpreting the
significance of morality.6
The manner in which McCarthy’s protagonists resist naming responsibility, or, their “will
to innocence,” is most suggestive in this context because here I find McCarthy asserting a more
obvious social commentary than in the works immediately previous.7 In McCarthy’s road
narratives, the search for an authentic or more natural source of law or right is often (if not
always) paired with a retreat from the need to name responsibility. This is clearly visible in
Outer Dark, Suttree, and Blood Meridian. Cooper continues:
In a world ruled by arbitrary fates as this literary universe seems to be, these novels
propose that personal responsibility and ethical intentions may be the only effective
measure of a man’s morality. Not surprisingly, then, All the Pretty Horses foregrounds
the role of personal responsibility more than any novel since The Orchard Keeper.8
The problematical question of responsibility emerging from McCarthy’s use of the man on a
journey motif attains significant political relevance in the context of witnessing. Here the
self/other dialectic presents itself not merely in terms of discreet individuals but of nations or
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states, invoking further and deeper questions of identity, and with increased theoretical
implications.
The confrontation of wills, forming the substance of the exchange between the self and
other, now takes on the dimension of action, framing McCarthy’s preoccupation with narrative in
more explicitly political terms. Cooper here comments on the manner in which narrative
expresses heroism through action:
McCarthy’s novels suggest that even though the deed may count for more than the
spoken word, the internal thought process, the moment of a single choice, may in the end
be the most significant measure of the human condition. However much an apocalyptic
despair seems to brood over the novels’ blasted landscapes, interior revelations of
morality suggest that hope may be a defining characteristic of humanity. And since
narrative is the means by which these interior moral commitments are valorized, the
novels suggest that heroism and narrative are inseparable from each other and, by
extrapolation, from human existence.9
This “moment of the single choice” is of political significance because it invokes the deeply
embedded system of ethics at play in any of McCarthy’s works. How do McCarthy’s
protagonists come to realize they have a choice to make, particularly when they have no
authority in a world in which they do not belong? How, then, should they act?
The idea of moral choice invokes the further themes of destiny and fate, also prominent
throughout McCarthy’s corpus, representing unreckonable forces of constraint for many of the
characters and circumscribing their absolute freedom of choice and action. In this dialectic, the
concept of fate expresses the polar opposite of freedom and casts doubt on the possibility that the
individual is in fact defined by his capacity for reasoning or making choices. Indeed, McCarthy
uses these concepts to question the idea of individual autonomy altogether. On this point,
Elizabeth Andersen interprets McCarthy as combining “an Existentialist’s appreciation for heroic
self-determination with a darkly remained Christian metaphysics stripped of eternal
9
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redemption.”10 Of McCarthy’s novels, she observes “that the shape of a life is predestined, even
as they advocate the heroism of the outlaw who claims agency and defiantly struggles to shape
his own fate.”11 This trope is engaged repeatedly throughout McCarthy’s canon and is typified
by the inability of ‘sympathetic’ characters to attain full agency or the freedom and authority of
action by naming responsibility for themselves and the lives of others. James D. Lilley is less
optimistic on this point:
McCarthy’s texts form the same narrative shapes time and time again, mapping the
repetitive movements of pawn-like protagonists who are dragged around an
uncompromising landscape by forces completely beyond their own control.12
Edwin T. Arnold differs with this conclusion. Though never explicit, each of McCarthy’s
works contains “a moral gauge by which we, the readers, are able to judge the failure or limited
success of McCarthy’s characters.”13 Arnold continues:
In none of McCarthy’s novels is the division between good and evil easily distinguished
nor are the agents easily identified and cast. It is, however, the state of the soul that is
being examined and narrated.14
This problem of distinguishing good and evil results from a deep lack of certainty as to the
substance of those ideas themselves.
The central problem of evil in McCarthy’s fiction invokes the ancient tradition of
theodicy. McCarthy’s fiction shares many affinities with Greek Tragedy, including the theme of
individual moral choice constrained by the forces of chance and fate. One of the important
differences with McCarthy’s fictional form of the novel and that of the tragic drama, however, is
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the location of the chorus, as an ersatz arbiter of judgment and the rational ‘voice’ of the
audience. McCarthy’s use of the impersonal, omniscient narrator serves this same purpose. His
reflexive use of naturalist imagery lays bare the base material of human nature and challenges
traditional assumptions. The answer he provides, however, is not simply “look at how violent
we are.” Nor is it to assert or critique some national mythology of conquest and redemption
covering up our sordid history of violence and exploitation in terms of an appeal to an even more
transcendent power—a power to which kings or emperors or any other regime must answer. A
poetics of this kind must rely upon a convention: some socially acknowledged principle of moral
or ethical judgment by which to characterize the deeds of sympathetic or villainous characters.15
Luce writes:
Though more secularized, the issue of judgment is central to All the Pretty Horses as
to Blood Meridian and Outer Dark. All of John Grady’s troubles derive from errors in
judgment or, worse, his refusal to make conscious choices instead of sleepwalking
through Mexico.16
John Grady’s journey, like those of so many of McCarthy’s protagonists, is an initiation
into evil. He has rejected his boy’s fantasy of the world as potentially an Eden, and he
knows now that he inhabits a mysteriously fallen world and is part of it. . .. [H]e must
thereafter wander uncertain and unsure.17
A number of McCarthy’s protagonists confront moral choices involving killing in which
their inability to give themselves over to Boehme’s “life of the darkness” constitutes both the
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limit of their agency and the absolute ground of their humanity.18 For this, they are typically
killed; their tragic suffering never redeemed, their possible heroism never affirmed. Vereen
Bell’s trailblazing chapter on Blood Meridian, displaying remarkable strength of prose in its own
right, is enormously helpful for my own analysis here. Bell and his allies find in Blood Meridian
a compulsion, “To call forth from ourselves a capacity for understanding evil that the various
meanings of our lives otherwise cause to be suppressed,” and, importantly, “to summon up an
American tradition—the compulsion to make war upon the unknown, to challenge destiny
itself—that helps us make sense of it.”19 In this way McCarthy’s fiction dramatizes the perpetual
confrontation between the embodied ego and its relationship to the impersonal ordering of the
world. Through this mode of storytelling McCarthy explores political questions by dramatizing
individual and collective experience.
McCarthy’s universe is one of profound emptiness, a void. The story is the pulsation of
human will against the vacancy of the non-human world. This is the basis of the imputed
nihilistic impulse so many readers find in McCarthy’s fiction. Stories are the positive
principle—the pulsation against that void. An illustration of this comes from political theorist
Hannah Arendt, who writes:
Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human world through
action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other words,
the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not the
author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the
word, namely its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author.20
Through fiction the political theorist gains access to a new world. This imaginary world
is often much like the real one in which we live. But it is also different, as it is the creation of an
artist. The parameters of a fictional world are set only by the artist’s vision and thus are purely
18
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imaginative. Though they owe little or nothing to the real world they must bear some
correspondence for a reader’s sake or else they have nothing to offer him. Even the highest
flights of pure fantasy are instructive, for they must always bear some correspondence to social
or political reality. However, the artist chooses to alter or bend the rules of the known universe,
he must always begin with those same rules. Thus, the literary imagination is always in some
sense a commentary on reality. Political theorist Catherine Zuckert has noted, in a manner
similar to Arendt, who called novels “the only entirely social art form,” the way in which novels
offer a particularly useful vantage point upon the field of political inquiry.21 She writes:
The greatest novels teach by showing rather than preaching, and they raise the most
penetrating questions about the foundations and effects of the political regime, i.e., human
nature and its implications for society.22
Fictional characters, like us, must deal with a world that they can never completely apprehend or
truly understand. They, like us, must seek out a home or reject one completely. In any case, the
fictional world is always in some sense our world, and insofar as any story is a story about
human beings, it is a story about mortal finitude and the brief spark of conscious reason in the
midst of boundless mystery.
The idea of the matrix partially serves as a means of expressing the omnipresent concern
with running into the hidden rules in the boundless expanses of McCarthy’s Southwest. What
Blood Meridian points toward, and All the Pretty Horses begins to affirm, then, is the recognition
that the “Why?” of how we act is determined by others and not ourselves. In the end, Frye
writes, “individuals can respond to others with justice and decency.”23 Frye continues:
John Grady’s heroism is derived from his unwillingness to be defined as [being more
than commonly brave or heroic], from his belief that his choices, though they seem
uncommon and virtuous, are nothing more than the expression of every man’s obligation
21
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to act within an elaborate matrix of cause and effect, one that in the end reveals itself in
sublime order—the beautiful tapestry that is the world.24
It is to these competing demands and the necessity of recognizing by the need and, importantly
capacity for choice in a resistant world, that I turn now to begin this chapter’s analysis.

“Existential heroes” in a fated landscape25
In this section I trace out the manner in which McCarthy’s imagery of the fundamental
encounter translates into the form of a hero’s romantic quest. Important to this discussion is the
insight that McCarthy tends to return to established tropes, character types, and situations
intertextually. Certain characters begin to resemble each other in important ways across his
corpus. Famously, the protagonists of McCarthy’s early works are defined by their lack of
reflection, of self-consciousness. Their motivation is more like a vague impulse than a defined
quest. They want a different world from the one in which they find themselves yet they never
appear to have any clear sense of what this might be or where it might even be found.
The general trend for a McCarthy “hero” is a general lack of awareness toward the object
of his search. For most of his young protagonists, the ultimate object of this search takes on a
vague but discernible shape only after each has distanced himself from home. Simply put, his
protagonists seek. All of his novels are structured around a quest of some sort. McCarthy’s
characters’ motivation for such questing is the deeply human impulse for freedom, or, frequently,
to escape the physical and spiritual domain of conventional laws. The hero’s journey is typically
an unreflective movement across a natural landscape that is both alien and familiar, rendered
24
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with such crystalline detail as to throw the opacity of the inner-workings of human consciousness
and the real possibilities of agency—of willed, conscious action—into stark relief.
McCarthy’s protagonists suffer because they fail to take responsibility, to accept their
complicity, to fully commit either to the life of darkness, or to embrace their full humanity—with
all its ethical entanglements. Thus, they wander. To be able to act in a meaningful way with
total freedom and legitimate authority serves, ultimately, as the ground whereupon the mortals of
McCarthy’s prose must measure themselves against the divine and the diabolical.26
Freedom in McCarthy’s fiction is usually expressed through the language and imagery of
movement.27 Frequently, the concept is intimately connected to problems and possibilities
surrounding the idea of the individual will, often expressed through action in the absence of
reflection. A final dimension of freedom is one through which a character accepts moral
obligation for his actions through some recognition of a shared humanity. This latter sense of
freedom then necessarily invokes linkages between the concepts of witnessing and narrative.
Freedom can also be interpreted in this context as the absence of restraint. In this sense it
is compatible with liberty and, taken to its logical extreme, to license. But this freedom, or
ability to act, commonly termed agency, carries with it some implicit sense of authority.
Freedom’s connections to agency and to authority is informed by the idea of keeping promises.
McCarthy prefers to work this question out by deploying what I term his predatory characters.
One of the common attributes of these stock characters is their superior knowledge compared to
the other characters. Whereas McCarthy’s protagonists are typically pursued and, thus,
constitute prey, they are typified by a certain naiveté or will to innocence. However, the
26
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predatory characters’ knowledge so often supersedes the constraints of time and place, often
bordering on omniscience. Because they often display superhuman abilities to move throughout
the landscape in a way unachievable by any other character, and an inhuman lethality, I must
challenge the conclusion of Vereen Bell that McCarthy does not use character types.28
McCarthy uses his predatory characters allegorically. They represent, among other things, fate.
McCarthy deploys this character type to force the protagonists into dialogs of existential
philosophy. The predators don’t simply wish to devour or negate their prey, they first pronounce
judgement on them. They will not allow the protagonist to persist in his will to innocence by
refusing to name his sin. This is seen as a failure of choice or a refusal to take responsibility, to
honor a promise; even one made involuntarily. These considerations would be interesting
enough when left at the level of character, but McCarthy raises the stakes by moving the
conversation into the realm of myth with his constant preoccupation with notions of fate and
chance, which also falls squarely within the purview of the predatory characters.
Like many of McCarthy’s young male protagonists, the kid in Blood Meridian is typified
by his lack of reflection, of will, and of agency to do more than apparently disappear from the
scenes in which his confederates engage in acts of murderous depravity. If Blood Meridian can
be said to embody the general character of the epic, its protagonist is far from heroic. If the
responsibility to choose a right course of action when confronted by equal and opposing goods
exemplifies tragic suffering in the classic sense, then the kid is hardly a tragic hero. In this he is
not alone.
The story of All the Pretty Horses, McCarthy’s sixth published novel, opens in 1949;
exactly one hundred years after the main action of Blood Meridian, its predecessor. Perhaps by
coincidence (though probably not) the novel’s protagonist is another sixteen-year-old cowboy
28
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named John Grady Cole. While the general tone of Blood Meridian invokes a world of portent
and dread, All the Pretty Horses, like the Border Trilogy in general, is characterized by a
pervasive sense of ubi sunt: a world of loss and absence, haunted by the ghosts and dreams of
those who came before and are now gone. Along with this sense of loss, however, is an
accompanying romantic sense of expectation; a better world to come. The last of a long line of
pioneering Texans, John Grady’s introduction comes in the context of his physical and spiritual
displacement. With the death of his grandfather, and failing subsequently to convince his mother
to allow him to take over the ranch, John Grady is denied what, for him, is his natural path.
Lacking this sense of continuity, and with few appealing options to sustain him, John Grady and
his friend Lacey Rawlins decide to run away on horseback and to seek their fortunes in Mexico.
John Grady is a different sort of protagonist from his predecessor, the kid. The former is
almost uniformly blank, if not vacant, and propelled into the events of his life as though by
accident. By contrast, John Grady is endowed with a certain personal sense of fate, if not
destiny. After he and Rawlins cross into Mexico, now accompanied by a wastrel runaway youth
who calls himself Jimmy Blevins, having made camp and turned in for the night, John Grady is
seen in contemplation (something usually reserved for the narrator in Blood Meridian): “He lay a
long time listening to the others breathing in their sleep while he contemplated the wildness
about him, the wildness within.”29 It is this wildness that gives McCarthy’s All-American
cowboy hero his romantic charm. But is also, ineluctably, the source of his downfall. Dianne
Luce has characterized John Grady as “the romantic dreamer who gradually awakens to reality,
which always lies waiting to test him, and who responds by abandoning his quest for dominance
and courageously embracing instead a quest for understanding. This is his true heroism.”30
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The great difference in personality or spirit between John Grady and Rawlins, his best
friend and traveling partner, is most visible early in the novel, as the two argue over what to do
with the self-destructive Blevins. In a scene in which Blevins insists the trio must steal back his
lost horse from a Mexican town peopled almost exclusively by armed toughs, the stark
difference between the two comes to the fore. Rawlins speaks: “Ever[sic] dumb thing that I ever
done in my life there was a decision I made before that got me into it. It never was the dumb
thing. It was always some choice I’d made before it. You understand what I’m sayin?”31 This
realization illustrates perfectly the difference between these two characters. Rawlins, a
pragmatist who refuses to abdicate his freedom of will throughout the novel, sees action as the
result of deliberation and choice. He sees the outcome of events in terms of consequence
flowing from wrong decisions he has made.
Typified by a general instinct for self-preservation, Rawlins knows that Blevins (who
embodies another character type of McCarthy’s) is marked by catastrophe in a way that will
draw all of them into danger. John Grady recognizes this and, while knowing his friend is right,
cannot abdicate what he sees as his responsibility for the boy. “He looked at Rawlins asleep in
his soogan and he knew that he was right in all he’d said and there was no help for it[.]”32 The
passage draws upon a number of McCarthy’s most established themes, imparting a sense of the
character’s helplessness to do other than he is compelled due to some inner workings of his
makeup. He cannot choose to do other than he does. He is helpless to act other than he must.
McCarthy’s romantic hero is constrained by the necessity to act according to his
principles and is oblivious to the transgression of boundaries. His refusal to bend seals his fate.
In the Trilogy’s third work, Cities of the Plain, he responds to his partner Billy Parham’s calling
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him crazy over his plans to marry a prostitute with the simple recognition that he “cant [sic] help
it.”33 Even in the role of the romantic hero John Grady reveals a reluctant acceptance of his
choices’ inescapable outcome. He seems to view his fate as a sort of sickness, later asking Billy:
“You think I’ll outgrow whatever it is I got?”34 Billy responds that he does not. “I used to but I
dont [sic] no more.”35 What is wrong with John Grady Cole is not simply a flaw in his thinking,
or a lack of maturity, but an orientation of personality or spirit that puts him at odds with a world
that resists those who refuse to bend. Like Billy’s brother Boyd (who follows a similar path in
The Crossing that leads to his own tragic death). Like all whose relationship with the world is to
know things in fact, rather than in representation, he must test the world constantly. He must put
his hand into the flame to verify that it will burn him. He must exhaust the limits of the world.
In his role as romantic hero, John Grady Cole must negotiate the forces and institutions of
order that stand opposed to his idealistic worldview. His difficulty stems, partially, from his lack
of knowing the rules, or knowing that the rules can be different when one crosses the frontiers
between worlds. Nowhere is this more evident than in John Grady’s experiences on the hacienda
in Part II of All the Pretty Horses. Here, the issue of who holds or exercises sovereign power or
authoritative utterance comes to the fore. While compelling, John Grady’s captivation with
horses and brief romantic affair with the hacendado’s daughter, Alejandra, offers little toward a
critical appraisal of agency in the novel. In the latter instance, however, we do see John Grady
crossing a line as a result of his ignorance or ambivalence toward the rules. In his conversation
with Alejandra’s great aunt, the Dueña Alfonsa, we see in the cagey dialog the philosophical
outlines of opposition. The result of which sets into motion most of the violent events that are to
follow in the novel.
33
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A matter of who must say…
Over the course of the trilogy, as in most of McCarthy’s fiction, sovereign power is often
located in the power of speech. He who has the authority to pronounce what is and what will be.
Throughout McCarthy’s border fiction, the opposition of viewpoints, Mexican and Anglo
(though this term may effectively be interchanged with “Americans,” “Texans,” and, frequently,
pilgrims in McCarthy’s Southwestern novels). Typical of McCarthy’s style, however, it is
seldom the hero and more usually the villain who does the talking. McCarthy’s loquacious
antagonists are almost always philosophic types. From the trio of outlaws in Outer Dark, to
Judge Holden in Blood Meridian, on to Anton Chigurh in No Country for Old Men, McCarthy’s
predatory characters represent more than simply a “principle of evil.”36 These characters
represent a principle of judgement and force the protagonist to pick a side and accept the
consequences of that choice. It is just these characters who present the hero with the greatest
impediment to the absolute they desire as a result of their will to innocence. The predators
always have something to teach to their prey.
In All the Pretty Horses, McCarthy offers a new rendition of this character,
coincidentally, in the form of an old woman, Señorita Alfonsa. Robert Jarrett comments on this,
pointing out that John Grady learns a lesson about freedom when “this desire to write freely
one’s own identity must yield to the will of others and to the opposition of historical and cultural
forces.”37 In the Mexican viewpoint, the idea of authority is indistinguishable from the idea of
truth as an objective reality. Authority is most commonly exercised through speech in these
novels. In All the Pretty Horses it can be glimpsed tellingly in scenes of dialog between John
Grady Cole and a Mexican interlocutor who is motivated to instruct the young cowboy about the
36
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flaws and limits of his perception of the world. The most forceful and circumspect agent of
authority John Grady encounters is the Dueña Alfonsa of the Hacienda de Purísima.
Of all the characters in All the Pretty Horses, Señorita Alfonsa articulates the most
compelling articulation of what could rightly be called a will to power, as a means of exerting
one’s agency in the violence and chaos of the world. In the first of two scenes with John Grady,
Alfonsa invites John Grady into the house to play chess as a pretext to size him up. Over the
course of their conversation she articulates to him that, while she is sympathetic to her
grandniece’s determination to live and love on her own terms, the relationship cannot be
continued. Hearing John Grady’s objection that he never meant to damage Alejandra’s
reputation by his being seen with her, she responds: “This is another country. Here a woman’s
reputation is all she has.”38 For women in Mexico, a damaged reputation can never be
overcome. To this John Grady retorts that such a thing does not seem right, weighing the
situation in Mexico against his own standards. Her response reframes the issue in her own
terms: “No. It’s not a matter of right. You must understand. It is a matter of who must say. In
this matter I get to say. I am the one who gets to say.”39 Her pronouncement has the power to
reframe the issue from terms of right to the terms of authority. Luce comments:
Alfonsa is less interested in control than in responsible choices, and she does not insist on
her right to say until John Grady demonstrates that he does not understand her warning
about consequences to Alejandra if her reputation were to be compromised. He attempts
to dismiss the aspects of reality that do not match his idea of what seems right.40
Over the course of this conversation Alfonsa sketches a vague outline of a life in which
she has known the unhappiness and injustice of being dominated by others. The dueña has given
great thought to the role of agency in the lives of her family and of their place in the history of
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Mexico. She has felt these very forces in her own life and reflects that while “the names of the
entities that have the power to constrain us over time” may change, their collective force to
inhibit the individual will does not.41 Though “convention and authority are replaced by
infirmity” over the course of her life, the Señorita Alphonsa maintains that her regard, her
“attitude toward them has not changed. Has not changed.”42 The reader easily perceives the
passionate and vengeful relish with which she claims for herself the role of decider-in-absolute in
this one area. Though history has rendered her nearly powerless to enact any meaningful word
or deed, in this privileged area, her word is sovereign. It is left to the reader to assess how justly
she decides in the matter. Jarrett writes:
While she appears to represent a hardheaded realism against the idealism of the young,
the aunt remains a radical idealist who denies fate by emphasizing the possibility of the
individual to define herself, even in the face of the disastrous constraints of culture and
history that have scarred her own life[.]43
As a character, Senorita Alphonsa embodies certain characteristics common to
antagonistic characters in McCarthy’s fiction. In this regard, she is particularly interesting
because of the lack of physical or material threat she presents. She is an old woman, but a
powerful one. Her opposition to the young cowboy’s suit of her niece would be a predictable
plot device in the tradition of the romance, but it runs deeper. McCarthy uses characters like
these as mouthpieces for little dialogic exchanges through which fundamental principles come
into play. In two scenes of dialog in the novel, her pronouncements on history touch on familiar
issues in McCarthy’s fiction: the questionable position of the individual in the world, and thus,
the idea of truth in terms of reality versus appearances or representation. Of course the notions
of chance and fate, and of the possibility of action in the face of conventional restraint abound.
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For his part, John Grady does not grasp the nature of his situation. Caught up in a world
of open frontiers, mustang horses, and teenage infatuation, he is heedless to the net consequences
that are drawing ever more tightly around him. It is easy to agree with Luce’s assessment of the
conflict between these two characters. He is a child playing in an adult’s world, wherein the
stakes are higher than he realizes. Thus, Luce writes: “John Grady wants to be the one who must
say. He has yet to outgrow the grandiosity and self-centeredness of childhood, and his journey
into Mexico is an exercise in self-will.”44 The conclusion of their dialog serves as the beginning
of the end of the good times in Mexico for John Grady in Mexico.
John Grady’s sense of purpose and entitlement begins to break down almost as soon as he
returns to his bunk after his chess game with the Dueña. Rawlins, with typical levelheadedness
tries his best to counsel a friend who seems intent on playing with fire. Tellingly, against
Rawlins’ anticipation that a courtship with the boss’s daughter will get them both “fired and run
off the place,” John Grady responds with dreamy nonchalance:
Did you give her your word? said Rawlins.
I dont [sic] know. I dont know if I did or not.
Well either you did or you didnt [sic].
That’s what I’d of thought. But I dont [sic] know.45
For a character who has heretofore sought to define himself by exercising his own will in the
face of the traditional culture of Mexico, John Grady seems incapable of even knowing where he
stands in his suit. This becomes all the more complicated when he and Alejandra begin sneaking
away at night. Throughout their trysting scenes of moonlight romance on horses, “[s]weeter for
the larceny of time and flesh, sweeter for the betrayal,” John Grady finds himself without the
resources to make choices for his future.46 In his moment of being tested, he lacks the ability to
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translate the immediacy of his desire for Alejandra into a concrete plan for the future.
Repeatedly he finds himself without words in her presence. She presents him with her dilemma
and all he can offer is to do whatever she says. She later asks him what to do in the same words.
And then, she is gone. A few days later, without explanation, John Grady and Rawlins find
themselves arrested and taken to jail. Their brief, stolen season at the Hacienda Purísima ends
with their arrest by the Mexican authorities. Part III of the novel begins with the two reunited
with Blevins in a Mexican jail in the town of Encantada. It is here that they learn that Blevins,
attempting to get back the horse and pistol he lost in the storm, has shot three men, one of whom
has died. It is in Part III of All the Pretty Horses that John Grady and Rawlins begin to learn
about the hard realities of Mexico.
From the captain of the rurales in Encantada, John Grady learns that the rules in Mexico
extend beyond the courtly norms of the hacienda. In a manner reminiscent of Alfonsa, the
captain’s power of authoritative utterance extends to the very nature of what is “true” in Mexico.
He tells John Grady: “We can make the truth here. Or we can lose it.”47 John Grady is
incredulous. “There aint [sic] but one truth,” he replies. “The truth is what happened. It aint
what come out of somebody’s mouth.”48 The truth the captain is looking for, however, is
different. He is looking for a truth that will allow him to summarily execute Blevins on the way
to the federal prison in Saltillo,which he does. A passage here reflects on the relationship of
agency to the deeds of the rurales in the desert with Blevins.
[T]he captain inhabited another space and it was a space of his own election and outside
the common world of men. A space privileged to men of the irreclaimable act which
while it contained all lesser worlds within it contained no access to them. For the terms
of election were of a piece with its office and once chosen that world could not be quit.49
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This lesson in truth begins a more prolonged section in the novel wherein the economies of
violence and exchange that govern the Mexican prison at Saltillo establish a new reality for the
embattled Americans. It is in this section that the roles of fate and chance begin to take on a
much more pronounced role.

This is another country…
A crucial scene from All the Pretty Horses invokes the question of agency and the
possibilities for action in the world of McCarthy’s fiction. Here, Emilio Pérez, the prison
potentate, or “Papazote,” as he is known around the prison, seeks to instruct young John Grady
Cole about certain realities of their shared existence. At the core of this dialog is a philosophical
discussion about the differences in worldviews between the world of Mexico and the world of
the United States. As a mentor figure, Pérez instructs John Grady about the new set of rules that
apply to his situation as an Anglo in a Mexican prison.
Pérez is a “prisoner of means,” and exists somewhat above or outside the hierarchy of the
Saltillo prison, he admits that his purview does not extend indefinitely. Even for him, he
indicates that any number of contingencies are possible in the ultimate outcome of events, an
awareness to which he feels an American in such a place may be blind. Pérez divides the people
of his world into two groups: those faithful to him and who come within the scope of his powers
and protection, and those who exist outside that sphere. For the former group, Pérez “can say
certain things.”50 Those outside it, however, “are simply outside.”51 “They live in a world of
possibility that has no end.”52 “Perhaps God can say what is to become of them. But I cannot.”53
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Pérez’s world is organized around the exchange of money. Wherever the basic rules of
commerce or mercantile ethics apply he has political capital enabling him to make certain
predictions. By implication, the second half of Pérez’s equation—those who live ‘simply
outside’—their affairs are determined by powerful nameless forces of cause and effect alien to
him. In this world, wherein he exerts no power, anything and every thing is possible and Pérez
notes how little ability he has to predict what outcomes will follow.
Once again, McCarthy enforces the motif of making choices in a world in which the rules
are not known. As long as the individual has knowledge of the basic forces of motivation or
parameters for action, power may be said to reside in the hands of those with the greatest means
in any society. Beyond this sphere, however, lies another larger sphere in which human behavior
is unpredictable as it is ungovernable. Pérez deals in the affairs of men who have something to
lose or, one might say, a reason to live. This is a world he understands well and, as a
consequence, is capable of mastery. In such a world a man like Pérez is capable of living
relatively well although he insists that this is in fact untrue. “Let me be clear with you,” he
abjures John Grady. “I do not live here so very good. I must make money to make my own
arrangements and this is a very expensive business. A very expensive business.”54 The
implication here is that he would like to take John Grady and his companion, Rawlins, on as
clients because he needs their money to ensure his own safety.
Beneath this exchange, however, is a deeper point at work throughout the scene. This is
that in all societies the mechanisms of knowledge are the same as those of power, all of which
function to reduce human sociability to the basic terms of transaction. When such logic carries
with it the power to manipulate the norms of order, he is powerful who can make arrangements
for himself and for others. To underline this fact, Pérez asks his naïve American interlocutors a
54
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childishly simple question regarding their situation. “If you don’t have no money how can you
be release [sic] from your confinement?”55 In other words, the whole basis for the boys’
confinement in the Saltillo prison is predicated, not on the outcome of some trial in a court of
justice, but simply upon their ability to pay the required sum to affect their release, and without
which they will surely die quickly.56
Even in a place like this where we are concerned with fundamental things the mind of the
anglo is closed. . . . It is not that he is stupid. It is that his picture of the world is
incomplete. In this rare way. He looks only where he wishes to see.57
Pérez is a philosopher of prison life and his pronouncements reveal yet another facet of
McCarthy’s concern for the way in which human will is deceived by its romantic attachment to
individualism, if not the illusion of its individuality itself. The juxtaposition in setting, between
the boundlessness of the frontier and the confinement of the Saltillo prison, produces an extreme
contrast. On both levels, as Pérez points out, the reconciliation or mediation of this tension turns
on the question of agency, the problem of making choices when confronted by forces of fate and
necessity: “Your case is not decided . . . You think there are no crimes without owners? It is not
a matter of finding. It is only a matter of choosing. Like picking the proper suit in a store.”58
Here Pérez invokes a seamier side of the looming question of agency that pervades the Border
Trilogy.
In Mexico, everything is other. The powers that be are not constrained by any truth as
concerns evidence or facts. The Mexican authorities are, however, constrained by the need to
uphold the formal aspects of law and order (“even in Mexico they cannot keep you indefinitely.
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That is why you must act.”)59 The agents of authority in Mexico can and do uphold the trappings
of an ordered state of affairs, and ensure a kind of distributive and retributive justice within their
jurisdiction; they are not inhibited by the “facts,” as John Grady knows them. Their behavior
here echoes the pronouncements of the Dueña Alphonsa (who is by no coincidence behind the
Americans’ capture in the first place) in that in such an affair, it is not who is right or wrong, but
who in fact is in a position to say. The sovereign authority of the state of Coahuila and its
representatives is not constrained in the exercising of its will—which, however presented,
embodies the collective will of the people. It is free to choose a guilty party for an un-owned
crime, a fairly straightforward matter from the state’s perspective. Summary judgment and the
swift execution of sentence in this case have a curious relationship to the truth. Pérez appreciates
John Grady’s position and pronounces the moment: “you must act.”60 In the absolute equanimity
of Pérez’s outlook, the world does not honor bravery or stoic resoluteness. In the worldview he
typifies, there is but one good in the world and that is to stay alive. The world offers no
privileged position for heroes. If bravery cannot be broken or bought off, it can still be negated.
The fact that John Grady and Rawlins have not actually committed a crime is not important.
Justice in McCarthy’s Mexico is not predicated on truth, or on what is deserved. Justice in this
vision is built upon transaction.
In the opposing worldview presented by McCarthy’s Mexican characters, the flaw in the
deeply “superstitious” mind of the “godless” nation north of the river is born of romantic
idealism, a tragic fixation on the national mythology of regeneration through violence, and in the
predestined fulfillment of its transcendent purpose.61 The radical individualism of such a regime
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strengthens the illusion of personal destiny, blinding the pilgrim to the realities of the world as it
is. Such a world does not conform the laws of logic or of reason. In fact, it is hostile, resisting
them with an agency of its own. Stephen Frye’s conclusion on this point is instructive.
Although the novel forces recognition of the omnipresent power of destruction,
predicating the hero’s stature upon his understanding of this mysterious conspiracy of
opposites, McCarthy resolves the story on a principle of value that is by no means strictly
scientific or philosophical. The notion of transcendent purpose finds its most poignant
expression in tangibly human terms, as John Grady sees to live by a strict and definable
code of ethics.62
The Mexican view, as Pérez sets it out, is that of ‘realism’ in contrast to the ‘idealism’ endemic
to Americans. The American superstition to which Pérez alludes is that individual choices
matter or that misfortune can be avoided by right intention. Though the mind of the Anglo is
closed to these ‘fundamental things’ he is not stupid, but rather: “It is that his picture of the
world is incomplete. In this rare way. He looks only where he wishes to see.”63
Pérez indicates that he finds Americans to be a ‘godless people,’ given their common
belief that the world can contain ‘things’ that, within themselves, are inherently good or bad; that
through some objective judgment regarding the means through which an item (a car, or simply
money) was obtained, then the thing itself could be said to be pure or corrupt.
I hope you will give some thought to your situation. Americans have ideas that are not so
practical. They think that there are good things and bad things. They are very
superstitious, you know. . . . It is the superstition of a godless people.64
Mexicans don’t believe things like cars can be good or evil. He knows where good and
evil have their home. The Anglo thinks the Mexican is superstitious. But who is the lost
one? Evil is not in a man. He cannot be tainted. It is not his own evil. Evil is a true
thing in Mexico. [Not a representation or reflection but the thing itself in the actual.] It
goes about on its own legs. Maybe someday it will come to visit you. Maybe it already
has.65
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How is this so? In the viewpoint Pérez espouses, the imperialist mentality of the
‘American,’ the things of the world are assigned moral qualities inasmuch as they can be
appropriated for the transcendent purposes of the agent. The Mexican, by contrast, does not
attempt to divine meaning from a story in which he is both the protagonist and the author. For
the Mexican, the story is already written, and the circumstances of fortune are neither affirming
nor condemning of the individual. Evil is not a thing to be pondered in Mexico, but a thing to be
avoided or embraced. This supposed godlessness of Americans, then, stems from the fact that
they do not truly understand evil for in Mexico evil is not circumscribed by fate, but has a will of
its own.66 Things like cars or money do not have inherent moral properties and the story of their
relationship to the human is circumstantial.
Another possible explanation for this superstition on the part of Americans, as presented
by Pérez, is that Americans tend to believe that their actions are endowed with divine purpose—
that they are enacting the will of some higher power and that as long as they are successful then
the divine will withhold misfortune. The superstition lies in the constant will to innocence—that
somehow war and conquest are foreordained and not the result of the basic will to dominance (or
libido dominandi) motivated by a passion common to all men—the desire for power. Such a will
makes war on the world itself and believes itself legitimately capable of victory. Such a will
seeks to exercise sovereignty, claiming for itself the legitimate use of unlimited force as a means
of achieving limited ends (peace, prosperity, liberty, etc.). Americans believe that the will of
such a power can be known by all men and that, significantly, this relationship is personal.
The Mexican view of evil, by contrast, implies that evil, or simply the bad in opposition
to the good, is not the outcome of human choice or action. It is not, then, the absence of the
good, but rather a positive force that acts of its own volition, when and where it will. Evil, says
66
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Pérez, “has its own home,” and has legs upon which to move about in the world. Such a force
might correspond to a character like Blood Meridian’s Judge Holden: an active presence in the
world with no origins or reckonable limits. This “embodiment of darkness,” however conceived,
is certainly the kind of evil that goes about on two legs and dabbling in the affairs of men as it
will.67 The Mexican, then, knows to expect the occasional visit from evil and how to recognize it
when it arrives. He may attempt to guard against it with whatever talismans or rituals he takes to
be effective, but ultimately mysterious external forces that can never be predicted determine the
outcome. The American would not suspect this evil and, ironically, would view the Mexican’s
proscriptions against evil to be superstitious and highly irrational. “But who is the lost one? Evil
is not in a man. He cannot be tainted. Not his own evil.”68 This is why, for Pérez, Americans
are a godless people. They lay claim to the rightful place of God themselves.
Important to note here is that Pérez sees distinct boundaries or fundamental differences
between the two groups (Mexicans and Anglos) and the divergent accounts of reality they
represent. While his pronouncements do not preclude the possibility of a common human nature,
they do assert a sort of mutual exclusivity between the two camps. There is only one true
explanation for the way of things. This is possibly the result of his acknowledged curiosity or
preoccupation with the ways of Americans. It is also possible that he has become influenced by
the stance of the other over and against all of his purported perspicacity.
Pérez’s pronouncements to John Grady in the Saltillo prison section of All the Pretty
Horses, insofar as they may be regarded as candid, stem from the manner in which the two
different societies perceive the relationship between God and man. The Anglos believe that the
material aspects of the world are endowed with inherent properties of good or bad. This is at the
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root of their ‘superstition’ and evidence of their ‘godlessness.’ The Anglo mentality, then, is not
simply materialistic, but blinded by its desire to see the world conform to a grand narrative; a
narrative that centers on the individual and the exercise of will. The Anglo believes himself
capable of discerning the true nature of the world based upon his understanding of his own story.
All of the things of the world, then, are essentially props in a play—they contribute to the
meaning and outcome of the story and have a personal meaning for the individual. In a certain
sense, Pérez’s characterization of the Anglo draws out the legacy of Calvinism in shaping the
American outlook. Divine approval takes material form and indicates either favor or rebuke.
The ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of things encountered along the course of the Anglo’s life can be
determined by their value to him, and reflect his state of soul. The Anglo has a strong inclination
to view himself as the author of his own existence; life lived as autobiography. As such, the
Anglo’s personal relationship with the divine is directly connected to his immediate material
circumstances. Thus, the Anglo can only conceive of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in terms related to himself,
and not as external or impersonal forces. The things of the world, then, he reckons to be his
own, as they must somehow or another be seen to represent the ongoing drama of the
individual’s pursuit of the divine.
The final conversation between John Grady and Pérez concludes with John Grady using
what money and friendship he has in the effort to purchase a knife. He is aware that what will
likely come next will be a move by Pérez to test his value. The fight comes that evening at
dinner in the form of a hired cuchillero. John Grady “knew the cuchillero had been hired
because he was a man of reputation and it occurred to him that he was going to die in this
place.”69 In the ensuing knife fight, John Grady manages to kill his attacker but is very badly
wounded himself. Staggering into the prison yard and waiting for the inevitable sound of alarm
69
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bells and the searchlights to come on, he is assisted by Pérez’s mayordomo and helped into
Pérez’s little house in the prison yard. He is treated for his wounds and several days later handed
an envelope full of money and released from prison along with Rawlins. When Rawlins asks
who has posted the money for the release, John Grady responds: “She paid us out.”
The señora?
The aunt. Yes.
Why?
I dont [sic] know.
Is that where you got the money?
Yes.
It’s got to do with the girl, dont it?
I expect it does.70
Discussing what to do next, John Grady informs Rawlins that he intends to go back to the
hacienda. Although John Grady realizes that in all likelihood Alejandra has made a deal with her
aunt to never see him again in exchange for his life, John Grady is determined. “I know. But
she’s going to have to tell me herself.”71 The two boys reflect over all they have seen, and of
their regrets over the fate of Blevins, and of the killing of the young cuchillero. John Grady, in
particular, feels a sense of remorse. When Rawlins tells him he had no choice. While John
Grady retains a wish that things could have been other, he tells Rawlins: “You don’t need to try
and make it right. It is what it is.”72 He accepts what has happened, but something about him
seems changed. Rawlins boards a bus for home and John Grady leaves Saltillo headed back to
confront whatever waits for him at the hacienda.
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The Hands of Other Puppets
The conversation between John Grady and Alfonsa in Part IV of All the Pretty Horses
unites many of the various representations of agency in the novel. Over the course of the long
scene, the dualities of freedom/necessity and fate/free will, come to the fore and are entertained
at length. It is in this scene that John Grady’s heroism is subjected to its harshest criticism. The
individual will that has typified him as a romantic hero earlier in the novel is examined as a lapse
in judgement, and a failure to take responsibility. As interlocutor, the character of Alfonsa also
is clarified. Ultimately, it is she who stands as the hero’s penultimate antagonist in the novel.
While many of the overarching themes of this dissertation are addressed in their conversation,
some in new and interesting ways, it is the subjects of fate and of responsibility that are given
most attention, and these are the subjects that contribute most to an understanding of agency in
the novel.
After having described to John Grady how the society of Mexico has been shaped by the
misdirected loves of freedom, truth, and honor of the Spaniard, Alfonsa hits on a point that she
feels is worth discussing with John Grady.
[T]he question for me was always whether the shape we see in our lives was there from
the beginning or whether these random events are only called a pattern after the fact.
Because otherwise we are nothing. Do you believe in fate?73
When John Grady responds that he does, she begins to tell him about her father. Expressing
how the world functions through connections relating to causality, she describes his position:
“He claimed that the responsibility for a decision could never be abandoned to a blind agency but
could only be relegated to human decisions more and more remote from their consequences.”74
Her father’s worldview expresses a sense of agency in which every event followed from the
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making of a single choice. For Alfonsa, however, “the world has always been more of a puppet
show.”75 The strings that dictate the movements of the figures on the stage extend upward where
they “terminate in the hands of yet other puppets, themselves with their own strings which trace
upward in turn, and so on.”76 In this imagery, Alfonsa finds an allegory for the history of
Mexico. In this story, which she intends to relate to John Grady, she tells John Grady that she
finds the reason why she has seen fit to reject his suit of her niece.
Alfonsa’s story about the Mexican revolution details her childhood acquaintance with
Francisco and Gustavo Madero. It is colored strongly by her brief romance with the latter
brother. In the Maderos, Alfonsa sees the kind of revolutionary fire that she herself had
embraced from a young age. In the failure of the reforms, their betrayal and martyrdom, she
perceives a certain fatalism:
In the end we all come to be cured of our sentiments. Those whom life does not cure
death will. The world is quite ruthless in selecting between the dream and the reality,
even where we will not. Between the dream and the thing the world lies waiting.77
And yet, earlier in this same speech she states that in her life she has embraced a goal to be a
person of value. A revolutionary herself, she believes that the goals the Maderos pursued were
not wrong, but perhaps misguided. She will not reconcile herself to the flat realism that has
come to dominate the Mexican worldview espoused by characters like Pérez. The love of
Gustavo Madero led her to see the value of principles, an insight she realized she had always
known: “That all courage was a form of constancy. That it was always himself that the coward
abandoned first. After this all other betrayals came easily.”78 Even in the loss of her youthful
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idealism, she has steadfastly clung to her principles. Her will to power in the world springs from
these.
Alfonsa tells John Grady that while she had sympathy for his suit, and was even open to
considering it, the revelation that he had both lied to the family about his association with
Blevins, and that he had failed to take responsibility for his actions causes her to reject it.
You won’t let me make my case.
I know your case. You case is that certain things happened to you over which you had
no control.
It’s true.
I’m sure it is. But it’s no case. I’ve no sympathy with people to whom things happen.
It may be that their luck is bad, but is that to count in their favor?79
Thus, she implies, choice is always a matter of necessity. And yet how does she intend to
mitigate this intolerable and abject state of woman in the rigidly hierarchic social structure of her
time and place?
Here the reader confronts a puzzle as to her meaning. On the one hand, it can be
reasonably inferred that her pronouncements indicate that the idea of individual, or even
collective freedom (qua agency) is life’s great illusion. On the other, as a later dialog between
these two antagonists will show, the very nature of a choice implies a sense of the individual
will—to abdicate the will is unacceptable. While casting strong doubt as to whether the
individual has a legitimate ground for action, her pronouncements are no less insistent that the
will exists and, inevitably, will be forced by nature itself into action, however futile.
I don’t hate you.
You shall.
We’ll see.
Yes. We’ll see what fate has in store for us, wont we?
I thought you didnt [sic] believe in fate.
She waved her hand. It’s not so much that I dont believe in it. I dont subscribe to its
nomination. If fate is the law then is fate also subject to that law? At some point we
cannot escape naming responsibility. It’s in our nature. Sometimes I think we are all like
79
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that myopic coiner at his press, taking the blind slugs one by one from the tray, all of us
bent so jealously at our work, determined that not even chaos be outside of our own
making.80
In the end, she tells John Grady that she judges him unfit for her niece due to the fact that he has
failed to exert his will in the face of his circumstances. That he has exhibited a kind of moral or
spiritual blindness toward the world that, rather than commending him as a kind of virtuous
romantic idealist, points to his inability to confront the truth that the natural origins he seeks are
but illusions, and that his actions have consequences. “Between the dream and the thing itself
the world lies waiting,” she instructs him.81 The logic presented, if correctly interpreted here,
concludes in an inescapable dilemma. And while it is also possible that her paradoxical stance
can be attributed to some latent impulse of passion or defect of character, which the words of
other characters’ would support, Alphonsa’s calm insistence that John Grady’s critical flaw is the
result of some choice to live in the world of his dreams rather than her family’s reality remains
highly compelling. Indeed, as the case of John Grady is drawn into comparison with various
other adolescent protagonists in McCarthy’s fiction, a common trend emerges: all of them, at
least at times, appear as lacking some important knowledge about the world that would enable
them to make critical choices or act in such a way as to take control of their own story from the
forces of circumstance, chance, and fate. Their lack of will manifests in a failure to act. These,
for Alfonsa, are the rules and they do not change or make special concessions. “If fate is the law
then is fate also subject to that law?”82
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John Grady encounters Alejandra one last time. They meet in Zacatecas, where he
proposes to her and makes promises for her future safety and happiness. He tells her everything
that has happened to him and she weeps. She tells him that she has told her father of their affair
and that she had never realized that her father could stop loving her. Expressing her love for him
and her belief in the things he has told her, Alejandra gives John Grady her final answer.
Though torn, she cannot do what he asks. Here, the narrative voice offers a brief glimpse into
the insights of a McCarthy character, and relates to the theme of fate:
He saw very clearly how all his life led only to this moment and all after led nowhere at
all. He felt something cold and soulless enter him like another being and he imagined
that it smiled malignly and he had no reason to believe that it would ever leave.83
In his lack of knowing a direction to go, John Grady returns to Encantada for the horses he and
his two companions had left behind. A brief gunfight ensues and, shot through the leg, John
Grady barely escapes with his life. His hostage, the captain who had shot Blevins, is released to
some men of the country. John Grady does not kill him. “I aint like you,” he says.84
Returning to Texas, John Grady is unable to locate the owner of the Blevins horse. After
asking around he is called into court and tells his story. The judge in the case believes him and
lets him keep all three of the horses he has with him. That night, after the hearing, John Grady
returns to the judge’s house. He informs the judge that he does not feel justified in being
considered totally in the right in the eyes of the law. He regrets the dishonor he brought to
Alejandra and her family, and the killing of the young cuchillero in the Saltillo prison. He even
expresses guilt over wanting to kill the Mexican captain. “The reason I wanted to kill him was
because I stood there and let him walk that boy out in the street and shoot him and I never said
nothin,” he tells the judge. “Would it have done any good?” the judge asks. “No sir. But that
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don’t make it right.”85 John Grady here expresses the nature of his guilt: that he failed to take
responsibility for Blevins in life, even though, as he tells the judge, “I didnt hardly know him. I
felt bad about it. But he wasnt nothing to me.”86 His guilt over his lack of agency in the moment
of Blevin’s death burdens him and leads him to wander the countryside looking for the horse’s
owner, whom he never finds. The novel concludes with John Grady attending another funeral
and then riding on, through a country that is much changed. He rides out west “into the
darkening land, the world to come.”87

Conclusion
Geographically, the world of All the Pretty Horses is set in many of the same locales of
Blood Meridian, but it is not the boundless, uncharted border country of the earlier novel. A
twentieth century cowboy, John Grady Cole knows of the West of his predecessor, the kid, only
through anecdote, legend, and myth. This is the world he seeks on his trip to Mexico. What he
finds along the way are fences. And while these fences are easily cut to allow a rider to pass,
John Grady fails to see the metaphor even as it affects him: even in the open country, there are
rules. John Grady’s journey is one of moral instruction, lessons in which he is forced to lay aside
his romantic notions of boundless freedom in a world open to the expression of the individual
will. Brutally, he learns that actions have broad reaching consequences, and that the world he
seeks is as inaccessible to him as the world within his own heart.
In the Border Trilogy, McCarthy’s fiction becomes increasingly focused on unique
theoretical possibilities surrounding the political questions of individual freedom and agency.
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He questions whether our actions and our failures of action amount to much the same thing in the
big picture. What may seem like fated outcomes may, in retrospect, reveal themselves to be the
result of choices, made or unmade, that can affect the lives of many others than the individual
self. This is where the recognition of the other, through witnessing comes most directly to bear.
To love another human or to even care about another human is a bold if not transgressive move
in McCarthy’s world. Such actions seem to provoke the world to extinguish the agent and all he
stands for. Our failures to meet up to our obligations may condemn us, but we are going to die
either way; and it is seldom pretty when we do. We bear witness and move on. In my next
chapter I turn to consider conclusions about McCarthy’s concern for the idea of order.
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6. Order
If we keep ever-present in our minds the idea of a veritable human order, if we think of it
as something to which a total sacrifice is due should the need arise, we shall be in a
similar position to that of a man travelling, without a guide, through the night, but
continually thinking of the direction he wishes to follow. Such a traveler’s way is lit by a
great hope.1
Political theorist Paul Cantor describes how nineteenth-century British and American
novelists display a tendency to emphasize human activity in the private rather than public or
essentially political sphere.
These writers focus intensely on certain provocative issues of private life only because
they take it for granted that more fundamental issues of political life have been settled;
that is, they think within a political context defined for them by their regimes. In short, it
is precisely because these novelists take for granted the right-ness of the democratic
regime and its concomitant bourgeois way of life that they devote themselves to
exploring the complexities of life under that regime. Here we see how useful the concept
of the regime can be in analyzing literature: it alerts us to the possibility that what is
omitted from a work of literature may be as important as what is included. 2
Tragedians have carefully rendered a normative space for action, insisting on the presence of a
public sphere or commons, and an established nomos as prerequisite. McCarthy, by contrast,
subverts and challenges this dictum. Human action in his world is set in the negative space of
absolute freedom, an apparently ungoverned and ungovernable moral universe in which
transgression becomes difficult to recognize.3 Without a chorus to witness the deeds of heroes
without thoughts, traditional notions of free will and moral restraint tend to become obscured in
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the fog of fate and chaotic chance. Indeed, I contend that McCarthy’s vision goes so far as to
obscure the very form of the individual self, the embodied cogito, in its commitment to a moral
terrain that is, as he puts it, “desert absolute.”4 His fiction continually explores an idea of evil
that moves about in the world on legs, compelling, judging, and condemning his protagonists for
their inability to offer an accounting of themselves, naming their transgressions and accepting
judgment. In some cases, the protagonist’s only redemption is expressed through an unreflective
action in resisting this power; some attempt to rebel, or at least demonstrate a reluctance to
acquiesce to “the life of the darkness,” as the quotation by Boehme states in the epigram to Blood
Meridian. It is undeniable that McCarthy intends this moral question as a significant
philosophical problem for his reader. I contend, against a number of McCarthy’s critics, that the
posing of such a nihilistic proposition does not support the conclusion of a deep existential
nihilism at the core of his vision. It does, however, pose a strident challenge to the authority of
the established order. But what is the outcome of this challenge, and of what use is it?
McCarthy’s political vision demonstrates the general failure of politics to do what politics
is supposed to do. The political or sovereign power in McCarthy’s world may be said to attempt
to provide for an ordered environment for human existence, even with nominal liberty. But it
fails in any meaningful way to protect men from each other and from themselves or to advance
any notion of the good life. Indeed, his reader is frequently left to ponder exactly what might
even be said to constitute the good life in McCarthy’s fiction. Is this failure of the political the
result of some deficiency in our laws or political institutions? No. The failure results from our
gross misunderstanding of our place in the order of the world. It results from our inability to
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accept our fundamental loneliness in the world. The ‘optical democracy’ of natural and human
landscapes overpowers human will, action, and defies our attempts to impose meaning.5
A general assumption governing all of McCarthy’s fiction is that the world is generally
mysterious and chaotic. To attempt to ascribe categories of morality or right order into the
matrix of the human relationship to the world is a false claim and a hopeless enterprise.
However, this foregrounding of chaos does not exert any simple nihilistic solution to questions
of how best humans ought to live or, for that matter, how humans can understand or even
describe the world or our place in it.
McCarthy’s fiction never precludes a world in which a sense of order and moral
judgment endures, even in the face of overwhelming chaos.6 The question is, then, what is this
order and what does it offer to the study of politics? If human actions do in fact have
consequences, where might these be glimpsed in human affairs? To employ the logic of cause
and effect, what can we say may result from any specific human action of good or evil? Answer:
We can never know—and this lack of surety endows all our decisions with possibility.
McCarthy’s apocalyptic backdrop serves to emphasize the durability of possibilities in a world of
unknowns. Nothing can ever completely erase the story, provided it has some witness. Perhaps
this witness is provided by nature itself, perhaps not. Even if some later civilization or
intelligence might stumble upon our own pictograms or hieroglyphs, the symbolizations we have
made of our world—which, of course, stems from our natural impulse to tell stories—bears a
certain nobility and beauty, and represents our refusal to acquiesce to the omnipresent darkness
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surrounding us. While McCarthy’s political vision is ultimately just a critique, it is a very fine
one.
In this chapter, I lay out the final thematic concept in my presentation of McCarthy’s
political vision. In it, I examine McCarthy’s two most recently published novels: No Country for
Old Men and The Road. While these works differ greatly from each other—the former is,
essentially, a more cinema-friendly distillation of Blood Meridian, while the latter constitutes a
unique and altogether new direction for McCarthy’s fiction. They are unified by the appearance
in each of the highly suggestive symbol of man carrying fire. Both works concern civilizational
collapse, the demise of one moral horizon and the rise of another. In No Country for Old Men,
the reader finds a pervasive motif of epochal change. Through the eyes and voice of an aging
and disabused country sheriff, the novel depicts the imminent collapse of the established order in
the face of a harsh new reality in the borderlands of West Texas at an early stage in the narcowars of that region.

Things losing shape: No Country for Old Men
No Country for Old Men (2005) interrogates the themes of agency and order. Here
McCarthy depicts the extent of human understanding confronting the limits of human agency.
Its operative question, posed by the villain, a psychopathic assassin named Anton Chigurh, to
one of his many victims, is a succinct statement of this theme: “How does a man decide in what
order to abandon his life?”7 At issue here are the competing obligations that conspire to thwart
an individual’s capacity to control a situation, order a life, or to align one’s purposes with one’s
values. It revisits the theme of agency in McCarthy’s work: the common human desire to
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reshape the world and the limits to which such an activity is ever possible. In one sense, this
question turns on the basic hierarchy of human needs and desires when confronted with difficult
ethical decision making; the underlying values that propel human behavior when circumstances
are at or beyond the edge of comprehension or control. Such situations are commonly
misunderstood by the human actors who, with imperfect knowledge, find themselves in their
midst.
The “Moss Case,” as I term it, serves as the catalyst for the narrative in No Country for
Old Men. One day in 1980 while out on an antelope hunting trip, Llewelyn Moss, a welder and
Vietnam Veteran in his late thirties, stumbles upon the scene of a bloody shootout in the desert of
the Texas borderlands. Deducing the scene to be the aftermath of a drug deal gone awry, Moss
tracks down the last man standing. When he finds him, the man is dead and has with him a
heavy leather document case. Moss looks inside. “It was level full of hundred dollar banknotes.
They were in packets fastened with banktape stamped each with the denomination $10,000.”8
Moss’s decision to take the money sets into motion a chain of events that will ultimately have
calamitous results. The case contains a radio transponder that enables it to be tracked by those to
whom it belongs. In the ensuing chase, Moss confronts forces of violence far exceeding
anything in his experience. Most notable among the various parties involved who join in the
hunt is a predatory villain worthy of rank among McCarthy’s finest.
While Moss is undoubtedly the man at the center of the action in the narrative, it is the
sheriff, ultimately, who comes to occupy the novel’s moral focus. McCarthy uses Moss as a
vehicle for driving the plot. But it is through the eyes and voice of retired sherriff Ed Tom Bell
that McCarthy elaborates on the larger forces in play. Bell will decide that the changing world
that this case exemplifies is no country for a man who is not ready or willing to “put his soul at
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hazard.”9 The Moss Case forces Bell to confront the “new” reality, and the new kind of men that
it brings to his world. Confounded by his inability to comprehend, let alone get ahead of the
violence wrought by those pursuing Moss and the stolen money, Bell reflects continually on his
life and career. He feels outmatched to exchange fire with those who embrace the life of
violence for the sake of it. He sees no place for himself in a world in which the traditionally
understood notions of freedom and justice are thwarted by the implacable will-to-power of the
drug traffickers and those in their employ.
Structurally, the text of No Country for Old Men is divided between two distinct narrative
modes. The first are the italicized passages at the opening of each of the novel’s thirteen parts in
which Bell speaks in the first person, presumably to some interviewer, or perhaps the reader
herself. These monologues reflect on the primary events of the novel from a position later in
time and read much like the first draft of an autobiography or memoir. Bell’s monologues
constitute a form of testimony, as Bell has witnessed these events in his life and in the lives of
his community and the impact it has made. His reflection is telling. In his first monologue Bell
delineates how his exposure to an unforeseen force of evil, something beyond his experience,
feeds his growing suspicion that the basic norms of lawfulness, decency, and respect for law and
order in his community are on the verge of collapse. His recent experiences lead him to
conclude: “there is another view of the word out there and other eyes to see it and thats where
this is goin. It has done brought me to a place in my life I would not of thought I’d come to.”10
The emphasis on “eyes to see” invokes the prominent theme of witnessing in McCarthy’s corpus
and Bell’s monologues constitute another formulation of it. Throughout the novel, his
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monologues (the reader is never sure whether these are spoken or thought; possibly both) reflect
his remembering and reflecting on the events of the novel.
A persistent mood of anxious expectation pervades much of the italicized passages in
which Bell reflects on his life and career in addition to some of the details of the case. As a
public servant and community leader in a small West Texas border county, Bell presents himself
as a man of respectable public intentions and deeply felt private regrets. In his ruminations, he
returns repeatedly to the idea that he sees his role as that of a shepherd or guardian watching out
for his people. He feels himself to be part of an old and proud tradition of Texas lawmen that
includes several members of his own family. Bell likes his role as a community figure, such as it
is, and he likes the general predictability of the world in which he operates. But as the novels
opens, something has changed.
Throughout the novel, Bell speaks of a changing world and of his lack of certainty within
it. He begins by describing the one “and only one” execution he has confronted in his career. A
teenaged boy who killed a fourteen-year-old girl without any sense of passion or remorse: “And
he told me he had been plannin to kill somebody about as long as he could remember. Said that
if they turned him out he’d do it again. Said he knew he was going to hell.”11 Bell imparts that
he has no sense of how to relate to such a person and, because of this, begins to wonder if this
person is “some new kind.”12 Here Bell expresses one of the major themes of the novel in
general, the possibility of fundamental shifts, a new world of irrational and overwhelming
violence. In such a world, as Bell sees it, traditional notions of the good, of justice and,
importantly, of order, are overrun by forces that cannot be constrained by any of the existing
institutions of law and its enforcement, or even the political community that gives said
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institutions their legitimate sanction. Important to understanding this aspect of the novel is the
recognition that while avid readers of McCarthy’s body of work are likely to recognize this
theme of nihilistic violence immediately, Sheriff Bell does not. Throughout the novel, both in
his interior monologues and in the main body of the story, Bell reveals his deep perplexity. He
feels himself to be living in new times and confronting men of a new type, to say nothing of the
larger social and economic forces in play. And it is in this very misapprehension that Bell
invokes the novel’s relevant political themes.
Visiting Moss’s wife in an Odessa cafe hoping to get information as to Moss’s
whereabouts and having seen the path of destruction left by those pursuing, he orders them both
coffee. “The face that lapped and shifted in the dark liquid in the cup seemed an omen of things
to come. Things losing shape. Taking you with them.”13 By this point in the novel, Bell has a
sense of the principal actors in the unfolding case. Though he does not yet know (and never will
know) who Chigurh is, he has begun to get a sense of his capabilities. And here he betrays his
basic fear: that he will not be able to stop a man like Chigurh even by using all the means at his
disposal. Bell offers a glimpse into the kind of evil he feels so unprepared to face, embodied in a
“true and living prophet of destruction.”14 The two never confront each other. Bell’s attempts to
find out more about this prophet come to no end. He has no fingerprints in the FBI database.
Bell cannot help but conclude: “He’s a ghost.”15 Bell indicates that his misgivings spring not out
of fear, but out of his reluctance to become something other than who he is. “I think a man
would have to put his soul at hazard. And I won’t do that. I think now that maybe I never
would.”16 In essence, Bell realizes that to be able to confront Chigurh, he must first be willing to
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behave like Chigurh, to abandon his principles and embrace chaos. And yet, even in Bell’s
steadfast refusal to take this step, the reader cannot fail to notice a certain interrelationship or
codependency between the two characters. Much like the kid and Judge Holden in Blood
Meridian, the opposition of Bell and Chigurh reveals a strange parallelism. Noting this,
Mangrum observes that “McCarthy’s device of revealing the interrelations of Chigurh and Bell’s
identities indicates, among other things, that human constructs (particularly regarding the just
and the good) often inadvertently affirm a common view of reality.”17
In his monologues, Bell states he is convinced of the existence of the good, in the
classical sense, and describes it in strongly Platonic terms; its permanence, its incorruptibility.
While not a religious man per se, Bell’s monologues return again and again to his belief in the
transcendent character of truth and in his love for his wife. Regarding the truth, Bell affirms that
it can be neither altered nor extinguished.18 He later states that he believes that the truth is
simple: “It needs to be simple enough for a child to understand.”19
Bell is also a liberal democrat in the modern sense, placing his faith in the goodness of
people—provided they are instructed by law and the institutions of civil government. But in his
role as a county sheriff Bell operates somewhat beyond the law in a sort of unspoken or
unlegislated gray area:
It’s an odd thing when you come to think about it. The opportunities for abuse are just
about everwhere. There’s no requirements in the Texas State Constitution for being a
sheriff. Not a one. There is no such thing as a county law. You think about a job where
you have pretty much the same authority as God and there is no requirements put upon
you and you are charged with preservin nonexistent laws and you tell me if that’s
peculiar or not. Because I say that it is. Does it work? Yes. Ninety percent of the time.
It takes very little to govern good people. Very little. And bad people cant be governed
at all. Or if they could I never heard of it.20
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While Bell seems to put strong faith in himself, and even more his people, his horizon is
predicated upon a notion of justice that requires the mutual acceptance of certain norms; a nomos
of the community. It is the unraveling of this, Bell purports, that is the cause for his greatest
concern. And yet in this position critic Benjamin Mangrum finds the “disingenuous grounds” of
Bell’s outlook to be a mode of McCarthy’s for expressing the tragic, vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s
critique of Plato in The Birth of Tragedy and elsewhere.21 Mangrum sees in Bell’s often
contradictory views regarding his role as sheriff a “shrouded skepticism,” that emerges when
Bell’s monologues wax nostalgic about old time lawmen.22 He writes:
The juxtaposition between the “old timers,” and the instances of abuse are “peculiar” to
Bell, for even the good lawmen “have pretty much the same authority as God” while they
are paradoxically “preservin nonexistent laws” (64). Like Bell’s previous inability to
explain his unease regarding the execution (63), the role of a Texas sheriff presents him
with a contradiction. Those serving the state have unrestrained authority—the same as
God’s—and thus can use any amount of force to preserve order. Yet this order is
conspicuously “nonexistent”—that is, without a definable system of law to determine the
civic dimensions of the just—indicating that the force that serves the democratic state is
displace from any ultimate telos (64). Like the God-Shepherd of the Psalms, the Texas
sheriff protects the herd, but he does not lead them “in right paths” because there are “no
requirements put upon” him (Psalm 23:3, NCFOM 64). For this figure of democratic
justice, there are, in other words, no defined “right paths.23
Mangrum uses terms like “contradiction” and “aimless” to describe Bell’s position, which might
even extend as far as his core values. Bell is a deeply unreliable narrator, but the extent of his
flaws are couched in the nuances of the narrative, indeed in the text itself. Bell’s valorization of
the bygone older times, in which sheriffs didn’t need to carry guns and knew and looked out for
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their people in a very personal way, fails to appreciate what Mangrum terms the “democratic
hegemony of that time.”24 Mangrum continues:
Therefore, Bell’s retirement not only expresses his doubts about the democratic state that
he represents but also concedes to the Nietzschean view that power and self-interest
govern human relations—that the essence of democratic justice is keeping stronger wills
in check in order to preserve the herd’s liberty. If justice depends upon “a bad enough
dog,” human nature is more concerned with dominating others than pursuing individual
freedom (299).25
For all his pronouncements on the transcendent nature of truth and goodness, then, Bell
ultimately betrays an underlying ambivalence toward them. His often cranky pronouncements
about the loss of basic manners, “Any time you quit hearin Sir and Mam the end is pretty much in
sight,” are a symptom of a larger problem he refers to as a “breakdown in mercantile ethics” and
results in chaos.26 Underlying this, however, is a deeper recognition that the justice he has
served and worked to uphold over the course of his career has very little grounding in a
transcendent notion of the good. This is not to conclude, however, that Bell’s position is an
argument in favor of the chaotic nihilism of Chigurh, who I will examine below. Rather, I
conclude with Mangrum that McCarthy’s understanding of justice is tragic—a pursuit that,
ultimately, is most likely to fail in a world where “the smallest crumb can devour us.”27 While
Bell reveals an underlying ambivalence regarding the good in a Platonic sense, he nevertheless
believes that it must be pursued and the temptation to give in to this “other world out there and
other eyes to see it” must be resisted if he is to retain his humanity.28
Throughout his monologues, Bell’s reflections are the key to McCarthy’s presentation of
order in the novel and its interpretation as a political concept. His loss of faith in himself and in
24
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the goodness of his people are certainly important to this. But McCarthy’s most compelling
statements on order come late in the novel, after the conclusion of the Moss Case. These are
found in the revelations about God found in Bell’s conversation with his uncle Ellis, along with
Bell’s final monologue on the novel’s last pages, in which he describes a dream about his father.
However, before concluding this section with my interpretation of these scenes, it will be
necessary to pivot briefly to examine the political implications latent in the philosophy of Bell’s
opposite number.
Like so many of the “hero” versus “villain” relationships in McCarthy’s corpus, the
essential tension between the two characters and the ideas they represent are generally most
revealing about the philosophical questions McCarthy is engaging in any particular work. And
in this regard, No Country for Old Men presents a curious specimen due to the fact that its
protagonist and antagonist never meet face to face or exchange words. Bell never remotely
understands Chigurh. Still, the reader gets a very clear sense of the latter’s rigidly defined
worldview, because, like all McCarthy’s great villains, Chigurh is both a philosopher and an
orator. I turn now to examine the character in one of his most emblematic scenes.
Anton Chigurh is a hitman as remorseless as he is lethal. The only comparison one of his
associations can make of him in this regard is to the bubonic plague.29 Chigurh conducts his life
according to a strict set of principles allowing him to function as a sort of deterministic envoy of
death. A skilled and merciless killer, he is also an ascetic adherent to a rigid code in his life. He
maintains his anonymity by killing just about anyone with whom he has dealings. And this is not
limited to those in the narcotics trade or law enforcement. In one of the novel’s early scenes,
Chigurh begins to antagonize a gas station proprietor who makes the mistake of noticing that the
car he drives carries Dallas plates. The car is stolen from a previous victim. When Chigurh
29
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learns the man “married into” his ownership of the business, he presents the man with the
following question: “What’s the most you ever saw lost on a coin toss?”30 Perplexed, the man
asks what, how, and why of the game Chigurh proposes. “How would that change anything?”
Chigurh responds to him. “Call it, he said.” The man is hesitant, so Chigurh insists:
I can’t call it for you. It wouldnt be fair. It wouldnt even be right. Just call it.”
I didn’t put nothin up.
Yes you did. You’ve been putting it up your whole life. You just didnt know it. You
know what the date is on this coin?
No.
It’s nineteen fifty-eight. It’s been traveling twenty-two years to get here. And now
it’s here. And I’m here. And I’ve got my hand over it. And it’s either heads or tails.
And you have to say. Call it.
I don’t know what I stand to win . . .
Your stand to win everything, Chigurh said. Everything.31
By “everything” here, Chigurh of course means, the man’s very life. And the man calls it
correctly: “Heads then.” Chigurh congratulates him tepidly. Before leaving, Chigurh gives the
man the “lucky” quarter as a souvenir, and a lecture.
Anything can be an instrument, Chigurh said. Small things. Things you wouldnt even
notice. They pass from hand to hand. People dont pay attention. And then one day
there’s an accounting. And after that nothing is the same.32
The phrase “anything can be an instrument” stands forward as a fairly emblematic expression of
Chigurh’s philosophy. However chaotic the nature of the coin toss, for him it is no more chaotic
than the circumstances that led to the encounter itself, or for that matter, the creation of the coin.
Chigurh’s philosophy does not acknowledge traditional moral categories like good or evil. In
this outright embrace of his code, Steven Frye describes Chigurh as both psychopathic and
sociopathic, “insofar as he lives a life unencumbered by social obligation or responsibility to any
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preconceived moral precepts.”33 In the asocial worlds of McCarthy’s fiction, Chigurh acts as a
force of nature, revealing the limits and apparent absurdity of human will and choice-making.
His elimination of his own will in the equation marks him as psychologically unhinged, but the
system he observes is nevertheless consistent. Frye asserts: “Chigurh contends that his free
choice to kill is mitigated by an elaborate system of cause and effect that renders individual
agency largely inconsequential.”34 Even within the purview of his own deterministic philosophy
of death, mediated only by the coin toss, he seems himself ultimately as an instrument.35 But an
instrument of what? Jay Ellis sees in Chigurh’s conversation with the gas station man a sort of
teaching, a Socratic-styled education in philosophy as preparation for death:
What he offers the man by choosing to toss the coin amounts to a gift, if a hard one to
take. If ethics and morality (let alone religion) are indeed human creations in a cosmos
that cannot recognize us at its center, Chigurh is teaching the man that fact. We need not
dismiss the value of those creations simply because they have no ultimate foundational
origin. That all life, including our values for how one should live it and respect it in
others, may be the result not only of our collective choices, but also of myriad chance
events, leads some of us to celebrate and value it all the more so. To live without
knowledge of this, however, to substitute for our own limits of knowledge a created
certainty that our little lives have necessary, inevitable, meaning, however, squanders
life.36
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As Chigurh drives away, the gas station man is depicted thus: “He laid the coin on the counter
and looked at it. He put both hands on the counter and just stood leaning there with his head
bowed.”37 Whether the man has learned anything or not from the exchange is never explained,
in typical McCarthy fashion, but Ellis’s suggestion is worth considering, as it pertains to order.
While Chigurh’s role in the novel is that of a harbinger of death, he is, at least in the scene with
the gas station man, also a harbinger of reflection, of weighing the limits of our knowledge, of
possibly glimpsing the extent of our hubris. In a world where control can be seen as an illusion,
albeit a convincing one, hubris comes to represent our failing to recognize the inevitability of
death, and our utter vulnerability before it. More than simply pride or vanity, this type of hubris
may be seen as a failure to recognize mortal limits before the gods or, as Jay Ellis terms it, “an
excessive inclination toward violence.”38 Simone Weil in her classic essay “The Iliad or The
Poem of Force,” makes the following connection to violence: “Perhaps all men, by the very act
of being born, are destined to suffer violence; yet this is a truth to which circumstance shuts
men’s eyes.”39
Chigurh’s regard for those people he encounters has little normative content. The reader
never gets a clear sense of his motivations, or even his underlying pathology—the precise
mechanism of disregard that allows him to exercise his role as a psychopathic and sociopathic
killer so effectively. In his mind, he is not altogether different from any other possible cause of
sudden death: undetected carbon monoxide leak, aneurysm, or stray bullet from a shootout in the
street; it matters little. When Chigurh offers Moss the opportunity to save his wife by returning
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the money, Moss refuses. Chigurh remains bound to kill Moss’s wife, Carla Jean, whether the
money is recovered or no. And, some months after Moss’s death, he makes good on his promise.
For Chigurh, even the death of Moss does not relieve him of his promise. He makes the
following pronouncement to Carla Jean: “Even a nonbeliever might find it useful to model
himself after God. Very useful, in fact.”40 His statement here is in response to her objection that
he has no reason to kill her. Chigurh’s idea of God in this sense is that He is beholden to his
rules and cannot make exceptions, even as He observes unspeakable injustice and suffering
among His children. The inability of God to change His own rules is of critical importance to
McCarthy’s vision of order. The horizon of the gods in McCarthy’s fiction is one in which
however much they (or He) must know, no intervention can be made in the immanent sphere.
This insight returns us the character of Ed Tom Bell in No Country for Old Men and anticipates
the major conclusions of The Road.
In one of No Country for Old Men’s final scenes, Ed Tom Bell returns to the dilapidated
family homestead to pay a visit to his uncle Ellis, a paralyzed former deputy sheriff himself.
Over the course of a dialog that ranges from Bell’s decision to retire, their respective regrets in
life (Bell reveals a story from WWII in which he acknowledges a lifetime of lingering guilt over
a decision to abandon his fallen comrades in order save his own life), and God, the two engage
several of the novel’s most compelling themes.
Central to their conversation is the possibility that the destructive force of evil in the
world cannot be accounted for within themselves or in the nature of the country, as an active
force. Ellis relates that he has always thought that, with age, “God would sort of come into my
life in some way. He didnt. I dont blame him. If I was him I’d have the same opinion about me
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that he does.”41 While Ellis has not found the redemption he has sought, some way to make
sense of the world’s pain and injustice, he does not blame God. Bell asks him:
Do you think God knows what’s happenin?
I expect he does.
You think he can stop it?
No. I dont.42
And here at last is the logical extension of Chigurh and Bell’s worldviews. They ultimately
have the same conception of God. For the former, God is a being bound by His own and unable
to make exceptions. In Chigurh’s formulation, wherein he models himself on God in his
inability to break his words, he indicates that a promise made even to a dead person is still a
promise. “…my word is not dead. Nothing can change that.”43 While Chigurh finds it
convenient, or “useful,” as he says, to adopt this God-like view of the world in a way that
overlooks the role his own will plays in the proceedings, his logic holds. When Carla Jean Moss,
pleading for her life, tells him that he does not have to kill her, he responds that his way of life
“doesnt allow for special cases. A coin toss perhaps.”44 His entry into her life has brought with
it her demise and there is no other possible outcome. He concludes his argument:
You can say things could have turned out differently. That they could have been some
other way. But what does that mean? They are not some other way. They are this way.
You’re asking me to second say the world. Do you see?45
According to Chigurh’s code, just as God cannot unwrite or rewrite the rules of the world,
Chigurh cannot unmake his promise. In this vision, God is held to a very high standard; the
highest, in fact. By endowing humanity with free will, He has sentenced himself to watch the
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bloody spectacle of human history repeat itself generation after generation because He cannot
alter His own path.
Bell’s vision of God is ultimately the same. In his agreement with Uncle Ellis about
whether or not God can stop the perceived collapse of civilization, Bell affirms a vision of God
in which He cannot intervene, though he suffers the knowledge of what is happening. In Bell’s
vision, like Chigurh’s, God cannot break his own word, his own oath. Thus, while both
characters have explicitly compared themselves to God in the novel, it is ultimately only Chigurh
who is prepared to commit fully to the role. Bell’s failure to uphold his role as sheriff and
shepherd his children to safety follows his earlier failure to keep his “blood oath” to look after
his men during the war.46 In both instances of Bell’s failure, he has been forced to contend with
overwhelming circumstances and reckon his own best course without divine omniscience,
omnipotence, or assistance. Ultimately he fails to achieve the god-like status he may have
aspired to, but in doing so he retains his humanity. His condition, therefore, can be seen one of
tragic suffering. In this view,
It follows that the noblest ethic of calculation cannot encompass death. When faced with
death, or rather when faced with a choice between death with honor and survival with
ignominy, it is impossible to ascertain an Aristotelian mean. The situation itself admits
of nothing but extremes. The truly tragic situation is always of this nature; it is almost by
definition a case in which the ethic of calculation admits insufficiency.47
Bell’s insufficiency, then, marks him out as human. Chigurh’s ambition to transcend this state
and achieve for himself some plane above the lot of man requires him to risk nothing in the way
of his own vulnerability to fate and chance. In his final appearance in the novel, he is wounded
in a car wreck he simply fails to see coming, proving, if only partially, his own mortality.
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Interestingly, Jay Ellis sees in Bell a vision of God in McCarthy’s fiction. His concerns
as sheriff mimic those of God in the book of Jeremiah. First, he fails to protect his people from a
foreign enemy (Mexican drug cartels). Second, he begins to mistrust his own people—
schoolkids are willing to buy the dope. Finally, Ellis contends that in Bell’s patriarchal tone
throughout the novel, the reader can see a vision in which the world for both of them as become
a country unwelcome to old men:
Bell is a model for the god in McCarthy’s philosophy: a slightly doddering figure old
before his time, worried first about the evil from without the space he keeps for his
people, but then secondly worried about the evil taken into that space, and ultimately
worried that, quite apart from whatever evil might exist outside that space, his people
have lost their way—they have forgotten to listen to him. But it also the case that he may
have forgotten how to speak to them. Thus the third, inmost worry of God and Bell is
that their children have given up their acknowledgement of what is good and righteous
because of some failure on the part of God or Bell; the parent ultimately owns all the
failures of the child.48
These tragic and prophetic interpretations of Bell are consistent with his overall sense of
resignation and sadness toward the civilization collapse he believes he witnesses. His retirement
manifests his recognition of the failure of the civil institutions of justice, and of law enforcement
to keep the people safe. Further, by expressing his view that the cultural fabric of society is
fraying, Bell no longer feels confident that he understands the people he has been elected to
serve, reminding an impertinent reporter that “you cant have a dope business without dopers.”49
Frustrated and fearful, he walks away from his thirty-nine-year career a defeated man. But this is
not the not the novel’s final scene.
In Bell’s final monologue, he talks at length about his father. He concludes the
monologue by sharing the two dreams he had about his father after he died. The first one is brief
and poorly remembered. The second is worth quoting at length.
48
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…it was like like we was both back in older times and I was on horseback goin through
this pass in the mountains. It was cold and there was snow on the ground and he rode
past me and kept on goin. Never said nothing. He just rode on past and he had this
blanket wrapped around him and he had his head down and when he rode past I seen he
was carryin fire in a horn the way people used to do and I could see the horn from the
light inside of it. About the color of the moon. And in the dream I knew that he was goin
on ahead and that he was fixin to make a fire somewhere out there in all that dark and all
that cold and I knew that whenever I got there he would be there. And then I woke up.50
Here Bell invokes a theme expressing the most hopeful possibility for ordering the universe
found in all of McCarthy’s fiction. The carried fire, here appearing in a dream, symbolizes the
unattainable something that, while lying beyond human apprehension in the immanent sphere,
projects hope for its continued existence in the future. Important to understanding the nature of
this symbol is the observation that it is carried by his father. While the relationship between
fathers and sons is a major motif throughout all of McCarthy’s work, the of idea of succession—
of ineluctable things of value passed by the older generation to the new in hopes of their
survival—comes to the fore in his most recent two novels. As will be shown below in my
analysis of The Road, this symbol comes to stand for the final promethean spark, the last hope of
divine order on earth, amid the ravages of apocalypse. In the road, McCarthy presents his most
nightmarish reality to date.
While this nightmare scenario of humanity’s final collapse exceeds any precedent in
McCarthy’s work, it is not altogether unanticipated. The decimation of nature, and of people
depicted in Blood Meridian stands as an antecedent. The events of The Road are a logical
extension: a world, “cold and growing colder,” in which chaos and depravity reach their ultimate
climax. A reader moving sequentially through McCarthy’s corpus might naturally anticipate the
final triumph of existential nihilism; the final coffin nail of hope for civilization. And yet, not so.
If anything, The Road stands apart from the rest of McCarthy’s corpus. It is, ultimately,
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McCarthy’s most hopeful work to date, but it is a hope borne of the most limited of all
circumstances. In such a world as we find in The Road, the lingering flame of hope—the
father’s tragic love for his son and the commitment this requires of him—establishes the last,
best principle of order for all humanity to be found in all McCarthy’s work.

A thing that even death cannot undo: The Road
Fittingly, The Road, published to great acclaim in 2006, is yet another of McCarthy’s
journey novels. A father and his son, “each the other’s world entire,” journey through a postapocalyptic nightmare world.51 Their journey is necessitated by an increasingly harsh climate,
and the fact that the man, as he is called throughout the novel, is dying. This landscape, an
“ashen scabland,” is a remnant of the former, or, “late world,” world, most likely some version
of contemporary America, though this is never made clear.52 Whatever the apocalyptic scenario,
global nuclear holocaust, meteorite or asteroid strike, or some other cataclysm, the damage is
apparently global and irreversible. In Steven Frye’s analysis:
The language as articulated seems selected for its ambiguity, allowing for both
possibilities (natural or manmade disaster), which have vastly different implications. A
nuclear holocaust would be the result of human evil, and the meteor or asteroid the
outcome of natural evil and the destructive capacity of the universe broadly construed.
This blending suggests perhaps that the two are complicated and inseparable.53
The text offers few details, but they are suggestive: “The clocks stopped at 1:17. A long shear of
light and then a series of low concussions.”54 The man and his wife, pregnant at the time with
their child, survive by virtue of the man’s instincts for survival. Other survivors are few. Many
died in their cars and are encountered in the ruins of a city as “incinerate corpses shrunk to the
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size of a child and propped on the bare springs of the seats. Ten thousand dreams ensepulchered
within their crozzled hearts.”55 Northern cities have been abandoned, “looted and exhausted,”
and the refugees survive with varying degrees of success.56 But the general collapse of
civilization is not far behind:
Within a year there were fires on the ridges and deranged chanting. The screams of the
murdered. By day the dead impaled on spikes on the road. What had they done? He
thought that in the history of the world it might even be that there was more punishment
than crime but he took small comfort from it.57
After this, the world is largely empty of people and what people there are the father and
son refer to as “the bad guys.”58 The nameless “bloodcults” are the remaining loose bands of
society, armies of men carrying bludgeons and lances, who march four abreast and “all wearing
scarves at their necks. . . . Red or orange, as close to red as they could find.”59
Behind them came wagons drawn by slaves in harness and piled with goods of war and
after that the women, perhaps a dozen in number, some of the them pregnant, and lastly a
supplementary consort of catamites illclothed against the cold and fitted in dogcollars and
yoked each to each.60
Against all hope, and facing his own death from illness, the father sets out south in effort to find
safety for the boy. He promises him that they will find “the good guys” repeatedly throughout
the novel. The distinguishing characteristic between these two groups constitutes the final
choice. The good guys do not cave into the final necessity: they refuse to become cannibals.
Confronting such horror, the man feels ill-equipped to carry his enormous burden all
alone. His wife has already made her consolation, opting to take her own life rather than face the
unspeakable. With the child still a toddler, she reaches her limit. On the last night of her life the
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couple argues. Calling his attention to the fact that they only have two bullets left in the gun, she
tells him she has made her decision and tells him why his inability to follow her is irresponsible.
She speaks:
Sooner or later they will catch us and they will kill us. They will rape me. They’ll rape
him. They are going to rape us and kill us and eat us and you wont face it. You’d rather
wait for it to happen. But I cant. . . . Maybe you’ll be good at this. I doubt it, but who
knows. The one thing I can tell you is that you wont survive for yourself.61
She uses a flake of obsidian to take her own life, saving the man the two remaining bullets. She
does not say goodbye to the child. Saying she has decided to take death as her new lover she
wishes him well and is gone, “and the coldness of it was her final gift.”62 And while the man is
determined to carry on alone, he has no true sense of hope himself. He can’t imagine the two of
them being lucky beyond controlling the circumstances of their deaths. Even if his wife was
right, “that the boy was all that stood between him and death,” he cannot take that final step.63
As long as the boy lives, the man cannot die and abandon him. Nor can he take the boy’s life,
even when it appears for a moment he will have no other choice. They are stuck in a sort of
Samuel Beckett-esque absurdity, wherein life is the thing most dreaded, and death the thing that
cannot be embraced. Having acknowledged the sacredness of his pledge, he struggles not to
resent the boy for dooming him to life and all the suffering, privation and fear it entails. “If only
my heart were stone.”64 While they live, the man is committed to preventing the boy from
falling into the hands of the bad guys. He will not let anyone touch him and is prepared to kill to
keep this pledge.
Amid the flimsiest of circumstances, the man claims agency for himself unto death, and
in doing so, acknowledges his transcendent purpose. “He knew only that the child was his
61
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warrant. He said: If he is not the word of God God never spoke.”65 He sees the world and his lot
in it as a great, perhaps the greatest of all injustice. His private thoughts (or speeches, we are
never sure) are lamentations directed to the god who has abandoned him: “Are you there? he
whispered. Will I see you at last? Have you a neck by which to throttle you? Have you a heart?
Damn you eternally have you a soul? Oh God, he whispered. Oh God.”66 What answer he
receives is the great darkness and silence of the world and the assurance that each day will be
colder than the last: “barren, silent, godless.”67
Among the most unaccountable things confronting the man in this new world, perhaps
none is more spectacular than the boy himself. Born after the cataclysm, the boy has never
known any other world. “Always so deliberate, hardly surprised by the most outlandish advents.
A creation perfectly evolved to meet its own end.”68 Having only faint memory of his mother,
his father is the only person to whom he has ever spoken. This journey and its travails are the
sum total of his life’s experience. And the child is not always the most willing travel companion.
He complains constantly of cold, of hunger, of wanting to stop. He mentions wanting to be with
his mother, and he knows where she has gone. He is constantly fearful, and the man cannot
leave him alone, even in moments in which their survival may depend upon it. He needs
constant reassurance and the man often is forced to bend the truth to accommodate this, if not lie
outright. Yet for all the poverty of their circumstances the child insists upon a moral code of
truth, of sharing, and of keeping promises between them. This innate sense of right will not be
compromised, however impractical. When the father hands him a cup of cocoa, their last and
perhaps the last on earth, the boy objects that he has not poured any for himself. Instead of the
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expected five-year-old greediness, the boy insists that they must share. It is a promised part of
their code. “If you break little promises you’ll break big ones. That’s what you said.”69
Even more surprising is the boy’s unswerving benevolence toward others. In a world
where nothing grows, scrounged cans of food are all the sustenance available. When the pair
encounters a solitary old man limping down the road, a typical McCarthy mystic who calls
himself “Ely,” the boy insists they share some of their food with him even though they have none
to spare. Ely, for his part, is dumbfounded, but he takes the food. When the man says he should
thank the boy because he would not have been so generous, Ely replies that he would not have
shared his food either, had he any, but asks if it will hurt the boy’s feelings. The man responds:
No. That’s not why he did it.
Why did he do it?
He looked over at the boy and he looked at the old man. You wouldnt understand, he
said. I’m not sure I do.70
The father sees in his son a glimmer of something he thinks may have been lost in the world
forever. The boy’s concern for others, his insistence that the two of them continually affirm their
status as “the good guys,” for now and for always, becomes apparent in this exchange and
develops over the later stages of their journey.
Following them, the reader becomes increasingly aware of the possibility that their
journey is as much or more a metaphysical one as a geographical one. Confronting a thief who
has stolen their food, clothes, and blankets, the father orders the man to strip naked before them
and leaves, even taking the man’s shoes. The child is distraught. He complains that the man
they’ve accosted was hungry and scared. The man responds that he is going to die. The child
cannot comprehend this and the man loses his patience: “I’m scared, he said. Do you
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understand? I’m scared.” In his moment of anger, he snaps at the boy: “You’re not the one who
has to worry about everything.” And it is here that the boy’s response sets the tone for the
duration of their relationship. In a manner reminiscent of Christ’s response to his mother’s
objection when he goes to the temple to speak to the learned men (Luke 2:49-52), the boy is
immovable. “Yes I am, he said. I am the one.”71 The boy hints here at knowing something
about the future that has never been spoken between them—that he will ultimately carry the
mantle of responsibility for all that has been done for his survival, and everything that is to come.
The odds of the man and the boy surviving as long as they have or making it as far as
they do cannot be attributed merely to luck or even skill. They buoy their spirits repeatedly with
small reaffirmations of their code and their mission. The boy continually seeks to reaffirm
whether the two are, after all, “the good guys.” Further, the two have a sort of mantra they
continually repeat between them “We are carrying the fire.”72 The fire in question is never
explained by either character. What is known is that they are seeking other “good guys” and the
father assures his son they are out there and that, when they find them, they too will be carrying
the fire. They agree that to find these people they must be vigilant and to this end the father
increasingly empowers the boy to make decisions, and to take on greater responsibility for
navigating their way. He has good reason for this.
As their journey progresses and the man becomes increasingly weak, conversations
between he and the boy become increasingly difficult to disentangle. Shifts between third and
first person in the narrative become more and more difficult to decipher. But a pattern emerges.
In a manner reminiscent of phrasing found in Blood Meridian and certain sequences found in
The Border Trilogy, McCarthy introduces the idea of succession in The Road, of a line of fathers
71
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and sons stretching back through time and sitting in judgement on the present. Whereas the
earlier works portray this judgement in a largely negative sense in The Road, perhaps due to the
uniquely brutal circumstances attending the man in his fight to protect his son, they are more
forgiving. I quote them here in series.
He kicked holed in the sand for the boy’s hips and shoulders where he would sleep and
he sat holding him while he tousled his hair before the fire to dry it. All of this like some
ancient anointing. So be it. Evoke the forms. Where you’ve nothing else construct
ceremonies out of the air and breathe upon them.73
Do you think that your fathers are watching? That they weigh you in their ledgerbook?
Against what? There is no book and your fathers are dead in the ground.74
He rose and built back the fire and sat beside the boy and pulled the blankets over him
and brushed back his filthy hair. I think maybe they are watching, he said. They are
watching for a thing that even death cannot undo and if they do not see it they will turn
away from us and they will not come back.75
He lay watching the boy at the fire. He wanted to be able to see. Look around you, he
said. There is no prophet in the earth’s long chronicle who’s not honored here today.
Whatever form you spoke of you were right.76
What is distinctive about this series of passages is not simply the interruption of the narrative
voice with the voice of the man, but also a developing theme. For the man, one of his great tasks
as a parent is to try to be both a guardian and a mentor. How does one educate a child in this
world? The truths of the old world, complete with its “old stories of courage and justice,” have
little meaning here.77 And yet, perhaps they do. The “fathers”—watching for some sign that all
good has not gone out of the world—do not completely withdraw. In the father’s determination
to provide his son with a reason to endure, he makes a spiritual connection with the transcendent.

73

Ibid., 74.
Ibid., 196.
75
Ibid., 210.
76
Ibid., 277.
77
Ibid., 41.
74

221

And perhaps in doing so he establishes a means of transcendence for his son once he has gone
on.
In a manner very similar to that presented in No Country for Old Men, the efforts of the
father to fill his son with hope and a will to endure in The Road present the reader with a sort of
existential philosophy for a world in which God observes, but cannot intervene in human affairs.
In this sense, God comes to stand as a witness. The narrative never makes clear whether God is
represented here as one of the “fathers” or not. Perhaps these are merely the lesser “prophets”
mentioned above. If so, then they would correspond very directly to the dream of Ed Tom Bell
at the conclusion of No Country for Old Men, in which the assistance of the ancestors becomes a
mysterious image of hope. In the final scenes of The Road, the father knows he is near death and
pulls the boy to him to give him his final instructions:
You have to carry the fire.
I don’t know how to.
Yes you do.
Is it real? The fire?
Yes it is.
Where is it? I don’t know where it is.
Yes you do. It’s inside you. It was always there. I can see it. . . . You’re the best
guy. You always were. If I’m not here you can still talk to me. You can talk to you.
You’ll see.78
Once again the image of the closely held sacred fire being passed from fathers to sons invokes
McCarthy’s most hopeful theme: a transcendent order that cannot be extinguished by the ravages
of the dying world. In McCarthy’s world, justice is never upheld by the intervention of divine
powers. The carried fire is fragile and its journey perilous. Though always in danger, it remains
all that stand between mankind and the dark and cold of the world.
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Conclusion

The political and philosophical resonance in McCarthy’s philosophy of narrative is
inherent. At its core, McCarthy’s entire narrative enterprise begins with the most basic of
questions: Who is man? To explore this question McCarthy creates worlds of fiction in which
man is generally the least known aspect of the landscape. His characters frequently “threaten to
become eerily unselfconscious” due to their lack of transparency.1 Little is discernible in them
as to their intellect, reason, or motive. As Bell states, “we remain as mystified and as suspended
as they are in a seemingly perpetual hermeneutic adventure.”2 Thus, to attempt generalization in
a political analysis of McCarthy’s novels one must deal with a vision of man in which very little
information is available in the way of emphatic statements or interior monologues on the part of
his characters. This problem is further complicated by the nature of his impersonal narrative
voice. The reader is presented with a field of vision that is acutely precise, detailing mundane
human acts of work with exacting specificity in a baroque and highly technical vocabulary. And
yet, for all the care lavished on the direct narrator’s presentation of how? in the novels, the
question of why? remains “tantalizingly obscure.”3 Thus, to approach an answer to the question
of Who is man? in McCarthy’s fiction, it becomes necessary to work backward from the
available data. Thus, I opened this dissertation with the guiding question of What does man do?
in McCarthy’s novels. In the broad scope of McCarthy’s corpus, the most fundamental answer
to this question is: He tells stories.
Stories and storytelling are signature features in all McCarthy’s works. The defining
structures of individual and communal existence are revealed largely in anecdote. And while the
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meanings of these tales within the narrative often go unremarked by the character hearing them
(and perhaps even the character telling them), they often have the quality of prophetic utterance,
and McCarthy’s reader is right to suspect an attempt to express some deep and mystic truth about
the world beyond the text. The stories within McCarthy’s texts consistently hint at the existence
of some other order in the world, a realm beyond what is known or even knowable to the
characters in any specific work. And because McCarthy’s novels are so typically devoid of any
definitive representations of the state, of formal institutions, or of the legitimate exercise of
justice, it is to this hinted at other realm that one must turn to make conclusions regarding the
political vision of McCarthy’s texts. In it, and only it, perhaps, can one come to some
conclusions regarding the most pervasive themes found in all of McCarthy’s work: the
omnipresent threat of irrational and nihilistic violence, and the disorienting boundlessness of
human freedom unconstrained by traditional norms. Unifying all of these considerations is the
increasing significance in McCarthy’s more recent works of the idea of the one tale that is the
tale of all. McCarthy’s understanding of man as a narrative being begins to crystalize in a
mythic sublimation of man and story, in which the individuality of a specific man at any certain
place or time converges with a larger presence: one man becoming a symbolic avatar of all men,
and his story, such as it is, with the story, which is universal.
Having established that narrative is the central theme of McCarthy’s political vision, I
began my analysis by articulating a set of foundational principles for reading McCarthy
politically. In an effort to explain the peculiarities of style and aesthetics that make McCarthy’s
writing so distinctive, my first chapter examines his first three novels across a set of prominent
themes. The Orchard Keeper, McCarthy’s first published novel, offers a vision of time in which
the reader is kept in a state of uncertainty regarding the temporal sequence of events. Distortion,
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as I term it, expresses this idea. McCarthy’s fiction displays an omnipresent concern for memory
in the shaping of reality in human experience. From this, his earliest novel, in which we find the
protagonist reflecting on a formative period in his life, McCarthy is consistent in his assertion
that that which is “true,” in a human sense, can only be perceived and expressed in the context of
memory and the medium of story. The claims of the past on the present are a powerful check on
John Wesley Rattner’s freedom of choice. In The Orchard Keeper, McCarthy’s representation
of the gap in the cemetery fence provides a visual metaphor to express the symbolic wrenching
apart of the continuity of events that precede John Wesley’s moment of praxis. Deciding that he
“no longer cared to tell which things were real and which dreamt,” John Wesley turns away from
the gravestone on which his family name is inscribed, and heads out to the western road and
begin his journey.4
In a manner similar to The Orchard Keeper’s distortion of time, McCarthy’s second
novel, Outer Dark, engages in a similar reimagining of space. Here, the parallel journeys of its
dual protagonists, the siblings Culla and Rinthy Holme, are presented in a manner that leaves the
reader as uncertain as to their location or destination as they appear to be. Displacement
signifies the manner in which McCarthy uses particular flora and fauna, regional dialect, and a
narrative style replete with biblical and mythic overtones, to establish an allegorical space for his
characters. Thus, what might appear to be a chronical of a person’s encounters on a journey on a
specific road, in a specific region, becomes a mythic exploration of the self’s movement through
a morally charged—though altogether mysterious—landscape.
In Child of God, McCarthy’s third published novel, the triad of rules for reading
McCarthy is completed with an examination of empathy. The novel’s protagonist, Lester
Ballard, is a wholly unlovable individual, whose dark sexual proclivities and utter rejection by
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the larger community raise extreme difficulties for the reader to identify, let alone empathize
with a protagonist in any traditional sense. The brutish deeds and lack of reflection that surround
so many of McCarthy’s characters are used intentionally to create a sense of discomfort,
challenging the established norms of morality and ethics. It is important to note, however, that
this is not an effort on McCarthy’s part to reconstitute a new foundation for morality. Rather, it
is a part of a larger philosophical enterprise, visible in all his works, to challenge the dominant
modes of perception and judgement, and subtly move his reader to reconsider his or her
suppositions regarding questions of ontology and epistemology. The problematics surrounding
the position of man in the world are best analyzed, then, from the perspective of the non-human
in his fiction.
The strange alterity of the natural world confronts the horizon of human perspective with
a frightening possibility regarding its perceived uniqueness. McCarthy creates a fictional
landscape both familiar and strange in all his novels, causing his reader to contemplate the eerie
possibility that the world is much more hostile and chaotic than one might think. Nowhere is this
more vividly displayed than in Blood Meridian. The desert terrain upon which his nameless
protagonist joins his fellow scalphunters in enacting a grotesque enterprise of genocide is of a
piece with the orgies of violence found throughout. The “desert absolute” of the novel’s setting
is endowed with certain characteristics, paralleling the moral ambivalence of its characters.5 It is
a world governed purely by force and indifference, and it does not have the capacity to care. The
natural laws of chaotic force and destruction that govern the events of the novel throw a pale
light on any attempts to constrain them through the use of human art. So much of what is taken
as natural by the characters in the novel: the legibility of the terrain, the pacification of aboriginal
violence through “legitimate” allocation of force by the sovereign state, the ethos of Manifest
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Destiny, becomes spurious. The total lack of preference for right or good is visible in this world,
and the novel manages to elevate this nihilistic indifference to operatic and apocalyptic levels.
This “optical democracy” of the human and nonhuman spheres creates a strong impression for
the reader that what can be known by human perception or reason is ultimately a fleeting
anomaly of consciousness and of no importance at all. The demonic Judge Holden argues
persuasively that, despite man’s deeply held desire to find some mystery in the world that could,
by its existence, hold open the possibility of the divine, “the mystery is that there is no
mystery.”6 And yet, for all the force of his argument, and the support it finds in the gang’s
bloody deeds notwithstanding, one final mystery remains, and this is found in the kid’s ultimate
failure to lose his humanity.
Blood Meridian’s indictment of human reason as a legacy of enlightenment philosophy
charted to its logical conclusion is most clearly visible in its presentation of history. Using actual
historical events as the subject matter of the novel enables McCarthy to create an interesting
dialectic between that which has actually happened, and that which has been created by
mythopoesis. Finding a cast-off piece of armor from the Spanish Conquests, the Judge sketches
it in his book and then tosses the artifact into the fire. In this, I find an allegory for McCarthy’s
view of history and myth: that every representation of the past is, to some extent, a destruction of
it. To create a world with language is an inherently violent act, because what is, or what was, is
replaced by its representation. And this is made all the more problematic by the contemporary
regard for “objective” historical facts. If we see the events of the past shaping the present and
discern in these a motive or a movement—something we might call “progress”—we lose sight of
the inherent limitations of our horizon. But it would be a misreading of Blood Meridian to
conclude that its philosophical vision calls us to reject any notions of moral progress, siding with
6

Ibid., 262.

227

Judge Holden’s Nietzschean position on morality: as an “invention of mankind for the
disenfranchisement of the powerful in favor of the weak.”7 However compelling its villain, the
notion that the universe is all chaos and force, while persuasive, is not its final statement.
Whether in the words of its characters or the voice of its omniscient narrator, Blood
Meridian is replete with references to the necessity of a witness in substantiating the verity of
any interaction between two impersonal “vectors,” or independent human agents. Whether in the
context of a clash in the desert, in which “the hearts and enterprise of one small nation have been
swallowed up and carried off by another,” or a verbal dispute between two “principals,”
contesting ownership a matter of property, the outcome of any exchange can only legitimated by
the testimony of some uninterested third party, or witness. The text of Blood Meridian tends to
express this notion in either legal verbiage or terms familiar to the philosophic school of
phenomenology. In later works, however, the idea of witnessing is increasingly endowed with
moral and spiritual significance. In The Crossing, witnessing comes to represent a narrative
exchange: the interaction between speaker and hearer, a telling and retelling of a story in which
meaning and value are imperfectly transmitted ad infinitum. This formulation constitutes a
matured version of McCarthy’s concept of narrative, in which the image of the solitary man
journeying down a road is expanded to include a moral and ethical dimension when he
encounters another. In a world as violent as McCarthy’s, one might well expect that the outcome
of such an encounter would inevitably result in one party’s killing of the other simply for his
being there, but this would be incorrect. McCarthy’s later fiction displays an increasing concern
for those areas of human existence that can transcend the horizon of mortality.
The formulation of interpolated tales-within-tales becomes an essential component of the
human experience in The Border Trilogy. In The Crossing, the trilogy’s second work, these are
7
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seen to constitute a form of expressing the human relationship to the Divine. In the midst of a
collapsed church in the Mexican village of Huisiachepic, Billy Parham encounters an anchorite
who, in telling him the tale of another man, a pensioner who had gone to another fallen church in
another Mexican town, Caborca, to dare God to kill him. In this story, the heretic encounters a
priest, “both of them heretics to the bone.”8 The heretic refuses to convert and the priest’s mind
“had become clouded by the illusion of its proximity to God.”9 In the course of hearing the
pensioner’s tale, in which the act of witnessing figures prominently, the interconnectedness of all
lives and that life itself is in fact a story.10
In the telling and retelling of stories, or witnessing the journeys of others and then
passing on what has been seen, the solipsism of the lone man on a journey becomes a tapestry of
words and flesh, and this, Billy is told, is the fabric of the world. “Ultimately every man’s path
is every other’s. There are no separate journeys for there are no separate men to make them. All
men are one and there is no other tale to tell.”11 As for the relationship between the immanent
sphere and that of the Divine, this scene and others found throughout The Border Trilogy present
a vision of God “weaving the world” and much removed from the affairs of men.12 “A God who
seemed a slave to his own selfordained duties. A God with a fathomless capacity to bend all to
an inscrutable purpose. Not chaos itself lay outside of that matrix.”13 It is in this telling and
retelling of stories, of witnessing and being witnessed by others, that McCarthy’s heretofore
bleak vision begins to entertain a notion of hope, albeit a very precarious one. The spiritual
imperative to engage in this matrix, to accept that all interactions are moral and that the other is
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not in fact a stranger, but one’s brother, is an expression of McCarthy’s tragic understanding of
the human condition.
In the world of McCarthy’s fiction, the horizon of the gods remains an inscrutable and
capricious mystery. The romantic attachment to freedom of movement and moral autonomy
sought by his cowboy protagonists in The Border Trilogy is constantly circumscribed by the
vicissitudes of fate. The image of the border itself carries with it an implied sense of
transgression, in which the outcome of any choice has consequences far exceeding the
considerations of the moment, and they are often terrifyingly violent. In McCarthy’s
unsentimental vision, justice is seldom aligned with virtue. In pursuing the objects of their
desire, his protagonists feel themselves protected by a blanket of good intention and basic
decency, but this armor proves inadequate to shield them when they cross over into the “other”
world represented by Mexico. Here their expectations of finding a truly authentic experience of
natural freedom is thwarted by a worldview that harbors no notion of right, and no sense of law
beyond kill or be killed. The lawless frontier becomes less a proving ground for the will as a
battleground for the soul.
Of all McCarthy’s novels, All the Pretty Horses is perhaps the most readily classified as a
work of genre fiction. Its teenaged protagonist, John Grady Cole, fits readily into the mold of the
romantic hero, a certified cowboy in a story that features many of the classic tropes of the
American Western. It is fitting, then, to examine McCarthy’s take on heroism for insights into
the political concept of agency. As a romantic hero, John Grady is easily one of McCarthy’s
most sympathetic characters. His virtue inheres in his sincerity, his instinctive desire to seek out
and protect innocence, and his inability to compromise with anything he perceives as false, even
unto death.
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What he loved in horses was what he loved in men, the blood and the heat of the blood
that ran them. All his reverence and all his fondness and all the leanings of his life were
for the ardenthearted and they would always be so and never be otherwise.14
His journey to Mexico is motivated by his dissatisfaction over his family’s changing
circumstances. His desire to reclaim for himself the free life of the cowboy leads him to run
away to Mexico, pursuing of a vision of freedom defined by an absence of conventional restraint.
What he finds in Mexico, however, is a world in which he does not ultimately belong. While
John Grady is able to taste the promise of this other, better world momentarily in his brief
romance with Alejandra, he fails to recognize that in doing so, he has crossed a line. And it is
here that All the Pretty Horses loses much of its apparent affinity for the tradition of the western
and reveals instead its affinities for classical tragedy. Almost instantly, the splendid natural
beauty of the hacienda is replaced by the brutal flatness of the desert and this is equally true at
the level of politics and philosophy. While the choices that lead John Grady to the Saltillo prison
may not have been obvious to him at the time, they were made nonetheless. Everything that
follows, whether described by the interplay of chance and fate in the deterministic philosophy of
the Dueña Alfonsa, or the more gnostic pronouncements of the prison kingpin, Pérez, who
declares “Evil is a true thing in Mexico. It goes about on its own legs. Maybe someday it will
come to visit you. Maybe it already has,” reveals that the romantic pursuit of individual
autonomy will be thwarted by a world that insists on being what it is.15 This is a world intent on
trying to break the courageous, and willing to kill those who will not bend or break. John Grady
will not bend, but in this refusal displays a form of tragic heroism. In McCarthy’s world, agency
is difficult to perceive. The choice of resistance is as close to heroic action as McCarthy’s
chaotic universe will permit. Nevertheless, the recognition of this necessity to resist is shown to
14
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be all the more meaningful for what it costs. And this faint glimmer of hope, always imperiled,
comes to symbolize the hope of order amidst chaos in the world of McCarthy’s fiction.
Throughout all of his fiction, but especially in No Country for Old Men and The Road,
McCarthy teases the issue of order itself, though never eclipsing the classical formulations of
right order or the good life. The lack of any possibility for eudaimonia seems telling in this
regard. There appears to be no better life possible for men—but this question is entertained
again and again throughout all of McCarthy’s later fiction, usually from the mouths of solitary
oracles and storytellers. Justice in McCarthy’s world begins as the omnipresent concern for
naming responsibility. This theme, found throughout his early fiction, and on into The Border
Trilogy, is the verdict pronounced on his journeying (or fleeing) protagonists by predatory agents
of retribution. They demand an accounting, and their knowledge of evil is near omniscient. As a
principle of order in McCarthy’s fiction, justice cannot be confined to strict or essentialist
definitions. The cosmos of McCarthy’s fiction depicts world-immanent justice meted out in the
most extreme terms, violence and death from without is the end result for almost every case of
internal evil. The hope for a more humane (one might say “civilized”) order in McCarthy’s
fiction comes from beyond the immanent sphere in the form of a precarious lamp: a fire carried
forward into the dark and cold with only the frailest chance of survival.
The humane world of McCarthy’s fiction, ultimately, is doomed. These are the things we
leave behind: inscrutable cave paintings, a few buildings, many of our assumptions about human
society and a structured ordered whole in the cosmos. Whether our intentions are swallowed up
in the “desert absolute” of the Southwestern border country, or in the “spectral waste” of a
swamp somewhere in the old Confederacy, “a faintly smoking garden of the dead,” matters
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little.16 McCarthy uses these “landscapes of the damned” to impart a sense of the utter
inconsequentiality of human existence, but in doing so he creates a vacuum into which solitary
acts of decency shine like torch fire. McCarthy offers no solutions for salvation and thus the rare
glimpses of hope and redemption he offers stand forward with luminous intensity.
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